Anguel S. Stefanov

This volume contains original contributions made at the sixth session of the Minkowski Institute international conference "Nature and Ontology of Spacetime." It continues the ambition of debating open ontological and epistemological problems in the philosophy and physics of spacetime. In this volume, topics covered include the reality of Minkowski spacetime ontology, the nature of time, quantum gravitation, inertia and relativistic phenomena, as well as aspects of the mathematical structure of the special and general theory of relativity. The volume will be of interest to students in philosophy of science, researchers in spacetime physics, and to any reader who wants to study contemporary issues and debates in modern philosophy and physics.

My aim in this paper is to suggest a new outlook concerning the nature of Zeno’s paradoxes. The attention is directed towards the three famous paradoxes known as “Dichotomy,” “Achilles and the Tortoise,” and “The Arrow.” An analysis of the paradigmatic proposals for a solution shows that an adequate solution has not yet been reached. An answer is provided instead to the question “How Zeno’s paradoxes emerge in their quality of aporiae?,” that is to say in their quality of impasses, of problem situations without an exit, what is the original meaning of the Greek word “aporia.” It is my claim that this is the correct rational approach for solving these conceptual puzzles. In other words, I am not proposing formal solutions by criticizing and/or altering their premises assuming the continuous or discrete nature of space and time, but I try to draw the philosophical attention to the way we possess the phenomenon of motion as a result of the perception of space-time in human experience.

How can we ever judge about the truth of a scientific theory? Ostensibly it seems to be no problems concerning such a judgement. Each scientific theory is expressed by a set of statements, formulated in a definite language; and we know, in principle, to ascertain whether a sentence is true or false, If we take any formula, say in the first order predicate calculus, no matter how complex, and if we know its interpretation, i.e. the appropriate finite domain of individuals, functions, and truth values of the atoms entering the formula, then we immediately come to know whether our formula is true or false. It is admitted by analogy, that if we come to know the truth values of the basic theory statements, then we can judge if a given theory is true or false. It can be shown, however, that there exists no similar reliable prescription [1]. Let me comment on this in some more detail

The book is engaged with the argumentation of original theses, as well as with putting forward theoretical reconstructions, which provide a new outlook at Kant's philosophical legacy concerning his conceptions of space and time, both pre-critical and critical (transcendental). The claim is defended that both in his first and in his last pre-critical work Kant has enunciated ideas,which have later proved to be of significance for the formation of contemporary physical and cosmological theories. Such is the idea about the relation between geometry and physics, as well as the one about the origin of incongruent counterparts. The latter could be looked upon as a proto-explanation of the breaking of mirror symmetry. It is also argued that traditional paradigmatic criticisms of Kant's transcendental conception of space and time stem out of misunderstandings, underpinned by philosophers and scientists who are visible figures in their respective cultural (and ideological) circles. The origin of familiar paradoxes connected with space and time, for instance with the notion of a flowing time, is found to be grounded in the classical conceptualization of space and time as separate autonomous entities. Because of its thematic content the book can attract the attention of a wide reading public: professional philosophers and scientists dealing both with scholarly research and teaching, students of philosophy and of history of science, and intellectuals concerned with seeking and explicating relations between philosophy and science.

My aims here are, firstly, to suggest a minor amendment to R. I. G. Hughes’ DDI account of modeling, so that it could be viewed as a plausible epistemological “model” of how scientific models represent and secondly, to distinguish between two epistemological kinds of models that I call “descriptive” and “constitutive”. This aim is achieved by criticizing Michael Weisberg’s distinction between models and abstract direct representations and by following, at the same time, his own methodological approach for such a distinction.

Why is quantum theory baneful to realism? The most widespread factor is that it is at odds with causality. There are, however, two other principal reasons. The first involves the methodological commitments of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. The other reason relies on Bell's theorem, which denies the possibility of local hidden variables. Both of these reasons are considered and the possibility of a non-classical model of the quantum object is examined. The question in the title is then answered in the negative.

The aim of this paper is to suggest a new interpretation to the Gettier problem by showing that the standard JTB definition of knowledge is not epistemologically incomplete, being at the same time formally incomplete. The Gettier problem is shown to emerge through the implicit self-application of the JTB definition of knowledge to prove its own incompleteness. A conclusion is drawn, which runs counter to the traditional view that the problem necessarily requires a conceptual amendment of the standard defi nition, in spite of the formal incompleteness of the latter. The Gettier problem is construed to be related to the ancient Meno problem within a contemporary justifi cational discourse.

Time travel is a theme that provokes scientific curiosity, as well as philosophical speculation. The problems it raises, however, are being tackled by science fiction only, and are still not resolved by science either theoretically, or practically. My aim here is, firstly, to present some curious facts about time travel and to have a look at the nature of different ontological constraints confronting time travel; secondly, to outline three cases for which time travel might be meaningfully contended; and thirdly, to defend the “unexpected” claim that human conscious presence in the world is the genuine-and-natural time travel