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703Conditionals in Theories of TruthJournal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1): 27-63. 2017.We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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490Finite Circular DefinitionsIn Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference, Csli Publications. pp. 79-93. 2006.
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157Empiricism and ExperienceOxford University Press USA. 2006.This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes availa…Read more
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153Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of MeaningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3): 654-666. 2003.This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles tha…Read more
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133A theory of conditionals in the context of branching timePhilosophical Review 89 (1): 65-90. 1980.
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125XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 227-246. 1989.Anil Gupta; XV*—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 227–246, https.
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123Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and NetaPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 490-508. 2009.No Abstract
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120Précis of empiricism and experience (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 461-467. 2009.No Abstract
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118Frey on Experiential Transparency and Its Rational RolePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 717-720. 2010.
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115The Revision Theory of TruthMIT Press. 1993.In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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108Experience and knowledgeIn Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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108Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience”Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 75-88. 2018.
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99The logic of common nouns: an investigation in quantified modal logicYale University Press. 1980.
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96Discussion of James Pryor's “The Merits of Incoherence”Analytic Philosophy 59 (1): 142-148. 2018.
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82Modal logic and truthJournal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1). 1978.I discuss in this paper a criticism of modal logic due to Donald Davidson and John Wallace. They have claimed that, to quote Wallace, “modal predicate calculus does not provide a reasonable standpoint from which to interpret a language” (1970, p. 147). The aim of this paper is to present and evaluate their argument for this claim
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80Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truthSynthese 195 (3): 1065-1075. 2018.We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the…Read more
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71A consecutive calculus for positive relevant implication with necessityJournal of Philosophical Logic 9 (4): 343-362. 1980.
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70Replies to Selim Berker and Karl SchaferPhilosophical Studies 152 (1). 2011.I respond to six objections, raised by Selim Berker and Karl Schafer, against the theory offered in my Empiricism and Experience: (1) that the theory needs a problematic notion of subjective character of experience; (2) that the transition from the hypothetical to the categorical fails because of a logical difficulty; (3) that the constraints imposed on admissible views are too weak; (4) that the theory does not deserve the label 'empiricism'; (5) that the motivations provided for the Reliabilit…Read more
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69Truth, Meaning, ExperienceOup Usa. 2011.This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |