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386Deformed desires and informed desire testsHypatia 20 (4): 109-126. 2000.: The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional "informed desire" tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal wort…Read more
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91Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2012.This collection showcases the work of 18 analytical feminists from a variety of traditional areas of philosophy. It highlights successful uses of concepts and approaches from traditional philosophy, and illustrates the contributions that feminist approaches have made and could make to the analysis of issues in key areas of traditional philosophy, while also demonstrating that traditional philosophy ignores feminist insights and feminist critiques of traditional philosophy at its own peril.
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81Right-wing women: Causes, choices, and blaming the victimJournal of Social Philosophy 24 (3): 40-61. 1993.
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80The self-interest based contractarian response to the why-be-moral skepticSouthern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 427-447. 1990.I examine the self-interest based contractarian's attempt to answer the question, "Why be moral?" In order to defeat the skeptic who accepts reasons of self-interest only, contractarians must show that the best theory of practical reasons includes moral reasons. They must show that it is rational to act morally even when doing so conflicts with self-interest. ;I examine theories offered by Hobbes, Baier, and Grice, and show they fail to defeat skepticism. Hobbes' theory gives no special weight t…Read more
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70The Employer-Employee Relationship and the Right to KnowBusiness and Professional Ethics Journal 3 (1): 45-58. 1983.
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66The Deferential Wife Revisited: Agency and Moral ResponsibilityHypatia 25 (2). 2010.This paper rejects two main arguments for absolving the deferential wife and victims of deprived circumstances from responsibility or hlame for their servility: for Susan Wolf, circumstances can determine their reasons and acts, and for Sarah Buss, circumstances can give them excusing reasons for their acts. The paper argues that circumstances can give them justifying reasons to act in ways defending their intrin-sic worth when their acts can be legitimately interpreted as a protest against an a…Read more
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64Teaching in the New Climate of ConservatismTeaching Philosophy 30 (2): 139-148. 2007.This paper (1) summarizes the main points of the papers in the volume which demonstrate some of the ways that academic freedom is at odds with recent conservative attacks on the professoriate; (2) argues that some of the conservative attacks from students on faculty are at base a failure to acknowledge their equal personhood, but treat them as inferior beings and thus elicit harmful psychological reactions similar to those found in victims of racist slurs; and (3) examines possible solutions, in…Read more
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50The moral skepticOxford University Press. 2009.Introduction -- The self-interest based contractarian response to the skeptic -- A feminist ethics response to the skeptic -- Deformed desires -- Self-interest versus morality -- The amoralist -- The motive skeptic -- The interdependency thesis.
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47Amorous Relationships Between Faculty and StudentsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3): 419-440. 2001.
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38Feminist Ethics: Defeating the Why-Be-Moral SkepticJournal of Social Philosophy 29 (2): 59-86. 1998.
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38Deformed Desires and Informed Desire TestsHypatia 20 (4): 109-126. 2000.The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
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36Moral luck and partialist theoriesJournal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2): 213-227. 1996.I argue that partialist theories that require us to give special weight to the desires, needs, and interests of ourselves or our social group, are national. I depend this impartialist principle: if the only difference between two persons to some property, where having the property to dependent on luck, morality's demanding that we disfavor either person because the person has this property, to national
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32Deformed Desires and Informed Desire TestsHypatia 20 (4): 109-126. 2005.The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
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26Gender Basics: Feminist Perspectives on Women and MenAnne Minas Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993, xiv + 545 pp (review)Dialogue 35 (2): 412-416. 1996.
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26The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions: The Interdependency ThesisDialogue 44 (3): 439-468. 2005.ABSTRACTI defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses, her desires, disposition, and choice to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim she adopts. The Interdependency Thesis shows that we do not need to demonst…Read more
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25The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions: The Interdependency ThesisDialogue 44 (3): 439-468. 2005.ABSTRACTI defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses, her desires, disposition, and choice to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim she adopts. The Interdependency Thesis shows that we do not need to demonst…Read more
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22The Self‐Interest Based Contractarian Response to the Why‐Be‐Moral SkepticSouthern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 427-447. 1990.
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19Scepticism about Moral MotivesDialogue 35 (1): 15-. 1996.Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number—Kant and Aristotle come to mind—are concerned in part with the …Read more
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17Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian RevivalDialogue 30 (1-2): 109-. 1991.In Realizing Rawls, Thomas Pogge defends a Rawlsian conception of justice. The book is divided into three main parts; this discussion will concentrate on the first two. Part 1 constitutes a defence of some aspects of Rawls's theory against objections raised by Nozick and Michael Sandel. This is followed by a second part on the two principles of justice—what they amount to, and some applications of them. Part 3 argues that the Rawlsian scheme should apply globally, not merely to a single state. R…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |