Anna Laktionova

The article offers formal and doctrinal reasons that prove the existence of the “Harvard Philosophical School” as a real historico-philosophical phenomenon. The author includes Willard Van Orman Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Hilary Putnam in this school. The aim of this article is to compare the conceptualism, relativism and anti-realism of Quine, Goodman and Pantem, on the basis of pragmatic tendencies in their philosophical studies. Formal reasons: all these philosophers were professors at Harvard University; in addition, Quine was a teacher of Goodman and Putnam, Goodman was a teacher of Putnam. Doctrinal reasons: Quine, Goodman, and Putnam, each in his own specific pragmatic way, stood on the positions of relativism, anti-realism, conceptualism, and tried to separate themselves from “cultural relativism”; common touchstone concepts and tendencies in particular in their philosophical investigations are: conceptual scheme, indeterminacy of translation, internal criteria, ontological relativity and others; the obvious analogy between Quine's standards of similarity, Goodman's standards of correctness, and standards for Putnam's conceptual schemes. Thus, we have strong reasons to consider Quine, Goodman and Putnam as representatives of a common philosophical school. The role played in their doctrines by the ideas of William James, who also taught at Harvard, at least hypothetically allows us to expand the boundaries of this school.

We live in a world of technologies. Classical Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Technology, Episte- mology, etc. philosophical disciplines appear insufficient for valid reflections on today's world. The Philo- sophy of Engineering and Design (Technological) Actions is seen promising to become a fruitful field of philosophical reflections and is offered from the perspective of the Philosophy of Action and Agency (Practical Philosophy). The foundations of the latter are presented in Part II. In the Part I, the Phi- losophy of Engineering and Design (Technological) Actions is outlined in a comparative with Philo- sophy of Technology, Humanities Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Engineering, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, etc. plane. The paradoxes of E. Feenberg's technique, the interpretation of which is proposed in the part III, are involved for the illustrating of the maintained understanding. In the conclusive part (IV) the general danger of distortive philosophical understandings about the tech- nological common world of today are mentioned.

Will is a very old important philosophical concept, an analysis of which is very specific, if not odd, comparatively with the others. This concept is going to be used to provide and clarify conditions of possibility for person of being an agent. In doing that I refer to the correspondent pieces of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Philosophical In ves tigations; and to their interpretations by M. Alvarez in “Wittgenstein on Action and Will” and D. K. Le vy in “Morality without Agency”. Person is essentially constituted by ‘powerless’ will in terms of ‘understanding’ that is experienced during her life. Action depends on and manifests understanding by will of a personal attitude to some states of affairs. Will does not incline a person to particular desires about preferable states of affairs or actions. Will is not about states of affairs. By willing I value the world, its portions, they appear significant, important to me. Volition is treated as related to will. Both are personal conditions of being an agent with priority of agency as capacity realized by rational actions.

Criticism in philosophy goes in accordance with general skeptical scientific attitude toward results of a research. The latter are to be achieved, presupposed, given as data and become to be verified or falsified, questioned by critique, analyzing etc. Criticism is improved mean to avoid persuasion and relativism, but (as selected sample versions of philosophical criticism will illustrate, in particular critical legacy of I. Kant, H. Putnam and L. Wittgenstein, especially via resolute interpretation of his views by J. Conant) all three methodological attitudes are mutually correlated, sometimes even viciously. Relativism appears to be less vicious, because it could be treated as performative: relativism is relative. Attention to performativity of relativism can provide for its contextual validity and relativity.

Philosophy of Engineering and Design (Technological) Actions is seen within the context of philosophical reflections about rationalizing, argumentation, modelling as specific particularities of scientific research actions (in fundamental natural sciences and engineering ones). Engineering is inseparable from design and technology (and vice versa: design relates to engineering and technology; technology – to engineering and design). For engineering both, is and ought relations; knowing that, knowing how, and knowing as mere direct experienced effective functioning, producing; world-to-mind and mind-to-world directions, – appear valid and relevant (in different degrees, in diverse contexts). Engineering and Design Technological Sciences open new interesting methodological perspective for nowadays investigations. From the other side, Engineering and Design Technological Sciences challenge higher and special technical education; and might play the key role for its renovating, integrating into inter-, cross- and trans- disciplinary studies. Infrastructure of Philosophy of Engineering and Design Technological Actions could include Epistemology of Engineering; Ontology of Engineering; elaborations on methodology of measurement; Ethical, Socio-Political, Environmental Studies etc. Infrastructure of Philosophy of Engineering and Design Technological Actions could correspond to Engineering and Design Technological Sciences. Mentioned philosophical and specific scientific fields remain to be open for diverse elaborations and development. Modelling as an appropriate within both science and engineering method is analyzed by involving into consideration topics of rationality and argumentation. Rationality is epistemically relevant for argumentation and modelling. Concepts of “frames” and “orientations” in argumentation are actual for interpreting rationality of actions; and in scientific modelling. Modelling itself could be seen as a special argumentative tool constructed on the rational background and opening rational understanding for scientific discovery and engineering design technological inventing.