My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Other conceptualism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept both
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Lean toward: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: skepticism
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Lean toward: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Lean toward: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept an intermediate view
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Lean toward: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Accept: Humean
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Lean toward: non-naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept both
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Lean toward: non-cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept: internalism
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: virtue ethics
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Accept: sense-datum theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Lean toward: further-fact view
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept: libertarianism
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept both
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Lean toward: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: deflationary
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible