•  152
    Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support
    In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    I focus on the No-Paradise Dilemma, which results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals, coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total …Read more
  •  162
    Disagreement in a Group: Aggregation, Respect for Evidence, and Synergy
    In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement, Routledge. pp. 184-210. 2021.
    When members of a group doxastically disagree with each other, decisions in the group are often hard to make. The members are supposed to find an epistemic compromise. How do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition? I answer the question by suggesting the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation, which is introduced in Brössel and Eder 2014 and is further developed here. I show how this method faces ch…Read more
  •  290
    Explicating the Concept of Epistemic Rationality
    Synthese (1-2): 1-26. 2021.
    A characterization of epistemic rationality, or epistemic justification, is typically taken to require a process of conceptual clarification, and is seen as comprising the core of a theory of (epistemic) rationality. I propose to explicate the concept of rationality. It is essential, I argue, that the normativity of rationality, and the purpose, or goal, for which the particular theory of rationality is being proposed, is taken into account when explicating the concept of rationality. My positi…Read more
  •  469
    No Commitment to the Truth
    Synthese 198 7449-7472. 2021.
    On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only th…Read more
  •  950
    Evidential Probabilities and Credences
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1-21. 2019.
    Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. …Read more
  •  658
    Evidence of Evidence as Higher Order Evidence
    with Peter Brössel
    In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 62-83. 2019.
    In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic state…Read more
  •  564
    Evidential Support and Instrumental Rationality
    with Peter Brössel and Franz Huber
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2): 279-300. 2013.
  •  363
    How to resolve doxastic disagreement
    Synthese 191 (11): 2359-2381. 2014.
    How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide a…Read more
  •  81
    Decision Theory and Rationality (review)
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3): 326-329. 2010.
  •  104
    No Match Point for the Permissibility Account
    Erkenntnis 80 (3): 657-673. 2015.
    In the literature, one finds two accounts of the normative status of rational belief: the ought account and the permissibility account. Both accounts have their advantages and shortcomings, making it difficult to favour one over the other. Imagine that there were two principles of rational belief or rational degrees of belief commonly considered plausible, but which, however, yielded a paradox together with one account, but not with the other. One of the accounts therefore requires us to give up…Read more