•  1051
    Tropes: For and Against
    In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong, De Gruyter. pp. 85-104. 2016.
    Trope theory is the view that the world consists (wholly or partly) of particular qualities, or tropes. This admittedly thin core assumption leaves plenty of room for variation. Still, most trope theorists agree that their theory is best developed as a one-category theory according to which there is nothing but tropes. Most hold that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of resembling tropes. And most hold that concrete particulars are made up from tropes in compresence (for an ove…Read more
  •  335
    Trope theory and the Bradley regress
    Synthese 175 (3): 311-326. 2010.
    Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in contradiction, nonsense, or wi…Read more
  •  334
    Grounding and metaphysical explanation: it’s complicated
    Philosophical Studies 176 (6): 1573-1594. 2019.
    Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important—possibly an indispensable—role in metaphysical explanation. Or both. I argue that saying that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature, but that this view is untenable. …Read more
  •  271
    Bradley’s Regress
    Philosophy Compass 7 (11): 794-807. 2012.
    Ever since F. H. Bradley first formulated his famous regress argument philosophers have been hard at work trying to refute it. The argument fails, it has been suggested, either because its conclusion just does not follow from its premises, or it fails because one or more of its premises should be given up. In this paper, the Bradleyan argument, as well as some of the many and varied reactions it has received, is scrutinized.
  •  203
    An Argument for the Existence of Tropes
    Erkenntnis 74 (1): 69-79. 2011.
    That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.
  •  160
    If Tropes
    Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2002.
    The treatise attempts to approach and deal with some of the most fundamental problems facing anyone who wishes to uphold some version of the so-called theory of tropes. Three assumptions serve as a basis for the investigation: tropes exist, only tropes exist, and a one-category trope-theory along these lines should be developed so that the tropes it postulates are able to serve as truth-makers for all kinds of atomic propositions. Provided that these assumptions are accepted, it is found that th…Read more
  •  152
    Exemplification as Explanation
    Axiomathes 23 (2): 401-417. 2013.
    In this paper I critically investigate an unorthodox attempt to metaphysically explain in virtue of what there are states of affairs. This is a suggestion according to which states of affairs exist thanks to, rather than, as is the common view, in spite of, the infinite regress their metaphysical explanation seems to engender. I argue that, no matter in which form it is defended, or in which theoretical framework it is set, this suggestion cannot provide us with the explanation we crave
  •  144
    Infinite Regress - Virtue or Vice?
    Hommage À Wlodek. 2007.
    In this paper I argue that the infinite regress of resemblance is vicious in the guise it is given by Russell but that it is virtuous if generated in a (contemporary) trope theoretical framework. To explain why this is so I investigate the infinite regress argument. I find that there is but one interesting and substantial way in which the distinction between vicious and virtuous regresses can be understood: The Dependence Understanding. I argue, furthermore, that to be able to decide whether an …Read more
  •  104
    Infinite Regress Arguments
    In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--421. 2013.
    According to Johansson (2009: 22) an infinite regress is vicious just in case “what comes first [in the regress-order] is for its definition dependent on what comes afterwards.” Given a few qualifications (to be spelled out below (section 3)), I agree. Again according to Johansson (ibid.), one of the consequences of accepting this way of distinguishing vicious from benign regresses is that the so-called Russellian Resemblance Regress (RRR), if generated in a one-category trope-theoretical framew…Read more
  •  99
    Same but Different
    Metaphysica 6 (1): 131-146. 2005.
    Paper responding to critique of Maurin (2002) presented by Herbert Hochberg in his “Relations, Properties and Particulars” (2004).
  •  80
    This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted in Cambridge on 30 May 2001 by Anna-Sofia Maurin and Johannes Persson for the philosophical journal Theoria.
  •  57
    A World of Tropes?
    In Robrecht Vanderbeeken & Bart D'Hooghe (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Studies of Analytic Metaphysics, World Scientific Publishers. 2010.
    The revisionary metaphysician seemingly faces a seriously unfortunate dilemma where she is forced to choose between the Scylla of too little regimentation and the Charbydes of too much. Many take this to be an impossible dilemma, and regard it as a reductio against the revisionary framework itself. In this paper, I argue that the dilemma is not necessarily impossible. To be justified, ontological theorising must be regimented just enough. To escape the dilemma, therefore, the revisionary metaphy…Read more
  •  53
  •  49
    The Routledge Handbook of Properties (edited book)
    Routledge. 2024.
    The Routledge Handbook of Properties is an outstanding reference source to this perennial topic and is the first major volume of its kind. Essential reading for anyone studying and researching metaphysics, metametaphysics, and ontology.
  •  39
    Davidson on properties
    Dialectica 52 (1). 1998.
    Donald Davidson claims that, by studying the most general aspects of natural language, we will also be studying the most general aspects of reality.In particular, this means that, through the application of a systematic truththeory to natural language, we will be able to reveal its basic structure, its true logical form. Once this logical form has been spelled out, we will be able to determine the finite stock of important constituents of which sentences are built, and also the specific roles th…Read more
  •  32
    The One over Many
    Acta Philosophica Fennica 84 37. 2008.
    This paper investigates the One over Many, first as it was first introduced by Plato. Here, it is argued, the One over Many can be understood in at least two senses, both different from, but in a sense included in, the sense in which the One-over-Many is regarded as an argument for the existence of universals. In both of these senses, it is argued, it is possible to accept the One-over-Many while denying the existence of universals.This established, I examine the argument from the One-over-Many …Read more
  •  30
    Eklund vs. Bradley : Regress, Relation, Explanation.
  •  26
    The One over Many
    In T. Im de Mey & Markku Keinänen (eds.), Problems From Armstrong, Acta Philosophica Fennica 84. 2008.
  •  20
    Does Ontology Matter?
    In Simone Gozzano & Francesco Orilia (eds.), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, De Gruyter. pp. 31-56. 2008.
  •  16
    States of Affairs and the Relation Regress
    In Gabriele Galluzzo, Michael Loux & Jonathan Lowe (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2013.
  •  11
    THERE WAS A TIME when many philosophers agreed that metaphysics was dead. Anyone aquatinted with the works of D.H. Mellor knows that the subject is alive and well. Two young philosophers who are familiar with his work, Anna-Sofia Maurin and Johannes Persson, met him in Cambrige for an interview.
  •  6
    Infinite Regress Arguments
    In Christer Svennerlind, Almäng Jan & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, Ontos Verlag. pp. 421-438. 2013.
  • Routledge Handbook on Properties (edited book)
    with Anthony Fisher
  • Russells regress: en replik
    Filosofisk Tidskrift 3. 2009.
  • Properties
    Cambridge University Press. 2022.
    Although the subject matter of this Element is properties, do not expect in-depth introductions to the various views on properties 'on the market'. Instead, here that subject matter is treated meta-philosophically. Rather than ask and try to answer a question like do properties exist? this Element asks what reasons one might have for thinking that properties exist, what counts as solving that problems, as well as how we ought to proceed when trying to find out if properties exist. As it turns ou…Read more
  • Om enhet i mångfald
    Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 4. 2000.