•  281
    The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231). 2008.
    Moore's proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright's nor Pryor's readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in …Read more
  •  244
    Self-knowledge and commitments
    Synthese 171 (3). 2009.
    In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for…Read more
  •  241
    Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 27-34. 2002.
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentificati…Read more
  •  183
    Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?
    Philosophical Investigations 33 (1): 1-23. 2010.
    The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wan…Read more
  •  166
    Which Hinge Epistemology?
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 79-96. 2016.
    _ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 79 - 96 The paper explores the idea of a “hinge epistemology,” considered as a theory about justification which gives center-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of _hinges_. First, some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on Wittgenstein’s texts and more theoretically committed work are put forward. Then, the main problems raised in _On Certainty_ and the most influential interpretative lines it has given ris…Read more
  •  163
    In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is…Read more
  •  153
    In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore’s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: appare…Read more
  •  152
    Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 101-116. 2010.
    In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called res…Read more
  •  134
    How to Commit Moore’s Paradox
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (4): 169-192. 2015.
    Moore’s paradox is taken to be emblematic of peculiarities in the first person point of view, and to have significant implications for several issues in epistemology, in philosophy of language and mind. Yet, its nature remains elusive. In the first part of the paper, the main kinds of analysis of it hereto proposed in the literature are criticized. Furthermore, it is claimed that there are cases in which its content can be legitimately judged. Close inspection of those cases reveals that they de…Read more
  •  101
    Peacocke's self-knowledge
    Ratio 21 (1). 2008.
    knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
  •  99
    Human diagrammatic reasoning and seeing-as
    Synthese 186 (1): 121-148. 2012.
    The paper addresses the issue of human diagrammatic reasoning in the context of Euclidean geometry. It develops several philosophical categories which are useful for a description and an analysis of our experience while reasoning with diagrams. In particular, it draws the attention to the role of seeing-as; it analyzes its implications for proofs in Euclidean geometry and ventures the hypothesis that geometrical judgments are analytic and a priori, after all
  •  94
    Jordi Fernández. Transparent Minds. A Study of Self-Knowledge (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (3): 442-445. 2014.
  •  94
    The paper offers a critical review of Roberto Farneti’s paper a minor philosophy. The state of the art of philosophical scholarship in Italy , recently published in Philosophia. It is argued that overall the status and interest of philosophy as practiced nowadays in Italy is less disappointing than Farneti makes out. It is also maintained that submitting papers to peer-refereed international journals can help cure the moral and sociological disease that besets the Italian academia, but that, a…Read more
  •  91
    Moore’s proof of an external world is a piece of reasoning whose premises, in context, are true and warranted and whose conclusion is perfectly acceptable, and yet immediately seems flawed. I argue that neither Wright’s nor Pryor’s readings of the proof can explain this paradox. Rather, one must take the proof as responding to a sceptical challenge to our right to claim to have warrant for our ordinary empirical beliefs, either for any particular empirical belief we might have, or for belief in …Read more
  •  83
    Stopping points: ‘I’, immunity and the real guarantee
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3): 233-252. 2017.
    The aim of the paper is to bring out exactly what makes first-personal contents special, by showing that they perform a distinctive cognitive function. Namely, they are stopping points of inquiry. First, I articulate this idea and then I use it to clear the ground from a troublesome conflation. That is, the conflation of this particular function all first-person thoughts have with the property of immunity to error through misidentification, which only some I-thoughts enjoy. Afterward, I show the…Read more
  •  77
    In this paper I address the question of whether the fact that our colour experiences have a finer‐grained content than our ordinary colour concepts allow us to represent should be taken as a threat to theories of the conceptual content of experience. In particular, I consider and criticise McDowell's response to that argument and propose a possible development of it. As a consequence, I claim that the role of the argument from the finer‐grained content of experience has to be redefined. In parti…Read more
  •  76
    Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4): 217-234. 2017.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 217 - 234 The paper presents the key themes of my _Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology_. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the j…Read more
  •  75
    This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual j…Read more
  •  72
    It is a striking feature of philosophical reflection on the self that it often ends up being revisionary of our commonsensical intuition that it is identical to a living human being with, intrinsically, physical and psychological properties. As is well known, Descartes identified the self with a mental entity, Hume denied the existence of such an entity and Kant reduced it to a transcendental ego—to a mere condition of possibility for experience and thought. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein follow…Read more
  •  70
    Disagreeing with Myself: Doxastic Commitments and Intrapersonal Disagreement
    American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1): 1-14. 2019.
    This paper explores the idea of disagreement with oneself, in both its diachronic and synchronic forms. A puzzling case of synchronic intrapersonal disagreement is presented and the paper considers its implications. One is that belief is a genus that comes in two species: as disposition and as commitment. Another is that self-deception consists in a conflict between one's beliefs as dispositions and one's beliefs as commitments. Synchronic intrapersonal disagreement also has implications for the…Read more
  •  65
    Self-Knowledge for Humans (review)
    Analysis 76 (2): 246-252. 2016.
  •  65
    Disagreement unhinged, constitutivism style
    with Michele Palmira
    Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4): 402-415. 2021.
    Metaphilosophy, EarlyView.
  •  59
    On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 41-46. 2002.
  •  58
  •  56
    How to perceive reasons
    Episteme 13 (1): 77-88. 2016.
    This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide ju…Read more
  •  52
    What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3): 198-207. 2018.
    _ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 198 - 207 The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book _What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy_. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_.