•  129
    Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view appears to …Read more
  •  32
    The Meaning of Terrorism (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Twenty years after September 11, the definition of terrorism remains a contentious issue. How to understand or not to understand ‘terrorism’ is by no means a purely academic exercise. The term has...
  •  170
    Epistemology of ignorance: the contribution of philosophy to the science-policy interface of marine biosecurity
    with Chad L. Hewitt, Remco Heesen, Marnie L. Campbell, Oliver Fritsch, Andrew T. Knight, and Erin Nash
    Frontiers in Marine Science 10 1-5. 2023.
    Marine ecosystems are under increasing pressure from human activity, yet successful management relies on knowledge. The evidence-based policy (EBP) approach has been promoted on the grounds that it provides greater transparency and consistency by relying on ‘high quality’ information. However, EBP also creates epistemic responsibilities. Decision-making where limited or no empirical evidence exists, such as is often the case in marine systems, creates epistemic obligations for new information ac…Read more
  •  130
    Commentary for NASSP Award Symposium on 'Getting Our Act Together'
    Social Philosophy Today 39 215-226. 2023.
    This commentary is part of a symposium on my book 'Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations' (Routledge, 2021). Here, I respond to the members of the North American Society for Social Philosophy’s 2022 Book Award Committee. I discuss whether most moral theory is individualistic, arguing that “traditional ethical theories” - meaning the traditions of Virtue Ethics, Kantian ethics as well as consequentialist ethics - certainly are. All of these focus on what individual ag…Read more
  •  404
    The statement that we are currently failing to address some of humanity’s greatest challenges seems uncontroversial—we are not doing enough to limit global warming to a maximum of 2 °C and we are exposing vulnerable people to preventable diseases when failing to produce herd immunity. But what singles out such failings from all the things we did not do when all are unintended? Unlike their individualist counterparts, collective inaction and omission have not yet received much attention in the li…Read more
  •  185
    Wenn gemeinsames Handeln das Böse hervorbringt (review)
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 70 (1): 172-179. 2022.
  •  411
    Kollektive Verantwortung und Armut
    In Gottfried Schweiger & Clemens Sedmak (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie Und Armut, J.b. Metzler. pp. 326-332. 2021.
    Die Frage nach der Verantwortung für globale Armut laesst sich auf mindestens zwei Weisen stellen – als Frage nach der (retrospektiven) Verantwortung für das Auftreten dieses Problems oder als Frage nach der (prospektiven) Verantwortung für dessen Behebung. Dieses Kapitel wird sich vor allem auf die zweite Frage konzentrieren: Inwiefern sollte die Verantwortung, Armut zu bekaempfen, als kollektive Verantwortung verstanden werden? Für viele von uns werden diese Pflichten nur im weiten (schwac…Read more
  •  1469
    Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-…Read more
  •  443
    The possibility of collective moral obligations
    In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Perron Tollefsen (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility, Routledge. pp. 258-273. 2020.
    Our moral obligations can sometimes be collective in nature: They can jointly attach to two or more agents in that neither agent has that obligation on their own, but they – in some sense – share it or have it in common. In order for two or more agents to jointly hold an obligation to address some joint necessity problem they must have joint ability to address that problem. Joint ability is highly context-dependent and particularly sensitive to shared (or even common) beliefs. As such, joint abi…Read more
  •  142
  •  392
    The Epistemology of Group Duties: What We Know and What We Ought to do
    Journal of Social Ontology (1): 91-100. 2020.
    In Group Duties, Stephanie Collins proposes a ‘tripartite’ social ontology of groups as obligation-bearers. Producing a unified theory of group obligations that reflects our messy social reality is challenging and this ‘three-sizes-fit-all’ approach promises clarity but does not always keep that promise. I suggest considering the epistemic level as primary in determining collective obligations, allowing for more fluidity than the proposed tripartite ontology of collectives, coalitions and …Read more
  •  348
    This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the glob…Read more
  •  421
    WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 Together we can often achieve things that are impossible to do on our own. We can prevent something bad from happening or we can produce something good, even if none of us could do it by herself. But when are we morally required to do something of moral importance together with others? This book develops an original theory of collective moral obligations. These are obligations that individual moral agents hold jointly, but not as…Read more
  •  882
    Structural Injustice and Massively Shared Obligations
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (1): 1-16. 2021.
    It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations visà- vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorgani…Read more
  •  758
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know an…Read more
  •  532
    Making sense of collective moral obligations: A comparison of existing approaches
    In Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski & Tracy Lynn Isaacs (eds.), Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice, Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 109-132. 2018.
    We can often achieve together what we could not have achieved on our own. Many times these outcomes and actions will be morally valuable; sometimes they may be of substantial moral value. However, when can we be under an obligation to perform some morally valuable action together with others, or to jointly produce a morally significant outcome? Can there be collective moral obligations, and if so, under what circumstances do we acquire them? These are questions to which philosophers are increasi…Read more
  •  553
    Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the pe…Read more
  •  1044
    Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?
    Environmental Values 28 (4): 405-427. 2019.
    Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than ant…Read more
  •  23
    Gemeinsame Hilfspflichten, Weltarmut und kumulative Handlungen
    Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 4 (1): 123-150. 2017.
    Duties to reduce global poverty are often portrayed as collective duties to assist. At first glance this seems to make sense: since global poverty is a problem that can only be solved by a joint effort, the duty to do so should be considered a collective duty. But what exactly is meant by a ‚joint‘ or ‚collective‘ duty? This paper introduces a distinction between genuinely cooperative and cumulative collective actions. Genuinely cooperative actions require mutually responsive, carefully adjusted…Read more
  •  1853
    Without doubt, the global challenges we are currently facing—above all world poverty and climate change—require collective solutions: states, national and international organizations, firms and business corporations as well as individuals must work together in order to remedy these problems. In this chapter, I discuss climate change mitigation as a collective action problem from the perspective of moral philosophy. In particular, I address and refute three arguments suggesting that business firm…Read more
  •  631
    Terrorism, jus post bellum and the Prospect of Peace
    In Florian Demont-Biaggi (ed.), The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict, Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 123-140. 2017.
    Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – state or…Read more
  •  1823
    Is there an obligation to reduce one’s individual carbon footprint?
    Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (2): 168-188. 2014.
    Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gases. This paper focuses on the question of whether i…Read more
  •  1156
    Rethinking legitimate authority
    In Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas Evans & Adam Henschke (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in the 21st Century, Routledge. 2013.
    The just war-criterion of legitimate authority – as it is traditionally framed – restricts the right to wage war to state actors. However, agents engaged in violent conflicts are often sub-state or non-state actors. Former liberation movements and their leaders have in the past become internationally recognized as legitimate political forces and legitimate leaders. But what makes it appropriate to consider particular violent non-state actors to legitimate violent agents and others not? This arti…Read more
  •  190
    Killing in War
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2). 2011.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 376-377, June 2011.
  •  1811
    Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations
    Ratio 26 (3): 310-328. 2013.
    In recent decades, concepts of group agency and the morality of groups have increasingly been discussed by philosophers. Notions of collective or joint duties have been invoked especially in the debates on global justice, world poverty and climate change. This paper enquires into the possibility and potential nature of moral duties individuals in unstructured groups may hold together. It distinguishes between group agents and groups of people which – while not constituting a collective agent – a…Read more
  •  1327
    Joint Moral Duties
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1): 58-74. 2014.
    There are countless circumstances under which random individuals COULD act together to prevent something morally bad from happening or to remedy a morally bad situation. But when OUGHT individuals to act together in order to bring about a morally important outcome? Building on Philip Pettit’s and David Schweikard’s account of joint action, I will put forward the notion of joint duties: duties to perform an action together that individuals in so-called random or unstructured groups can jointly ho…Read more
  •  223
    Terrorism: A Philosophical Enquiry
    Palgrave-Macmillan. 2012.
    This book engages with the most urgent philosophical questions pertaining to the problem of terrorism. What is terrorism? Could it ever be justified? Assuming that terrorism is just one of many kinds of political violence, the book denies that it is necessarily wrong and worse than war. In fact, it may be justifiable under certain circumstances.
  •  462
    This essay investigates the possibilities and limits of interdisciplinary research into terrorism. It is shown that approaches that combine philosophy and international law are necessary, and when such an approach needs to be adopted. However, it is also important not to underestimate how much of a challenge is posed by the absence of agreement concerning the definition of terrorism, and also by the structural differences in the way the two disciplines address the problem and formulate the issue…Read more
  •  419
    Bridging The Emissions Gap: A Plea For Taking Up The Slack
    Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (1): 273-301. 2013.
    With the existing commitments to climate change mitigation, global warming is likely to exceed 2°C and to trigger irreversible and harmful threshold effects. The difference between the reductions necessary to keep the 2°C limit and those reductions countries have currently committed to is called the ‘emissions gap’. I argue that capable states not only have a moral duty to make voluntary contributions to bridge that gap, but that complying states ought to make up for the failures of some other s…Read more