•  412
    A deterrence theory of punishment
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212). 2003.
    I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describ…Read more
  •  97
    What is special about religion?
    Law and Philosophy 25 (2): 219-241. 2005.
  •  94
    Offense and the liberal conception of the law
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1): 3-23. 1984.
  •  85
    Punishment and the Principle of Fair Play
    Utilitas 9 (1): 81. 1997.
    What I call the Just Distribution theory of punishment holds that the justification of punishment is that it rectifies the social distribution of benefits and burdens which has been upset by the offender. I argue that a recent version of this theory is no more viable than earlier versions. Like them, it fails in its avowed intention to deliver fundamental intuitions about crime and punishment. The root problem is its foundation in Hart's Principle of Fair Play, a foundation which, I argue, is in…Read more
  •  85
    Rights and the Criminal Law
    Analysis 54 (2). 1994.
    Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued that any acceptable-- and perhaps even imaginable-- legal system must assign to citizens certain rights not to be aggressed against. I argue that this is not so. Typical legal systems certain assign duties of non-aggression; but the criminal branches of those systems do not assign corresponding rights. The civil branches may, but not to an extent that supports Thomson's thesis
  •  75
    War crimes, punishment and the burden of proof
    Res Publica 16 (2): 181-196. 2010.
    This paper argues that there is a default presumption that punishment has some deterrent effect, and that the burden of proof is upon those who allege that the costs of any particular penal system are insufficient to offset its deterrent benefits. This burden of proof transmits to the discussion of international law, with the conclusion that it is those who oppose international jurisdiction, rather than their opponents, who must prove their position. This they have so far failed to do.
  •  61
    Punishment as Deterrence: Reply to Sprague
    Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218). 2005.
    In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasiautomatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply …Read more
  •  20
    Recent Work on Punishment
    Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179). 1995.
    This article surveys some of the more important work in the philosophy of punishment in past ten years or so
  •  7
    Review: May on International Crimes (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225). 2006.
  • Violence, Reason and Justice: No Dogs or Philosophers Allowed
    with Ken Knisely, David Garren, and Scott Hibbard
    DVD. forthcoming.
    Who gets to use force and when? How are we supposed to justify the use of violence in achieving political goals and establishing and maintaining political communities and structures? With Anthony Ellis , David Garren , and Scott Hibbard
  • Antony Duff. Criminal Attempts
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 207-211. 1998.