•  15
    Seeing human: Distinct and overlapping neural signatures associated with two forms of dehumanization
    with Abigail J. Dawson and Megan E. Norr
    NeuroImage 79 313-328. 2013.
    The process of dehumanization, or thinking of others as less than human, is a phenomenon with significant societal implications. According to Haslam's model, two concepts of humanness derive from comparing humans with either animals or machines: individuals may be dehumanized by likening them to either animals or machines, or humanized by emphasizing differences from animals or machines. Recent work in cognitive neuroscience emphasizes understanding cognitive processes in terms of interactions b…Read more
  • FMRI reveals reciprocal inhibition between social and physical cognitive domains
    with Abigail Dawson, Katelyn Begany, Regina Leckie, Kevin Barry, Angela Ciccia, and Abraham Snyder
    NeuroImage. 2013.
  •  2
    Searching for a scientific experience
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 51-55. 2004.
  •  25
    How well do you know yourself?
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (10): 433-434. 2006.
  • Journal of Consciousness Studies (edited book)
    Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic. 2004.
  •  8
    Ethical Leadership as a Balance Between Opposing Neural Networks
    with Kylie C. Rochford, Richard E. Boyatzis, and Shannon E. French
    Journal of Business Ethics 144 (4): 755-770. 2017.
    In this article, we explore the implications of opposing domains theory for developing ethical leaders. Opposing domains theory highlights a neurological tension between analytic reasoning and socioemotional reasoning. Specifically, when we engage in analytic reasoning, we suppress our ability to engage in socioemotional reasoning and vice versa. In this article, we bring together the domains of neuroscience, psychology, and ethics, to inform our theorizing around ethical leadership. We propose …Read more
  •  25
    Antagonistic neural networks underlying differentiated leadership roles
    with Richard E. Boyatzis and Kylie Rochford
    Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8. 2014.
  •  22
    There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution wh…Read more
  •  1
    More than a feeling: counterintuitive effects of compassion on moral judgment
    with Philip Robbins, Jared Friedman, and Chris Meyers
    In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, Bloomsbury. pp. 125-179. 2014.
    Seminal work in moral neuroscience by Joshua Greene and colleagues employed variants of the well-known trolley problems to identify two brain networks which compete with each other to determine moral judgments. Greene interprets the tension between these brain networks using a dual process account which pits deliberative reason against automatic emotion-driven intuitions: reason versus passion. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests, however, that the critical tension that Greene identifies as…Read more
  •  44
    This phenomenon is an extension of the 'why trust the subject' question asked in the introduction ... critical use of verbal reports in cognitive science. ...
  •  54
    Induced gamma activity is associated with conscious awareness of pattern masked nouns
    with Christopher Summerfield and Adrian Philip Burgess
    International Journal of Psychophysiology 44 (2): 93-100. 2002.
  •  441
    Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness
    with T. Shallice
    Cognition 79 (1): 161-196. 2001.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processe…Read more
  •  247
    Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: from stimulus–response to script–report
    with Andreas Roepstorff
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8): 333-339. 2002.
    Cognitive science has wholeheartedly embraced functional brain imaging, but introspective data are still eschewed to the extent that it runs against standard practice to engage in the systematic collection of introspective reports. However, in the case of executive processes associated with prefrontal cortex, imaging has made limited progress, whereas introspective methods have considerable unfulfilled potential. We argue for a re-evaluation of the standard ‘cognitive mapping’ paradigm, emphasiz…Read more
  •  113
    Trust or interaction? Editorial introduction
    with Andreas Roepstorff
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8): 11--7. 2004.
    One of the best gimmicks on the cognitive science conference circuit is the demonstration of inattentional blindness. Many readers of this journal must have already been exposed to it. For the rest we will briefly describe a striking and popular demonstration. It typically evolves during a conference talk, where the presenter provides the audience with a stimulus in the form of a small video clip of six people, three in white, three in black, who pass two basket balls around. The instruction is …Read more
  •  62
    Varieties of self-systems worth having
    with Pascal Boyer and Philip Robbins
    Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4): 647-660. 2005.
  •  336
    The phenomenal stance
    Philosophical Studies 127 (1): 59-85. 2006.
    Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More …Read more