Anthony Newman

Background: Maintaining cognitive function protects older adults from developing functional decline. This study aims to identify the neuroimaging correlates of maintenance of higher global cognition as measured by the Modified Mini Mental State Test score. Methods: Repeated 3MS measures from 1997-98 through 2006-07 and magnetic resonance imaging with diffusion tensor in 2006-07 were obtained in a biracial cohort of 258 adults free from dementia. Participants were classified as having shown either maintenance or decline of cognition using linear mixed models. Measures of interest were white matter hyperintensity volume from total brain, volume of the gray matter and microstructure for total brain and for brain areas known to be related to memory and executive control function: medial temporal area, cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex. Results: Differences between cognitive maintainers and non-maintainers were significant for GMv of the medial temporal area and lower MD of the cingulate cortex, but not for other neuroimaging markers. In multivariable regression models adjusted for age, race, WMHv and GMV from the total brain and vascular conditions, each standard deviation of GMv of the medial temporal area and each standard deviation of MD of the cingulate cortex were associated with a nearly 4 times greater probability and a 34% lower probability of maintaining cognitive function, respectively. In these models neither WMHv nor GMv from total brain were significantly associated with probability of maintaining cognitive function. Conclusions: Preserving the volume of the medial temporal area and the microstructure of the cingulate cortex may contribute to maintaining cognitive function late in life. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play the desired causal role. In this paper I argue that such examples show no such thing, and that the only reason to think they do is to endorse an unacceptable principle concerning the sufficient conditions for causal efficacy. Internalists might be wrong that externalism is incompatible with mental causation; but the most common defense against that allegation should not move us at all.

Internalism about mental content is the view that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates as well. This dissertation develops and defends the idea that only a strong version of internalism is compatible with our commonsense commitment to mental causation. ;Chapter one defends a novel necessary condition on a property's being causally efficacious---viz., that any property F that is efficacious with respect to event E cannot be instantiated in virtue of any property G that is itself ceteris paribus sufficient for E---and shows that that necessary condition vindicates the idea that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense commitment to mental causation. ;The internalist's core intuition is that only intrinsic properties can be causally efficacious. Chapter two defends that intuition from the common externalist response that extrinsic properties abound. ;A popular "Middle Way" between externalism and internalism holds that although ordinary, "folk-psychological" contents of prepositional attitudes are extrinsic, there exists some other non-folk-psychological kind of content that is intrinsic. Chapter three argues that Jerry Fodor's influential argument for the Middle Way is incoherent. ;Chapter four identifies a weak but popular grade of internalism, endorsed by John Searle among others, and argues that it is untenable. ;The preceding defense of internalism can be believed only if there is something wrong with the canonical arguments for externalism developed by Hillary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and Saul Kripke. My postscript says what I think is wrong with the canonical externalist arguments: they assume the nonexistence of propositions that are truth-evaluable only relative to particular persons, places, or times; while I argue that our commonsense commitment to mental causation requires at least some such "indexical propositions"

Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play the desired causal role. In this paper I argue that such examples show no such thing, and that the only reason to think they do is to endorse an unacceptable principle concerning the sufficient conditions for causal efficacy. Internalists might be wrong that externalism is incompatible with mental causation; but the most common defense against that allegation should not move us at all