University of Oxford
DPhil, 2018
APA Eastern Division
Fribourg, Canton of Fribourg, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Social and Political Philosophy
  •  315
    Territorial Jurisdiction: A Functionalist Account
    Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Functionalists hold that the territorial rights of states are grounded solely in their successful performance of their morally mandated functions. In this paper, I defend a distinctive functionalist view of the right of territorial jurisdiction. I develop this view over the course of considering a variety of objections to functionalism that arise from reflection on cases of non- violent and otherwise rights-respecting annexation. Functionalism’s critics argue that it is committed to counterintui…Read more
  •  118
    Liberal Perfectionism, Moral Integrity, and Self-Respect
    American Journal of Jurisprudence 63 (1): 63-79. 2018.
    This paper presents a dilemma for Matthew Kramer’s view, as defended in his _Liberalism with Excellence_. A central aim of that book is to critique existing liberal perfectionist theories, which he labels “edificatory,” and to defend a different such theory, which he calls “aspirational.” Edificatory perfectionism holds that governments ought to promote citizens’ well-being directly by inducing them to live lives that are more wholesome, cultivated, or autonomous. Aspirational perfectionism, mea…Read more
  •  232
    Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason?
    Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 24-45. 2023.
    Public reason views hold that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. A growing number of philosophers argue that this reasonable acceptability principle (RAP) can be justified by appealing to the value of civic friendship. They claim that a valuable form of political community can only be achieved among the citizens of pluralistic societies if they refrain from appealing to controversial ideals and values when justifying the exercise of political power to …Read more
  •  484
    An attractive form of social stability is realized when the members of a well-ordered society give that society’s organizing principles their free and reflective endorsement. However, many political philosophers are skeptical that there is any requirement to show that their principles would engender this kind of stability. This skepticism is at the root of a number of objections to political liberalism, since arguments for political liberalism often appeal to its ability to be stable in this way…Read more
  •  1143
    Rawls's Conception of Autonomy
    In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy, Routledge. pp. 96-109. 2022.
    This chapter sets out John Rawls’s conception of autonomy and considers the role that it plays in his thought across A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. I suggest that one distinctive but overlooked feature of this conception is that it takes seriously the threat to autonomy that arises from how individuals are shaped by their social and political institutions. After setting out this conception and tracing its connections to wider discussions of autonomy, I argue for two main conclusio…Read more
  •  369
    A Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories
    European Journal of Political Theory 21 (4). 2022.
    Proponents of public reason views hold that the exercise of political power ought to be acceptable to all reasonable citizens. This article elucidates the common structure shared by all public reason views, first by identifying a set of questions that all such views must answer and, second, by showing that the answers to these questions stand in a particular relationship to each other. In particular, we show that what we call the ‘rationale question’ is fundamental. This fact, and the common str…Read more
  •  585
    Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1): 97-113. 2018.
    A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentm…Read more