•  34
    Kripkenstein on Belief
    Journal of Philosophical Research 43 249-258. 2018.
    I offer a skeptical reading of Saul Kripke’s “A Puzzle about Belief.” I maintain that Kripke formulates a skeptical paradox about belief that is analogous to the skeptical paradox about meaning and rule-following that, according to Kripke, Wittgenstein formulates in his Philosophical Investigations.
  •  28
    In Defense of Donnellan on Proper Names
    Erkenntnis 85 (6): 1289-1312. 2020.
    Kripke’s picture of how people use names to refer to things has been the dominant view in contemporary philosophy of language. When it is mentioned at all, Donnellan’s view of proper names is considered the same as Kripke’s. It is certainly true that both Donnellan and Kripke rejected descriptivism about proper names and appealed to historical facts to determine whom a speaker is referring to by using a proper name. However, the relevant historical facts Kripke and Donnellan appeal to are ultima…Read more
  •  25
    Reference and incomplete descriptions
    Philosophical Studies 178 (5): 1669-1687. 2021.
    In “On Referring” Peter Strawson pointed out that incomplete descriptions pose a problem for Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions. Howard Wettstein and Michael Devitt appealed to incomplete descriptions to argue, first, that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions fails, and second, that Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction has semantic bite. Stephen Neale has defended Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions against Wettstein’s and Devitt’s objections. In this paper, my…Read more
  •  21
    From Having in Mind to Direct Reference
    In Kabasenche - O'Rourke - Slater (ed.), Reference and Referring, Mit Press. pp. 189-208. 2012.
  •  8
    On Referring: Donnellan versus Strawson
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4): 1091-1110. 2019.
  • Il realismo anomalo di Sartre
    Rivista di Estetica 42 (21): 71-85. 2002.
  • The Ground Zero of Semantics
    In P. J. - Leonardi Almog (ed.), Having In Mind, Oxford University Press. 2012.