•  1192
    Why Realists Need Tropes
    Metaphysica 17 (1): 69-85. 2016.
    We argue that if one wishes to be a realist, one should adopt a Neo-Aristotelian ontology involving tropes instead of a Russellian ontology of property universals and objects. Either Russellian realists should adopt the relata-specific relational tropes of instantiation instead of facts, or convert to Neo-Aristotelian realism with monadic tropes. Regarding Neo-Aristotelian realism, we have two novel points why it fares better than Russellian realism. Instantiation of property universals by trope…Read more
  •  1056
    Quantity Tropes and Internal Relations
    with Markku Keinänen and Jani Hakkarainen
    Erkenntnis 84 (3): 519-534. 2019.
    In this article, we present a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes falling under determinates and determinables. We begin by providing a novel characterization of the necessary relations between these tropes as basic internal relations. The core ideas here are that the existence of the relata is sufficient for their being internally related, and that their being related does not require the existence of any specific entities distinct from the relata. We argue that quantit…Read more
  •  657
    Kinds of Tropes without Kinds
    Dialectica 72 (4): 571-596. 2018.
    In this article, we propose a new trope nominalist conception of determinate and determinable kinds of quantitative tropes. The conception is developed as follows. First, we formulate a new account of tropes falling under the same determinates and determinables in terms of internal relations of proportion and order. Our account is a considerable improvement on the current standard account (Campbell 1990; Maurin 2002; Simons 2003) because it does not rely on primitive internal relations of exact …Read more
  •  434
    Taxonomy of Relations: Internal and External
    In Bertini Daniele & Migliorini Damiano (eds.), Relations: Ontology and Philosophy of Religion, Mimesis International. pp. 93-121. 2018.
    In this paper, we discern different types of possible relations. We focus on the distinction between internal and external relations and their various possible sub-types. In the first section, we present what is nowadays more or less the standard distinction between internal and external relations. In the second section, we make two contributions to the literature of internal relations: a new taxonomy of internal relations and a novel distinction between formal and material ontological relation…Read more
  •  221
    Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism?
    Theoria 78 (2): 128-145. 2012.
    W. V. Quine describes himself as a “robust realist” about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quine's naturalism. On the other hand, Quine's naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quine's realism and his epistemological concep…Read more
  •  212
    Concrete Universals and Spatial Relations
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1): 57-71. 2015.
    According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of str…Read more
  •  96