•  36
    Are Impossible Goals Rational?
    The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 113-119. 2006.
    I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will…Read more
  •  19
    L. Laudan's theory of Scientific aims
    Ludus Vitalis 8 (14): 103-130. 2000.
  •  16
    Se discute el análisis de M. Williams de la Concepción de la Fundamentación Previa de la justificación epistémica –una concepción supuestamente detrás del trilema de Agripa– y se le contrasta con la Concepción del Desafío por Defecto – la concepción alternativa de la justificación epistémica propugnada por Williams. Se argumenta que los privilegios epistémicos predeterminados de la CDD son un eufemismo para estipulaciones epistémicamente arbitrarias, asimismo se argumenta que mientras el CFP pue…Read more
  •  6
    Are Impossible Goals Rational?
    The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 113-119. 2006.
    I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will…Read more
  •  3
    Critical Comments on Laudan’s Theory of Scientific Aims
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 37 17-24. 1998.
    I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals. Laud…Read more
  •  2
    ¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor?
    Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1): 7-31. 2014.
    Se argumenta que la crítica de Pryor al escepticismo sobre la justificación perceptiva está fuera de foco: mientras que el dogmatismo puede ser una explicación exitosa sobre la justificación perceptiva de las creencias empíricas de primer orden (i.e. de la justificación proposicional), es estéril frente a las críticas escépticas (de segundo orden) sobre el estatus epistémico de las creencias justificadas perceptivamente (es decir, frente a críticas que señalan la ausencia de justificación doxást…Read more
  •  2
    La importancia de los valores epistémicos en la adopción ya sea de la postura realista o de la anti-realista (o empirista) en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia se ilustra con tres debates. Los debates en cuestión son: i) aquel sobre si debemos buscar explicar o no la extraordinariamente baja entropía del universo temprano, ii) el debate sobre si las regularidades nómicas empíricas requieren o no de explicación vía leyes de la naturaleza y iii) el debate entre Clarke y Leibniz sobre la natu…Read more
  •  2
    Pancritical Rationalism Re Examined
    Praxis Filosófica 58. 2024.
    Critical and pancritical rationalism were mainly debated in the second half of the XXth century, however a new important paper on pancritical rationalism has been published recently, and hence a critical commentary of this recent publication is required, one is offered here.
  • W. W. Bartley argued that Popper's original theory of rationality opened itself to a tu quoque argument from the irrationalist and to avoid this Bartley proposed an alternative theory of rationality: pancritical rationalism . Bartley's characterization of PCR leads, however, to self-referential paradox. David Miller outlaws self-reference by distinguishing between positions and statements, Miller's distinction looks, however, suspiciously like an ad hoc manoeuvre or as a stipulation that has to …Read more
  • Laudan's proposed constraints on cognitive aims are criticized. It is argued that: Laudan does not distinguish impossible goals from impossible but approachable goals; and owing to that imprecision Laudan recommends conservatism and mediocrity. Impossible but approachable goals can be rational objectives, if we understand means/ends rationality as the attitude of someone who tries to reach the warranted optimum means to the attainment of or approximation to his desired aims. Ideals cannot be dis…Read more