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2¿Religión y ciencia sin creencia?Praxis Filosófica 54 31-50. 2022.Se describen dos ejemplos de tradiciones religiosas en las que se enfatiza el ritual, la ortopraxis, para posteriormente argumentar que ejemplos como estos hacen sicológica y sociológicamente plausible la actitud hacia la religión de un Sexto Empírico, para el que la religión es exclusivamente ritualista, sin doctrina, mientras suspende el juicio sobre el credo, sobre la ortodoxia; se argumenta que los pirrónicos también procedían así con relación a la medicina. Se esboza un argumento en favor d…Read more
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9Platonismo cum externismo en la epistemología de Los experimentos mentalesLudus Vitalis 20 (37): 33-46. 2012.
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26Trading One Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams Criticism of Aggripan ScepticismTópicos: Revista de Filosofía 44 9-34. 2013.Se discute el análisis de M. Williams de la Concepción de la Fundamentación Previa de la justificación epistémica –una concepción supuestamente detrás del trilema de Agripa– y se le contrasta con la Concepción del Desafío por Defecto – la concepción alternativa de la justificación epistémica propugnada por Williams. Se argumenta que los privilegios epistémicos predeterminados de la CDD son un eufemismo para estipulaciones epistémicamente arbitrarias, asimismo se argumenta que mientras el CFP pue…Read more
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9Pancritical Rationalism Re ExaminedPraxis Filosófica 58. 2024.Critical and pancritical rationalism were mainly debated in the second half of the XXth century, however a new important paper on pancritical rationalism has been published recently, and hence a critical commentary of this recent publication is required, one is offered here.
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8El disenso axiológico entre realistas y anti realistas científicosPraxis Filosófica 45 11-23. 2018.La importancia de los valores epistémicos en la adopción ya sea de la postura realista o de la anti-realista (o empirista) en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia se ilustra con tres debates. Los debates en cuestión son: i) aquel sobre si debemos buscar explicar o no la extraordinariamente baja entropía del universo temprano, ii) el debate sobre si las regularidades nómicas empíricas requieren o no de explicación vía leyes de la naturaleza y iii) el debate entre Clarke y Leibniz sobre la natu…Read more
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11¿Qué está mal con el dogmatismo de Pryor?Areté. Revista de Filosofía 26 (1): 7-31. 2014.Se argumenta que la crítica de Pryor al escepticismo sobre la justificación perceptiva está fuera de foco: mientras que el dogmatismo puede ser una explicación exitosa sobre la justificación perceptiva de las creencias empíricas de primer orden (i.e. de la justificación proposicional), es estéril frente a las críticas escépticas (de segundo orden) sobre el estatus epistémico de las creencias justificadas perceptivamente (es decir, frente a críticas que señalan la ausencia de justificación doxást…Read more
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15Critical Comments on Laudan’s Theory of Scientific AimsThe Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 37 17-24. 1998.I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals. Laud…Read more
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10Are Impossible Goals Rational?The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 113-119. 2006.I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will…Read more
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6On the possible evolutionary justification of our epistemic capacitiesLudus Vitalis 9 (16): 27-46. 2001.
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Critical Comments on Laudan's Theory of Scientific AimsSorites 10 19-38. 1999.Laudan's proposed constraints on cognitive aims are criticized. It is argued that: Laudan does not distinguish impossible goals from impossible but approachable goals; and owing to that imprecision Laudan recommends conservatism and mediocrity. Impossible but approachable goals can be rational objectives, if we understand means/ends rationality as the attitude of someone who tries to reach the warranted optimum means to the attainment of or approximation to his desired aims. Ideals cannot be dis…Read more
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2Playing Devil's advocate. Methodological Relativism and Scientific CreationismLudus Vitalis 13 (24): 107-112. 2005.
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2Critical comments to Miller's defense of Bartley's Pancritical RationalismLudus Vitalis 10 (18): 27-36. 2002.
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David Miller's Defence of Bartley's Pan Critical RationalismSorites 15 50-55. 2004.W. W. Bartley argued that Popper's original theory of rationality opened itself to a tu quoque argument from the irrationalist and to avoid this Bartley proposed an alternative theory of rationality: pancritical rationalism . Bartley's characterization of PCR leads, however, to self-referential paradox. David Miller outlaws self-reference by distinguishing between positions and statements, Miller's distinction looks, however, suspiciously like an ad hoc manoeuvre or as a stipulation that has to …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphilosophy |
General Philosophy of Science |