•  339
    Authority and Coercion
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (1): 2-35. 2004.
    I am grateful to Donald Ainslie, Lisa Austin, Michael Blake, Abraham Drassinower, David Dyzenhaus, George Fletcher, Robert Gibbs, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Sari Kisilevsky, Dennis Klimchuk, Christopher Morris, Scott Shapiro, Horacio Spector, Sergio Tenenbaum, Malcolm Thorburn, Ernest Weinrib, Karen Weisman, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for comments, and audiences in the UCLA Philosophy Department and Columbia Law School for their questions.
  •  234
    Foundationalism in political theory
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2): 115-137. 1987.
  •  223
    Beyond the Harm Principle
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (3): 215-245. 2006.
  •  211
    In this masterful work, both an illumination of Kant's thought and an important contribution to contemporary legal and political theory, Arthur Ripstein gives a comprehensive yet accessible account of Kant's political philosophy. In addition to providing a clear and coherent statement of the most misunderstood of Kant's ideas, Ripstein also shows that Kant's views remain conceptually powerful and morally appealing today.
  •  128
    Critical notice too much invested to quit
    Economics and Philosophy 20 (1): 185-208. 2004.
    Faculty of Law and Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto 1. INTRODUCTION The economic analysis of law has gone through a remarkable change in the past decade and a half. The founding articles of the discipline – such classic pieces as Ronald Coase’s “The problem of social cost” (1960), Richard Posner’s “A theory of negligence” (1972) and Guido Calabresi and Douglas Malamed’s “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) – offered economic analy…Read more
  •  99
    Justice and Responsibility
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 17 (2): 361-386. 2004.
    I argue that institutions charged with giving justice must understand responsibility in terms of norms governing what people are entitled to expect of each other. On this conception, the sort of responsibility that is of interest to private law or distributive justice is not a relation between a person and the consequence, but rather a relation between persons with respect to consequences. As a result, nonrelational facts about a person’s actions and the circumstances in which she performs them …Read more
  •  98
    Commodity Fetishism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (4). 1987.
    Criticism and sarcasm are interspersed with description and analysis throughout Marx's work. Most of the criticism is aimed at one or another side of a single target: what Marx sees as capitalism's pretensions of freedom, equality, and prosperity in the face of exploitation and recurrent crises. But the remarks on commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital seem to be directed at a different target. Here Marx tells us that a commodity is ‘a queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtletie…Read more
  •  94
    Douglas Joel Butler 1957-1991
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (5). 1992.
    APA Memorial Minutes.
  •  87
    In A Theory of Justice, Rawls makes almost no mention of the issues of justice that animated philosophers in earlier centuries. There is no discussion of justice between persons, issues that Aristotle sought to explain under the idea of “corrective justice.” Nor is there discussion, except in passing, of punishment, another primary focus of the social contract approaches of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.1 My aim in this article is to argue that implicit in Rawls’s writing is a powerful and persuasive…Read more
  •  76
    Equality, Luck, and Responsibility
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1): 3-23. 1994.
  •  62
    Form and Matter in Kantian Political Philosophy: A Reply
    European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3): 487-496. 2012.
    This paper responds briefly to four reviews of Force and Freedom. Valentini and Sangiovanni criticize what they see as the excessive formalism of the Kantian enterprise, contending that the Kantian project is circular, because it defines rights and freedom together, and that this circularity renders it unable to say anything determinate about appropriate restrictions and permissions. I show that the appearance of circularity arises from a misconstrual of the Kantian idea of a right. Properly und…Read more
  •  62
    Law students are usually told that the purpose of damages is to make it as if a wrong had never happened.3 Although torts professors are good at explaining this idea to their students, it is the source of much academic perplexity. Money cannot really make serious losses go away, and it seems a cruel joke to say that money can make an injured person “whole.” Worse still, if money could make an injured person whole, injuring someone and then paying them seems just as good as not injuring them at a…Read more
  •  57
    Critical notice
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4): 669-699. 2010.
    The 2008 meltdown in global capital markets has led to a renewed interest in questions of economic distribution. Many people suggest that the motives, incentive structures, and institutions in place were inadequate and, for the first time in a generation, public debate is animated by arguments about the need for greater equality. G.A. Cohen's new book resonates with many of the themes of these debates; he advocates a more thoroughgoing equality, even more thoroughgoing than that demanded by John…Read more
  •  56
    Three duties to rescue: Moral, civil, and criminal (review)
    Law and Philosophy 19 (6): 751-779. 2000.
    No Abstract
  •  55
    In one of the few widely discussed passages in the Doctrine of Right, Kant makes the surprising claim that a shipwrecked sailor who dislodges another from a plank that will support only one of them is "culpable, but not punishable." Many commentators regard this passage as a sort of smoking gun that shows that, in extremis, Kant resorts to the very sort of empirical and consequentialist reasoning that he claims to do without.2 My aim in this paper is to defend his analysis, by showing both that …Read more
  •  54
    Ronald Dworkin (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    Ronald Dworkin occupies a distinctive place in both public life and philosophy. In public life, he is a regular contributor to The New York Review of Books and other widely read journals. In philosophy, he has written important and influential works on many of the most prominent issues in legal and political philosophy. In both cases, his interventions have in part shaped the debates he joined. His opposition to Robert Bork's nomination for the United States Supreme Court gave new centrality to …Read more
  •  53
    Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier (edited book)
    with Christopher W. Morris
    Cambridge University Press. 2001.
    What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the controversies surrounding…Read more
  •  41
    Private law and private narratives
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20 (4): 683-701. 2000.
  •  40
    Just War, Regular War, and Perpetual Peace
    Kant-Studien 107 (1): 179-195. 2016.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 179-195.
  •  33
    Liberal Justification and the Limits of Neutrality
    Analyse & Kritik 14 (1): 3-17. 1992.
    This paper examines a style of political justification prominent in contemporary liberalism, according to which policies are legitimate only if they can be shown to be acceptable to all. Although this approach is often associated with neutrality about the good life, it is argued that liberalism cannot be neutral about questions of the role of various goods, such as work, play and community. The paper closes by exploring the implications and applicability of this account of justification to conte…Read more
  •  33
    Law and disagreement
    Philosophical Review 110 (4): 611-614. 2001.
    Author Jeremy Waldron has thoroughly revised thirteen of his most recent essays in order to offer a comprehensive critique of the idea of the judicial review of legislation. He argues that a belief in rights is not the same as a commitment to a Bill of Rights. This book presents legislation by a representative assembly as a form of law making which is especially apt for a society whose members disagree with one another about fundamental issues of principle
  •  31
    Explanation and Empathy
    Review of Metaphysics 40 (3). 1987.
    I WISH to defend the claim that imagining what it would be like to be in "someone else's shoes" can serve to explain that person's actions. This commonsense view has considerable plausibility, but requires clarification to be philosophically defensible; discussions of explanation often assume that understanding requires a theory of the thing understood. If understanding requires a theory, then however much imagining what it would be like to be in another person's situation might sooth one's curi…Read more
  •  31
    What Can Philosophy Teach Us About Multiculturalism? (review)
    Dialogue 36 (3): 607-614. 1997.
    Multiculturalism is an increasingly important topic for philosophers, largely because of the practical problems posed by diversity. Traditional political philosophy had little to say about cultural difference, taking the existence of a shared language and culture pretty much for granted. The multicultural societies of the contemporary world make such assumptions untenable. Traditional questions of fairness and sovereignty find hard cases in such policy issues as immigration, education, criminal …Read more