Ashley Shew Heflin

. In this paper we examine the use of companion animals in studies of drugs and devices aimed at human and animal health and situate it within the context of philosophy of technology. We argue that companion animals serve a unique role in illuminating just what it means to use biological technologies and examine the implications for human-animal relationships. Though philosophers have often treated animals as technologies, we argue that the biomedical use of companion animals presents a new configuration of ethical and technological concerns that deserves more attention. Though it seems that companion animals solve many of the ethical dilemmas caused by the use of laboratory animals, the use of companion animals presents its own set of ethical concerns. This paper contextualizes the use of companion animals in research.

Focused on mapping out contemporary and future domains in philosophy of technology, this volume serves as an excellent, forward-looking resource in the field and in cognate areas of study. The 32 chapters, all of them appearing in print here for the first time, were written by both established scholars and fresh voices. They cover topics ranging from data discrimination and engineering design, to art and technology, space junk, and beyond. Spaces for the Future: A Companion to Philosophy of Technology is structured in six parts: Ethical Space and Experience; Political Space and Agency; Virtual Space and Property; Personal Space and Design; Inner Space and Environment; and Outer Space and Imagination. The organization maps out current and emerging spaces of activity in the field and anticipates the big issues that we soon will face.

Philosophers often enroll disabled bodies and minds as objects of thought in their arguments from marginal cases and in thought experiments: for example, arguments for animal ethics use cognitively disabled people as a contrast case, and Merleau-Ponty uses a blind man with a cane as an exemplar of the relationship of technology to the human, of how technology mediates. However, these philosophers enroll disabled people without engaging significantly in any way with disabled people themselves. Instead, disabled people are treated in philosophy as literal objects—and in many cases, as less than human. (This sense of a categorical difference between disabled and nondisabled people is becoming especially clear during the Covid-19 pandemic, as I write this article.) Philosophical reflection thus makes assumptions—often wrong—about disabled people’s lives, experiences, and relationships to technology. Outside of philosophy as well as in, disabled people are not regarded as experts about our own experiences and lives; our testimony is paternalistically written over. We need better consideration of disabled people as people as we consider the future. Lack of disabled people’s points of view in philosophy colors—and sometimes invalidates—views of technological change.

Nanotechnology is viewed by those in favor of its development in two different ways, and the divide is not recent. This article describes the origins of the differing visions of nanotechnology and examines their broader impacts. The typical history of the field tells nothing about these differing visions, which perhaps misleads. At least two distinct camps among scientists and engineers pursue work on the nanoscale, but they rarely interact, and when they do, they get nowhere. This article looks first at definitional issues in the field; then turns to the common history of nanotechnology, the history's shortcomings, and one particular episode that highlights the divide; and then examines the broader impacts of this dispute. The divide among those interested in nanotech tells something about the way different groups of people see technology and the application of science. This historical review clarifies controversy over societal issues and terminology in nanotechnology.

We are in a position today to appreciate the ambiguity of technologies: that they are good, and bad, and neutral and present challenges in different ways. Reading U.S. national nanotechnology documents and histories of nanotechnology, one finds that rhetoric idealizing progress without serious consideration of negative side-effects remains unfortunately fixed within stories constructed about technology. Though we should be better aware of the potential for unintended consequences and negative social effects (and, if anything, we should expect these things), the narratives about nanotechnology today still center on unlimited power over nature, much like technological narratives of eras past. David Nye, in America as Second Creation: Technology and Narratives of New Beginnings, explains how American narratives during the 19th century focused on technology as both transformative and stabilizing. In this time, it seemed as if nature was ready and waiting to be transformed and made useful for the new Americans. While negative effects are predicted and worried about by some elements, the overwhelming voice in discussions of nanotechnology come from the funding agencies, governments, and businesses that seek to profit from it. This article gives us reason to be more skeptical about the types of rhetoric used in this field. The rhetoric used in nanotechnology mimics that of earlier rhetorics of progress. By focusing specifically on narratives of progress within the United States, this article reveals the odd correspondence of rhetoric about nanotechnology with earlier American rhetoric on other technologies.