•  40
    Categorical Injustice
    Journal of Social Philosophy 50 (4): 392-406. 2019.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
  •  2
    The metaphysics of sex and gender
    Feminist Metaphysics 47--65. forthcoming.
  •  12
    Response to Critics
    Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2): 273-283. 2019.
    This is a response to the critical comments by Åsa Burman, Esa Díaz-León, Aaron Griffith, and Katharine Jenkins.
  •  13
    Précis: Categories We Live By
    Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2): 229-233. 2019.
    The project of Categories We Live By is to offer a metaphysics of social categories. The strategy is to give a theory of social properties of individuals. The main components of the theory are a conferralist framework for properties; an account of social meaning; and an account of social construction; accompanying is also an account of social identity. This theory can be applies to offer concrete conferralist proposals of categories such as sex, gender, race, disability, religion, and LGBTQ cate…Read more
  •  18
    Ideological Absorption and Countertechniques
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (3). 2020.
    here.
  •  15
    The pull of social roles (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 118-119. 2012.
  •  69
    The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences (review)
    Philosophical Review 127 (2): 247-251. 2018.
  •  6
    We are women, we are men. We are refugees, single mothers, people with disabilities, and queers. We belong to social categories and they frame our actions, self-understanding, and opportunities. But what are social categories? How are they created and sustained? How does one come to belong to them? Ásta approaches these questions through analytic feminist metaphysics. Her theory of social categories centers on an answer to the question: what is it for a feature of an individual to be socially me…Read more
  •  65
    The pull of social roles
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 118-119. 2012.
  •  9
    Siding with Euthyphro: Response‐Dependence and Conferred Properties
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 108-125. 2010.
    : I argue that a response‐dependence account of a concept can yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in the literature on response‐dependence. In particular, I show how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain property by arguing that the concept of the property is response‐dependent, if certain assumptions are made.
  •  89
    Review of The Metaphysics of Gender by Charlotte Witt (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2012 (5). 2012.
    Review of Charlotte Witt's The Metaphysics of Gender (Oxford 2011)
  •  195
    The Social Construction of Human Kinds
    Hypatia 28 (4): 716-732. 2013.
    Social construction theorists face a certain challenge to the effect that they confuse the epistemic and the metaphysical: surely our conceptions of something are influenced by social practices, but that doesn't show that the nature of the thing in question is so influenced. In this paper I take up this challenge and offer a general framework to support the claim that a human kind is socially constructed, when this is understood as a metaphysical claim and as a part of a social constructionist d…Read more
  •  130
    Essentiality conferred
    Philosophical Studies 140 (1). 2008.
    In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
  •  109
    Siding with euthyphro: Response-dependence and conferred properties
    European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 108-125. 2010.
    : I argue that a response‐dependence account of a concept can yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in the literature on response‐dependence. In particular, I show how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain property by arguing that the concept of the property is response‐dependent, if certain assumptions are made
  •  162
    Social Construction
    Philosophy Compass 10 (12): 884-892. 2015.
    What is social construction? This essay offers a survey of the various ways in which something could be socially constructed and then addresses briefly the questions whether social constructionism involves an untenable anti-realism and what, if anything, unifies all social construction claims
  •  102
    Knowledge of essence: the conferralist story
    Philosophical Studies 166 (1): 21-32. 2013.
    Realist essentialists face a prima facie challenge in accounting for our knowledge of the essences of things, and in particular, in justifying our engaging in thought experiments to gain such knowledge. In contrast, conferralist essentialism has an attractive story to tell about how we gain knowledge of the essences of things, and how thought experiments are a justified method for gaining such knowledge. The conferralist story is told in this essay
  •  1047
    The Metaphysics of Sex and Gender
    In Charlotte Witt (ed.), Feminist Metaphysics, Springer. 2011.
    In this chapter I offer an interpretation of Judith Butler’s metaphysics of sex and gender and situate it in the ontological landscape alongside what has long been the received view of sex and gender in the English speaking world, which owes its inspiration to the works of Simone de Beauvoir. I then offer a critique of Butler’s view, as interpreted, and subsequently an original account of sex and gender, according to which both are constructed—or conferred, as I would put it— albeit in different…Read more
  •  14
    Review of Anthony O'Hear, The Landscape of Humanity: Art, Culture, and Society (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.