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43Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability of Early Vision?Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (4): 1307-1330. 2024.Empirical research suggests that motive states modulate perception affecting perceptual processing either directly, or indirectly through the modulation of spatial attention. The affective modulation of perception occurs at various latencies, some of which fall within late vision, that is, after 150 ms. poststimulus. Earlier effects enhance the C1 and P1 ERP components in early vision, the former enhancement being the result of direct emotive effects on perceptual processing, and the latter bein…Read more
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51Cognitive Penetrability: An OverviewIn John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-56. 2015.
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223The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2015.According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developme…Read more
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26Studies on cognitively driven attention suggest that late vision is cognitively penetrated, whereas early vision is notBehavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.
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19Introduction: The 5th Hellenic Conference on the History, Philosophy and Science Teaching “The Great Scientific Theories in the Teaching of Natural Sciences”Science & Education 20 (10): 937-941. 2011.
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Cognitive penetrability and consciousnessIn John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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The cognitive penetrability of perception : an overviewIn John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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15Précis of "Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception"Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (3): 355-362. 2020.
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38Object individuation by iconic content: How is numerosity represented in iconic representation?Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1): 42-70. 2020.: Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for …Read more
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36Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of PerceptionSpringer Verlag. 2019.This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neithe…Read more
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13Pre-cueing, the Epistemic Role of Early Vision, and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early VisionFrontiers in Psychology 8. 2017.
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19Abduction, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Scientific Practise: The Case of Newton’s OpticsIn Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues, Springer International Publishing. 2006.Hintikka argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive proc…Read more
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23Editorial: Pre-cueing Effects on Perception and Cognitive PenetrabilityFrontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.
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17Lessons from the History of the Concept of the Ray for Teaching Geometrical OpticsScience & Education 20 (10): 1007-1037. 2011.
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23The Phenomenal Content of ExperienceMind and Language 21 (2): 187-219. 2006.We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottom‐up from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. T…Read more
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1Cartesian Deductivism and Newtonian Inductivism: A Comparative StudyDissertation, The Johns Hopkins University. 1994.It has been a traditional claim that Newtonian inductivism sharply contradicts Cartesian deductivism, and that Newton's rejection of the method of hypothesis is intended as a criticism of the Cartesian scientific methodology. There have been some sharp attacks against the received view that Descartes aimed at the construction of a purely a priori science, but despite this two beliefs still dominate even recent interpretations of Descartes' work. The first is the belief that a significant part of…Read more
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445Was cartesian science ever meant to be a priori? A comment on HatfieldPhilosophy of Science 62 (1): 150-160. 1995.In a recent article G. Hatfield claims that Descartes for a certain time thought a purely a priori science to be possible. Hatfield's evidence consists of his reading of the Cartesian method in the Regulae and of a letter to Mersenne, written in May 1632. I argue that Hatfield misinterprets the Cartesian method and Descartes' claim in the letter to Mersenne. I first show that the latter does not argue for an a priori science. Then, I show that the method of the Regulae is not a priori. Finally, …Read more
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83The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual contentPhilosophical Psychology (5): 1-20. 2013.I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I examine the definitions of N…Read more
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64Nonconceptual content: A reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision”Philosophical Psychology 27 (5): 643-651. 2014.Toribio argues against my thesis that the cognitive penetrability (CP) of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for this content to be nonconceptual content (NCC)–the MET (mutually entailing thesis). Her main point is that MET presupposes a non-standard, causal interpretation of NCC that either trivializes NCC or fails to engage with the contemporary literature on NCC, in which the property of being nonconceptual is not construed in empirical but in constitutive ter…Read more
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82Cognitive Penetration Lite and Nonconceptual ContentErkenntnis 82 (5): 1097-1122. 2017.The Macpherson :24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable. Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content because this would provide a good explanation for several phenomena concerning perceptual experience. To have both, Macpherson must defend the thesis that the CP of perception is compatible with perception having NCC. Since the classical notion of CP of perception does not allow perception to have NCC, Macpherson proposes CP-lite…Read more
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Abductive Inference in Late VisionIn Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii: Western & Eastern Studies, Springer Verlag. 2015.
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1120The phenomenal content of experienceMind and Language 21 (2): 187-219. 2006.We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. Th…Read more
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254Reentrant neural pathways and the theory-ladenness of perceptionPhilosophy of Science 68 (3). 2001.In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observati…Read more
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127Descartes’ Proof of the Essence of Matter and the Cartesian Scientific SystemJournal of Philosophical Research 21 209-229. 1996.It has been a traditional claim that Descartes sought to construct a deductive scientific system in which everything could be deduced from a priori truths. I shall call this thesis strong a priorism. In view of the overwhelming amount of evidence that Descartes thought experience to be a necessary part of his method, the traditional interpretation has undergone several transformations. One interpretation resulting from this transformation holds that Descartes sought to prove the first principles…Read more
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60What Unilateral Visual Neglect Teaches us About Perceptual PhenomenologyErkenntnis 80 (2): 339-358. 2015.Studies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay , based on spatial neglects studies, argued that the property of being suitable for action is part of the perceptual phenomenology of neglect patients. In this paper, I argue that the studies on visual neglect conducted thus far do not support Nanay’s thesis that when patients succeed in detecting the neglected object, it’s action properti…Read more
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88The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-LadennessJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1): 87-103. 2015.In this paper, I claim that since there is a cognitively impenetrable stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and cognitive penetrability and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasi…Read more
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273Newton's experimental proofs as eliminative reasoningErkenntnis 50 (1): 91-121. 1999.In this paper I discuss Newton's first optical paper. My aim is to examine the type of argument which Newton uses in order to convince his readers of the truth of his theory of colors. My claim is that this argument is an induction by elimination, and that the Newtonian method of justification is a kind of “generative justification”, a term due to T. Nickles. To achieve my aim I analyze in some detail the arguments in Newton's first optical paper, relating the paper with Newton's other writings …Read more
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83Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints (edited book)Nova Science. 2005.The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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University of CyprusRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |