•  2
    Introduction
    In Bernard Williams (ed.), Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Princeton University Press. 2006.
  •  1
    This essay is concerned with Bernard Williams’ contention in _Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy_ that, in ethics, reflection can destroy knowledge. I attempt to defend this contention from the charge of incoherence. I do this by taking seriously the idea that ethical knowledge is knowledge from an ethical point of view. There nevertheless remains an issue about whether the contention is consistent with ideas elsewhere in Williams’ own work, in particular with what he says about knowledge in _D…Read more
  • Western Philosophy (edited book)
    with Malcolm Seymour, Trevor Green, Audrey Healy, J. D. G. Evans, Richard Cross, James Ladyman, Katherine J. Morris, W. J. Mander, Christine Battersby, Robert Stern, Christopher Hookway, Bob Carruthers, Gary Russell, Dennis Hedlund, Alex Ridgway, Alexander Fyfe, Paul Farrer, and Trevor Nichols
    Kultur. 2006.
  • Bernard Williams
    In John Shand (ed.), Central Works of Philosophy, Vol. 5: The Twentieth Century: Quine and After, Acumen Publishing. pp. 207-226. 2006.
  •  3
    Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mathematics
    In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, Wiley-blackwell. 2017.
    The philosophy of mathematics was of colossal importance to Wittgenstein. Its problems had a peculiarly strong hold on him; and he seems to have thought that it was in addressing these problems that he produced his greatest work. However robust the distinction between the calculus and the surrounding prose, the prose may infect the calculus; or the prose may infect how we couch the calculus. Yet Wittgenstein's writings in the philosophy of mathematics stand in a curious relation to this self‐ass…Read more
  •  1
    Philosophy of Logic
    In Nicholas Bunnin & E. P. Tsui‐James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Blackwell. 2002.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Propositions Possibility Marginalia.
  •  8
    Wittgenstein and Transcendental Idealism
    In Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters, Blackwell. 2007.
    This chapter contains section titled: Introduction1 Was the Early Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist? Was the Later Wittgenstein a Transcendental Idealist?
  •  12
    More on 'The Philosophical Significance of Gödel's Theorem'
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 55 (1): 103-126. 1998.
    In Michael Dummett's celebrated essay on Gödel's theorem he considers the threat posed by the theorem to the idea that meaning is use and argues that this threat can be annulled. In my essay I try to show that the threat is even less serious than Dummett makes it out to be. Dummett argues, in effect, that Gödel's theorem does not prevent us from "capturing" the truths of arithmetic; I argue that the idea that meaning is use does not require that we be able to "capture" these truths anyway. Towar…Read more
  •  129
    Critical notice. One or two dogmas of objectivism
    Mind 108 (430): 381-394. 1999.
  •  19
    Ineffability and Nonsense
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1): 169-193. 2003.
    Criteria of ineffability are presented which, it is claimed, preclude the possibility of truths that are ineffable, but not the possibility of other things that are ineffable—not even the possibility of other things that are non-trivially ineffable. Specifically, they do not preclude the possibility of states of understanding that are ineffable. This, it is argued, allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and those who adop…Read more
  •  106
    Review: One or Two Dogmas of Objectivism (review)
    Mind 108 (430). 1999.
    This essay is a critical notice of Thomas Nagel’s The Last Word. Though the essay evidences broad sympathy with the spirit of Nagel’s book, its main burden is to query the letter of the book. Nagel’s defence of the view that there are certain beliefs and ways of thinking that are not from any point of view, or that are ‘objective’ in his own terms, is criticized on the grounds that it is too facile. It is also criticized for not being pitted against a critique of beliefs and ways of thinking tha…Read more
  •  237
    Bird on Kant's Mathematical Antinomies
    Kantian Review 16 (2): 235-243. 2011.
    This essay is concerned with Graham Bird’s treatment, in The Revolutionary Kant, of Kant’s mathematical antinomies. On Bird’s interpretation, our error in these antinomies is to think that we can settle certain issues about the limits of physical reality by pure reason whereas in fact we cannot settle them at all. On the rival interpretation advocated in this essay, it is not true that we cannot settle these issues. Our error is to presuppose that the concept of the unconditioned has application…Read more
  •  217
    The metaphysics of perspective: Tense and colour (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2). 2004.
    This essay is a contribution to a symposium on Barry Stroud’s book The Quest for Reality. It exploits various analogies between tense and colour to defend the idea, about which Stroud is deeply sceptical, that we can successfully undertake what Stroud calls ‘the philosophical quest for reality’—more specifically, to defend the idea that we can do this by arguing that any fact can be represented from no point of view.
  •  264
    What are these Familiar Words Doing Here?
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 147-171. 2002.
    This essay is concerned with six linguistic moves that we commonly make, each of which is considered in turn. These are: stating rules of representation; representing things categorically; mentioning expressions; saying truly or falsely how things are; saying vaguely how things are; and stating rules of rules of representation. A common-sense view is defended of what is involved in our doing each of these six things against a much more sceptical view emanating from the idea that linguistic behav…Read more
  •  278
    Ineffability and religion
    European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2). 2003.
    It is argued that, although there are no ineffable truths, the concept of ineffability nevertheless does have application—to certain states of knowledge. Towards the end of the essay this idea is related to religion: it is argued that the language that results from attempting (unsuccessfully) to put ineffable knowledge into words is very often of a religious kind. An example of this is given at the very end of the essay. This example concerns the Euthyphro question: whether what is right is righ…Read more
  •  51
  •  1
    Wittgenstein and infinity
    In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  49
    Wittgenstein and transcendental idealism
    In Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Wittgenstein and His Interpreters: Essays in Memory of Gordon Baker, Blackwell. pp. 174--199. 2007.
  •  6
    The Infinite: Third Edition
    Routledge. 2018.
    This third edition of The Infinite includes a new part 'Infinity Superseded' which contains two new chapters refining Moore's ideas through a re-examination of the ideas of Spinoza, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Much of this is heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze. There is also a new technical appendix on still unresolved issues about different infinite sizes.
  •  86
    This book is concerned with the history of metaphysics since Descartes. Taking as its definition of metaphysics 'the most general attempt to make sense of things', it charts the evolution of this enterprise through various competing conceptions of its possibility, scope, and limits. The book is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with the early modern period, the late modern period in the analytic tradition, and the late modern period in non-analytic traditions. In its unusually wide …Read more
  •  20
    The English language and philosophy
    Rue Descartes 26 73-80. 1999.
    Dans quelle mesure la philosophie du langage ordinaire, faite par des anglophones qui réfléchissent sur la langue et son usage correct, est-elle liée à l'anglais ? Ainsi, quand elle traite de la nature de la connaissance, se peut-il qu'il s'agisse de questions induites par le terme knowledge ? Adrian Moore instruit la cohérence d'une réponse négative à partir d'une réflexion sur le « nous » qui parle. Mais il voit dans l'impossibilité de principe pour la philosophie du langage ordinaire de denie…Read more
  •  3
    Review: On the Right Track (review)
    Mind 112 (446). 2003.
  •  146
    Quasi‐realism and Relativism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1). 2002.
    1. If it is true that ‘an ethic is the propositional reflection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of people,’ as Simon Blackburn says in summary of the quasi-realism that he champions in this excellent and wonderfully provocative book, then it seems to follow that different dispositions, attitudes, policies and stances—different conative states, for short—will issue in different ethics, each with an equal claim to truth; and this in turn seems to be one thing that could be…Read more
  •  2
    Quine
    In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), 12 Modern Philosophers, Wiley-blackwell. 2009.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Carnap's Logical Positivism Quine's Naturalism The External/Internal Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction The Indeterminacy of Translation Quine's Conception of Philosophy I: Metaphysics Quine's Conception of Philosophy II: Ontology Quine's Influence References.
  • Points of View
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (3): 401-401. 1999.
  •  1
    Points of View
    Mind 109 (433): 166-170. 2000.
  •  9
    Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (edited book)
    Princeton University Press. 2006.
    What can--and what can't--philosophy do? What are its ethical risks--and its possible rewards? How does it differ from science? In Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Bernard Williams addresses these questions and presents a striking vision of philosophy as fundamentally different from science in its aims and methods even though there is still in philosophy "something that counts as getting it right." Written with his distinctive combination of rigor, imagination, depth, and humanism, the boo…Read more
  •  87
    On the right track (review)
    Mind 112 (446): 307-322. 2003.