•  1
    The Inner World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (1): 105-107. 1942.
  •  22
    Howison, Philosopher and Teacher
    Journal of Philosophy 31 (21): 581-582. 1934.
  •  14
    The mindful eye: Smooth pursuit and saccadic eye movements in meditators and non-meditators
    with Veena Kumari, Elena Antonova, Aseel Hamid, Eva Machado Hernandez, Anne Schmechtig, and Ulrich Ettinger
    Consciousness and Cognition 48 66-75. 2017.
  •  3
    The Organization of Truth
    International Journal of Ethics 20 (1): 63-72. 1909.
  •  25
    Benacerraf's Dilemma Revisited
    European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1): 101-129. 2002.
  • Process and Purpose
    Hibbert Journal 32 (n/a): 202. 1933.
  • Everyman a Philosopher
    Hibbert Journal 33 (n/a): 549. 1934.
  • The Creed of the World Council of Christian Churches
    Hibbert Journal 38 (n/a): 386. 1939.
  • George Holmes Howison Philosopher and Teacher; a Selection From His Writings,with a Biographical Sketch
    with George Holmes Howison and George Malcolm Stratton
    University of California Press. 1934.
  • Philosophers I have known
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3): 267. 1940.
  • Borden Parker Bowne: Personalist
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 5 (2): 88. 1924.
  •  100
    Is there a phenomenology of thought?
    In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2011.
  •  126
    Darkness Visible?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1). 2012.
    In the philosophy of perception, typically, everything is illuminated. Discussions of perceptual experience primarily focus on subjects situated in illuminated environs. Rarely do we see treatment of putative perceptual experience involving darkness. In this paper, I will carefully canvas and characterize the nature of experiences of darkness, marking a substantive distinction between two such kinds of experiences. Crucially, I give an account of the distinctive phenomenology of experiences of d…Read more
  •  30
    Transitivity for height versus speed: To what extent do the under-7s really have a transitive capacity?
    with Suzanne Robertson and Lucy Hadfield
    Thinking and Reasoning 17 (1): 57-81. 2011.
  •  82
    Getting one step closer to deduction: Introducing an alternative paradigm for transitive inference
    with Donna Howells
    Thinking and Reasoning 14 (3): 244-280. 2008.
    Transitive inference is claimed to be “deductive”. Yet every group/species ever reported apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve five-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible. Response accuracy and RT (non-discriminative nRT ) were measured as is typically done. We also measured RT confined to correct responses ( cRT ). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena emerged. The symbol…Read more
  •  4
    Pre-Socratic philosophy. - Plato. - Aristotle. - Post-Aristotelian philosophy. - The Theory of art: Quintilian, Longinus, and Philostratus. - Plotinus. - The lesser Neoplatonists. - Neoplatonic views of three early Christians. - Mediaeval descriptive psychology. - The psychology of the mystics. - Dante's theory of vision. - Conclusion.
  •  34
    Transitive inference (TI) plays a part in many aspects of reasoning, and is usually assessed using variants on a particular task dubbed the “IP-paradigm”. Advocates of this paradigm assume it ensures that subjects must use deduction to solve the inferential questions. The present task with 63 adults strengthened this claim by removing all possible perceptual cues and limiting as far as possible all cues from the training procedure itself. Response speed and accuracy were measured as premises wer…Read more
  •  8
    And if the developmental data doesn't quite fit ..
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 847-848. 1998.
    Halford et al. seek to provide a framework that unifies distinct developmental phenomena. However, in pursuit of this goal, they sidestep crucial aspects of some well-known developmental benchmarks (most notably Transitive Inference and Object Concept), and they do not acknowledge “repeated” or “direct” experience as possibly being more fundamental than relational complexity, instead, ascribe all experience a secondary role.
  •  14
    The organization of truth
    International Journal of Ethics 20 (1): 63-72. 1909.
  •  19
    Personal realism
    Philosophical Review 45 (6): 601-609. 1936.