• Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy
    with John Rawls
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1): 178-179. 2002.
  •  22
    The Practice of Moral Judgment
    Journal of Philosophy 82 (8): 414. 1985.
  •  75
  •  128
    Mutual aid and respect for persons
    Ethics 94 (4): 577-602. 1984.
  •  64
    Rules, motives, and helping actions
    Philosophical Studies 45 (3). 1984.
  •  106
    Morality and Everyday Life
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (2). 2000.
  •  195
    Murder and Mayhem: Violence and Kantian Casuistry
    The Monist 72 (3): 411-431. 1989.
    This paper began in the startled realization that little if anything is said in Kant’s ethics about the more violent forms of immoral action. There are discussions of lying, deception, self-neglect, nonbeneficence—but apart from suicide, a great silence about the darker actions. At the least, this should be an occasion for curiosity. Although the degree of concern with acts of violence in contemporary ethics may be in its own way curious, it does not seem unreasonable to expect a moral theory to…Read more
  •  58
    Doing Too Much
    The Journal of Ethics 22 (2): 147-162. 2018.
    It is common to find moral fault for doing less than one should, but not for doing more. A detailed investigation of some examples of “doing too much” reveals an important sphere of wrong-doing related to abuses of authority and discretion.
  •  16
    The Practice of Moral Judgment
    Ethics 106 (2): 404-423. 1993.
  •  58
    Morality and Moral Theory
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83 (2). 2009.
  •  8
    First published in 1990. The aim of this thesis is to show that the way to understand the central claims of Kant’s ethics is to accept the idea that morality is a distinctive form of rationality; that the moral "ought" belongs to a system of imperatives based in practical reason; and that moral judgment, therefore, is a species of rational assessment of agents’ actions. It argues, in effect, that you cannot understand Kant’s views about morality if you read him with Humean assumptions about rati…Read more
  •  37
    The Practice of Moral Judgment
    Philosophical Review 103 (4): 768. 1994.
  •  635
    On the value of acting from the motive of duty
    Philosophical Review 90 (3): 359-382. 1981.
    Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not also hold that such a state of affairs is morally better, al…Read more
  •  63
    Embracing Kant's Formalism
    Kantian Review 16 (1): 49-66. 2011.
    In response to critical discussions of my book, Moral Literacy, by Stephen Engstrom, Sally Sedgwick and Andrews Reath, I offer a defence of Kant's formalism that is not only friendly to my claims for the moral theory's sensitivity to a wide range of moral phenomena and practices at the ground level, but also consistent with Kant's high rationalist ambitions
  •  54
    Making Exceptions
    In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010, De Gruyter. pp. 245-262. 2013.
  •  194
    Integrity and Impartiality
    The Monist 66 (2): 233-250. 1983.
    Most of us have been brought up on the idea that moral theories divide as they are, at the root, either deontological or consequentialist. A new point of division has been emerging that places deontological and consequentialist theories together against theories of virtue, or a conception of morality constrained at the outset by the requirements of the “personal.” In a series of important essays Bernard Williams has offered striking arguments for the significance of the personal in moral thought…Read more
  •  144
    Moral Literacy
    Harvard University Press. 2007.
    Making room for character -- Pluralism and the community of moral judgment -- A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends --Responsibility and moral competence --Can virtue be taught?: the problem of new moral facts -- Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education -- Bootstrapping -- Rethinking Kant's hedonism -- The scope of moral requirement -- The will and its objects -- Obligatory ends -- Moral improvisation -- Contingency in obligation.
  •  2
    A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends
    In Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, Christine M. Korsgaard & John Rawls (eds.), Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, Cambridge University Press. pp. 187--213. 1997.
  •  185
    Reasoning to obligation
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1). 2006.
    If, as Kant says, "the will is practical reason", we should think of willing as a mode of reasoning, and its activity represented in movement from evaluative premises to intention by way of a validity-securing principle of inference. Such a view of willing takes motive and rational choice out of empirical psychology, thereby eliminating grounds for many familiar objections to Kant's account of morally good action. The categorical imperative provides the fundamental principle of valid practical i…Read more
  •  45
    Kant and the Duty of Mutual Aid
    Journal of Philosophy 79 (11): 720-721. 1982.
  •  174
    Morality unbounded
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (4): 323-358. 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  423
    The practice of moral judgment
    Journal of Philosophy 82 (8): 414-436. 1985.