•  28
    It has been argued contra Humean accounts of scientific laws that on Humean accounts laws are flukes since they are merely true generalizations and it would be an accident or a fluke for a generalization to obtain unless there was a non-Humean law "backing" it. This paper argues that this kind of objection is mistaken. It goes on to describe an account of laws called "the Package Deal Account" that is a descendent of Lewis' BSA on which it is not an accident that our universe has a best systemat…Read more
  •  15
    Humean laws and explanation
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (3): 373-385. 2019.
    My primary focus in this paper is on an objection to Humean account of laws and specifically to David Lewis’ “best systems analysis”. The objection is that the laws according to the BSA fail to account for the ability of laws to explain. In contrast governing laws are alleged to account for the role of laws in scientific explanations by virtue of their governing role. If governing is required for laws to be explanatory then Humean accounts like Lewis’ are dead in the water since explanation is c…Read more
  •  32
    This paper develops an account of the metaphysics of fundamental laws I call “the Package Deal Account ” that is a descendent of Lewis’ BSA but differs from it in a number of significant ways. It also rejects some elements of the metaphysics in which Lewis develops his BSA. First, Lewis proposed a metaphysical thesis about fundamental properties he calls “Humean Supervenience” according to which all fundamental properties are instantiated by points or point sized individuals and the only fundame…Read more
  •  21
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information
    Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 297-300. 1982.
  •  10
    Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
  •  32
    Three Trivial Truth Theories
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3). 1983.
    According to Tarski, a theory of truth for a language L is a theory which logically implies for each sentence S of L a sentence of the form:S is true-in-L if and only if p,where rS1 is replaced by a canonical description of a sentence of L and rp1 is replaced by that sentence if L is contained in the metalanguage or by a translation of S if it is not so contained. Tarski constructed consistent and finitely axiomatized theories of truth for various formal languages and showed how to explicitly de…Read more
  • Freedom from Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will
    In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2004.
  •  1
    Philosophy of Cosmology: an Introduction (edited book)
    with A. Ijjas
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  12
    A companion to David Lewis (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2015.
    In _A Companion to David Lewis_, Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer bring together top philosophers to explain, discuss, and critically extend Lewis's seminal work in original ways. Students and scholars will discover the underlying themes and complex interconnections woven through the diverse range of his work in metaphysics, philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. The first and only comprehensive study of the work of David…Read more
  • Physicalism and its Discontents (edited book)
    . 2001.
  •  83
  •  12
    Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s M ind and the Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
    NRP is a family of views differing by how they understand “reduction” and “physicalism.” Following Kim I understand the non-reduction as holding that some events and properties are distinct from any physical events and properties. A necessary condition for physicalism is that mental properties, events, and laws supervene on physical ones. Kim allows various understandings of “supervenience” but I think that physicalism requires at least the claim that any minimal physical duplicate of the actual…Read more
  • Knowledge, Names, and Necessity
    Dissertation, Stanford University. 1975.
  •  228
    Mind matters
    with Ernest Le Pore
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (11). 1987.
  •  34
    Help for the good samaritan paradox
    Philosophical Studies 50 (1). 1986.
  •  253
    Why is there anything except physics?
    Synthese 170 (2). 2009.
    In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and…Read more
  •  311
    David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance
    Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 1115--25. 2004.
    The most important theories in fundamental physics, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics, posit objective probabilities or chances. As important as chance is there is little agreement about what it is. The usual “interpretations of probability” give very different accounts of chance and there is disagreement concerning which, if any, is capable of accounting for its role in physics. David Lewis has contributed enormously to improving this situation. In his classic paper “A Subjectivist's …Read more
  •  20
    Preface
    Synthese 70 (2): 157-157. 1987.
  •  143
    Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s Mind and the Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3). 2002.
    NRP is a family of views differing by how they understand “reduction” and “physicalism.” Following Kim I understand the non-reduction as holding that some events and properties are distinct from any physical events and properties. A necessary condition for physicalism is that mental properties, events, and laws supervene on physical ones. Kim allows various understandings of “supervenience” but I think that physicalism requires at least the claim that any minimal physical duplicate of the actual…Read more
  •  50
    The value of truth
    Philosophical Issues 4 265-280. 1993.
  •  86
    Solipsistic semantics
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 595-614. 1986.
  •  378
  • E. Lepore
    with New Directions In Semantics
    In Ernest Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics, Academic Press. pp. 83. 1987.
  •  62
    Wanted Dead or Alive: Two Attempts to Solve Schrodinger's Paradox
    with David Albert
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 277-285. 1990.
    We discuss two recent attempts two solve Schrodinger's cat paradox. One is the modal interpretation developed by Kochen, Healey, Dieks, and van Fraassen. It allows for an observable which pertains to a system to possess a value even when the system is not in an eigenstate of that observable. The other is a recent theory of the collapse of the wave function due to Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber. It posits a dynamics which has the effect of collapsing the state of macroscopic systems. We argue that t…Read more
  • Determinism
    In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Routledge. 2008.