•  169
    More on making mind matter
    with Ernest Lepore
    Philosophical Topics 17 (1): 175-191. 1989.
  •  13
    More on Making Mind Matter
    with Ernest Lepore
    Philosophical Topics 17 (1): 175-191. 1989.
  •  50
    What Davidson Should Have Said
    with Ernest Lepore
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1): 65-78. 1989.
    According to Davidson, a theory of meaning for a language L should specify information such that if someone had this information he would be in a position to understand L . He claims that a theory of truth for L fits this description. Many critics have argued that a truth theory is too weak to be a theory of meaning. We argue that these critics and Davidson's response to them have been misguided. Many critics have been misguided because they have not been clear aboutwhat a theory of meaning is s…Read more
  •  4
    What Davidson Should Have Said
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1): 65-78. 1989.
    According to Davidson, a theory of meaning for a language L should specify information such that if someone had this information he would be in a position to understand L. He claims that a theory of truth for L fits this description. Many critics have argued that a truth theory is too weak to be a theory of meaning. We argue that these critics and Davidson's response to them have been misguided. Many critics have been misguided because they have not been clear aboutwhat a theory of meaning is su…Read more
  •  33
    Three Trivial Truth Theories
    with Ernest Lepore
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3). 1983.
    According to Tarski, a theory of truth for a language L is a theory which logically implies for each sentence S of L a sentence of the form:S is true-in-L if and only if p,where rS1 is replaced by a canonical description of a sentence of L and rp1 is replaced by that sentence if L is contained in the metalanguage or by a translation of S if it is not so contained. Tarski constructed consistent and finitely axiomatized theories of truth for various formal languages and showed how to explicitly de…Read more
  • Why There Is Anything except Physics
    In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press. 2008.
  •  34
    It has been argued contra Humean accounts of scientific laws that on Humean accounts laws are flukes since they are merely true generalizations and it would be an accident or a fluke for a generalization to obtain unless there was a non-Humean law "backing" it. This paper argues that this kind of objection is mistaken. It goes on to describe an account of laws called "the Package Deal Account" that is a descendent of Lewis' BSA on which it is not an accident that our universe has a best systemat…Read more
  •  19
    Humean laws and explanation
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (3): 373-385. 2019.
    My primary focus in this paper is on an objection to Humean account of laws and specifically to David Lewis’ “best systems analysis”. The objection is that the laws according to the BSA fail to account for the ability of laws to explain. In contrast governing laws are alleged to account for the role of laws in scientific explanations by virtue of their governing role. If governing is required for laws to be explanatory then Humean accounts like Lewis’ are dead in the water since explanation is c…Read more
  •  40
    The package deal account of laws and properties
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 1065-1089. 2020.
    This paper develops an account of the metaphysics of fundamental laws I call “the Package Deal Account ” that is a descendent of Lewis’ BSA but differs from it in a number of significant ways. It also rejects some elements of the metaphysics in which Lewis develops his BSA. First, Lewis proposed a metaphysical thesis about fundamental properties he calls “Humean Supervenience” according to which all fundamental properties are instantiated by points or point sized individuals and the only fundame…Read more
  •  25
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information
    Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 297-300. 1982.
  •  10
    Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
  • Freedom from Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will
    In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2004.
  •  1
    Philosophy of Cosmology: an Introduction (edited book)
    with A. Ijjas
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  25
    A companion to David Lewis (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2015.
    In _A Companion to David Lewis_, Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer bring together top philosophers to explain, discuss, and critically extend Lewis's seminal work in original ways. Students and scholars will discover the underlying themes and complex interconnections woven through the diverse range of his work in metaphysics, philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. The first and only comprehensive study of the work of David…Read more
  • Physicalism and its Discontents (edited book)
    . 2001.
  •  87
  •  12
    Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s M ind and the Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
    NRP is a family of views differing by how they understand “reduction” and “physicalism.” Following Kim I understand the non-reduction as holding that some events and properties are distinct from any physical events and properties. A necessary condition for physicalism is that mental properties, events, and laws supervene on physical ones. Kim allows various understandings of “supervenience” but I think that physicalism requires at least the claim that any minimal physical duplicate of the actual…Read more
  • Knowledge, Names, and Necessity
    Dissertation, Stanford University. 1975.
  •  228
    Mind matters
    with Ernest Le Pore
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (11). 1987.
  •  187
    Copenhagen versus Bohmian Interpretations of Quantum Theory1 (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 317-328. 1998.
  •  12
    Mind Matters
    with Ernest Le Pore
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (11): 630-642. 1987.
  •  45
    Leibniz and the ontological argument
    Philosophical Studies 34 (1). 1978.
    According to leibniz, Descartes' ontological argument establishes that if God possibly exists then God exists. To complete the argument a proof that God possibly exists is required. Leibniz attempts a proof-Theoretic demonstration that 'god exists' is consistent and concludes from this that 'god possibly exists is true'. In this paper I formalize leibniz's argument in a system of modal logic. I show that a principle which leibniz implicitly uses, 'if a is consistent then a is possibly true' is e…Read more
  •  30
    Freedom from Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will
    Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 91-112. 1996.
  •  314
    Determinism and Chance
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (4): 609-620. 2001.
    It is generally thought that objective chances for particular events different from 1 and 0 and determinism are incompatible. However, there are important scientific theories whose laws are deterministic but which also assign non-trivial probabilities to events. The most important of these is statistical mechanics whose probabilities are essential to the explanations of thermodynamic phenomena. These probabilities are often construed as 'ignorance' probabilities representing our lack of knowledg…Read more