University of Reading
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics
  •  126
    Quasi-Realism for Realists
    Philosophers' Imprint. forthcoming.
    Reductive realists about normative properties are often charged with being relativists: it is often argued that their view implies that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, these judgements can both be true. I argue that reductive realists can answer this charge by copying the quasi-realist moves that many expressivists make. I then argue that the remaining difference between reductive realism and expressivism is unimportant.
  •  62
    Superspreading the word
    Noûs. forthcoming.
    Quasi‐realists are expressivists who say much of what realists say. To avoid making their view indistinguishable from realism, however, they usually stop short of saying everything realists say. Many realists therefore think that something important is missing from quasi‐realism. I argue that quasi‐realists can undermine this thought by defending a version of quasi‐realism that I call super‐quasi‐realism. This version seems indistinguishable from realism, but I argue that this is a mistaken impr…Read more
  •  55
    Standing up for supervenience
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    There is a well-known argument against irreducibly normative properties that appeals to the following claim about supervenience: for all possible worlds W and W*, if the instantiation of descriptive properties in W and W* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative properties in W and W* is also exactly the same. This claim used to be uncontroversial, but recently several philosophers have challenged it. Do these challenges undermine this argument? I argue that they do not, since th…Read more
  •  48
    We argued that formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize and therefore fail. Christine Tiefensee and Gregory Wheeler deny this. We argue that they are wrong, for two reasons. The first concerns how we should adjudicate conflicts between formal and substantive commitments. The second concerns an overlooked tension between formal objections and non-error-theoretic views. Our discussion shows that the commitments behind formal objections to the error theory, such as the dual schema, shou…Read more
  •  2
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
  •  127
    Why formal objections to the error theory fail
    Analysis 81 (2): 254-262. 2021.
    Many philosophers argue that the error theory should be rejected because it is incompatible with standard deontic logic and semantics. We argue that such formal objections to the theory fail. Our discussion has two upshots. First, it increases the dialectical weight that must be borne by objections to the error theory that target its content rather than its form. Second, it shows that standard deontic logic and semantics should be revised.
  •  454
    A brief overview of metaethics, written for students.
  •  30
    Précis of Unbelievable Errors
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6): 687-696. 2019.
    In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgments, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory.
  •  33
    Response to Hattiangadi, Evers, and Tiefensee
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6): 743-754. 2019.
    I argue that Hattiangadi’s, Evers’ and Tiefensee’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail.
  •  38
    Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (4): 322-341. 2018.
    I argue that Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder’s objections to my arguments for the error theory in Unbelievable Errors fail. I also argue that our inability to believe the error theory should affect our assessments of these arguments.
  •  32
    Précis of Unbelievable Errors
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (4): 257-269. 2018.
    In Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that our inability to believe this theory makes the theory more likely to be true. This précis gives a brief overview of my arguments for the error theory and of my explanation of our inability to believe the theory.
  •  70
    I Ought to Reply, So I Can
    Philosophia 47 (5): 1547-1554. 2019.
    I have elsewhere given three arguments for the claim that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action only if this person can perform this action. Henne, Semler, Chituc, De Brigard, and Sinnott-Armstrong make several objections to my arguments. I here respond to their objections.
  •  159
    According to the error theory, normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but these properties do not exist. I have argued elsewhere (in "Can We Believe the Error Theory?") that we cannot believe this theory. Several philosophers have replied to this argument. In this chapter, I respond to their replies.
  •  169
    Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory.…Read more
  •  110
    Reasons and Entailment
    Erkenntnis 66 (3): 353-374. 2007.
    What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p1,...,pn and q, if the conjunction of p1,..., and pn entails q, then there is a reason against a person's both believing that p1,..., and that pn and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the other answers to this question face…Read more
  •  164
    Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?
    Ratio 26 (4): 450-470. 2013.
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world
  •  288
    Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4): 537-561. 2008.
    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties
  •  235
    Reasons and Impossibility
    Philosophical Studies 136 (3): 351-384. 2007.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the …Read more
  •  201
    Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?
    European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2). 2003.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.
  •  167
    Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 419-436. 2016.
    Jonas Olson writes that "a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity". I agree. But unlike Olson, I think we cannot believe this error theory. I first argue that Olson should say that reasons for belief are irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then explain why I think Olson's objections to this argument fail. I end by showing tha…Read more
  •  186
    Campbell Brown is right that my argument against semi-global consequentialism relies on the principle of agglomeration. However, semi-global consequentialists cannot rescue their view simply by rejecting this principle.
  •  74
    No, We Cannot
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4): 537-546. 2016.
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot.
  •  223
    Can consequentialism cover everything?
    Utilitas 15 (2): 237-47. 2003.
    Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.
  •  69
    Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall, Reasons for Action (review)
    Analysis 71 (1): 200-202. 2011.
  •  152
    Inferential and non-inferential reasoning
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 1-29. 2007.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help …Read more
  •  258
    Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?
    with Daan Evers
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1): 1-9. 2016.
    Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
  •  202
    Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties
    In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336. 2013.
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.