•  2
    Exploring the relationship between natural law theory and the philosophy of law, Bebhinn Donnelly proposes a new approach to natural law theory - one which addresses some of the tradition's shortcomings, and advances further the approach to Hume's dichotomy. This volume will be of interest to academics in philosophy of law, moral/political philosophy, natural law theorists, and students of jurisprudence internationally.
  •  10
    Evil trolley turners; what they do and how they do it
    Jurisprudence 12 (2): 259-268. 2021.
    Sarch understands human actions to be ontologically rich and so descriptively broad.1 He provides a careful account of how this is so and of the ensuing implications for posited and normative culpa...
  •  31
    Intention is at the heart of criminal law. If it is not the mens rea requirement found most often in offences, it is still the standard against which other grades of fault tend relatively to be judged. It has generated much controversy, as the crucial question, “Did the defendant intend X?” is resistant to clear answers. This paper argues that intention-questions are difficult because intention is not the thing law takes it to be: Importantly, contrary to law's assumptions, it is neither a state…Read more
  •  8
    Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action: Concepts, Crimes, and Courts (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2018.
    Law regulates human behaviour, a phenomenon about which neuroscience has much to say. Neuroscience can tell us whether a defendant suffers from a brain abnormality, or injury and it can correlate these neural deficits with criminal offending. Using fMRI and other technologies it might indicate whether a witness is telling lies or the truth. It can further propose neuro-interventions to 'change' the brains of offenders and so to reduce their propensity to offend. And, it can make suggestions abou…Read more
  • Possibility, Impossibility and Extraordinariness in Attempts
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23 (1): 47-70. 2010.
    The relationship between possibility / impossibility and attempts is complex. Accounts of the relationship are often marked by a confusion that serves to distort our understanding of the nature of attempts as such. It will be argued below that impossibility is irrelevant to an understanding of attempts. This is not just to say that impossibility should not affect our view of how blameworthy certain defendants are. It is rather to say that the ‘impossibility’ referred to in the context of attempt…Read more
  •  13
    Subjectivity and Law's Fields of Enquiry
    Ratio Juris 20 (1): 77-96. 2007.
  •  42
    The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?
    Ratio Juris 24 (3): 284-303. 2011.
    Jurisprudential debate about the grounds of law often focuses on the status of morality. Given the undoubted fact of judicial engagement with morality in legal reasoning, the key question is whether morality legitimately counts as a ground of law. This article seeks to challenge the special status accorded to morality in debates about the grounds of law. The claim I seek to advance is that very often judicial engagement with morality is not different in kind to judicial engagement with other div…Read more
  •  12
    A Philosophy of Criminal Attempts
    Cambridge University Press. 2015.
    An investigation of criminal attempts unearths some of the most fundamental, intriguing and perplexing questions about criminal law and its place in human action. When does attempting begin? What is the relationship between attempting and intending? Do we always attempt the possible and, if so, possible to whom? Does attempting involve action and does action involve attempting? Is my attempt fixed by me or can another perspective reveal what it is? How 'much' action is needed for an attempt, how…Read more
  • Dworkin’s Morality and its Limited Implications for Law
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 (1): 79-95. 2012.
    In his account of adjudication, Ronald Dworkin makes the case that judicial engagement with morality is a necessary feature of legal practice and so of law itself. This paper examines the nature and implications of this claim. It argues that Dworkin is concerned with a form of engagement between law and morality that is insufficient to make morality count as part of law in virtue of it and that the sort of engagement with morality that Dworkin identifies turns out to support only the notion that…Read more
  •  5
    Law as a Claim-Maker
    Jurisprudence 4 (2): 336-343. 2013.
    Law as a Claim-Maker: A review of Stefano Bertea, The Normative Claim of Law