•  2
    Aesthetic Life and Why It Matters
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    You have a complex and detailed aesthetic life. You make aesthetic decisions every day. You wake up, shower, and dress. When you decide what to wear, you think about how it feels and fits. You have aesthetic feelings and reactions every day. The sunset swings into view as you turn a corner and you think, “That’s beautiful.” A wave of calm and pleasure wash over you. You take a bite of cake and you think, “Wow, that’s sweet.” Maybe too sweet. Almost everything you do has an aesthetic dimension—fr…Read more
  •  6
    Looking for Profundity (in All the Wrong Places)
    Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. forthcoming.
    Philosophers of music, like Charles Swann in Proust’s novel (Proust 1913/1992, p. 360), have traditionally found it difficult to utter the word ‘profound’ unironically. But this changed with Peter Kivy’s 1990 paper ‘The profundity of music’ The problem Kivy draws our attention to is this: we do call some musical works profound. However, Kivy argues, given that a work is profound only if it is about something profound and given that music (or ‘music alone’) is not about anything, this leads to so…Read more
  •  74
    Olfactory Amodal Completion
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    Amodal completion is the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. While amodal completion is rife and plays an essential role in all sense modalities, philosophical discussions of this phenomenon have almost entirely been limited to vision. The aim of this paper is to examine in what sense we can talk about amodal completion in olfaction. We distinguish three different senses of amodal completion – spatial, temporal and feature-based completi…Read more
  •  2
    Temporal Mental Imagery
    In Anna Abraham (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination, . pp. 227-240. 2020.
    Mental imagery is perceptual processing that is not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. Temporal mental imagery is perceptual processing that is not triggered by temporally corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. We aim to show that temporal mental imagery plays an important role in explaining a number of diverse mental phenomena, from the thickness of temporal experience and the specious present to episodic memory and postdict…Read more
  •  229
    Theory of mind, the attribution of mental states to others is one form of social cognition. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of another, much simpler, form of social cognition, which I call vicarious representation. Vicarious representation is the attribution of other-centered properties to objects. This mental capacity is different from, and much simpler than, theory of mind as it does not imply the understanding (or representation) of the mental (or even perceptual) states …Read more
  •  213
    Implicit Bias as Mental Imagery
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3): 329-347. 2021.
    What is the mental representation that is responsible for implicit bias? What is this representation that mediates between the trigger and the biased behavior? My claim is that this representation is neither a propositional attitude nor a mere association. Rather, it is mental imagery: perceptual processing that is not directly triggered by sensory input. I argue that this view captures the advantages of the two standard accounts without inheriting their disadvantages. Further, this view also ex…Read more
  •  68
    Synesthesia as (multimodal) mental imagery
    Multisensory Research. forthcoming.
    It has been repeatedly suggested that synesthesia is intricately connected with unusual ways of exercising one’s mental imagery, although it is not always entirely clear what the exact connection is. My aim is to show that all forms of synesthesia are forms of (often very different kinds of) mental imagery and, further, if we consider synesthesia to be a form of mental imagery, we get significant explanatory benefits, especially concerning less central cases of synesthesia where the inducer is n…Read more
  •  274
    Unconscious Mental Imagery
    Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. forthcoming.
    Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state - as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery - including the most famous ones - don’t actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious…Read more
  •  137
    Perceiving indeterminately
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3): 160-166. 2020.
    It has been argued recently that perception is indeterminate. But there are more than one ways of spelling out what this means. The standard line is that perceptual states attribute different probabilities to different propositions. I provide an alternative to this view, where it is not the attitude, but the content of perceptual states that is indeterminate, inasmuch as it consists of the representation of determinable properties. This view does justice to the more general claim that perception…Read more
  •  118
    Van Eyck: An Optical Revolution
    British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2): 223-225. 2020.
    Van Eyck: An Optical RevolutionMuseum of Fine Arts, Ghent, Belgium, 1 February–30 April 2020.
  •  101
    If the sight of cortically blind people were restored, could they visually recognize a cube or a sphere? This is Molyneux’s question. I argue that the answer to this question depends on the specificities of the mental setup of these cortically blind people. Some cortically blind people have (sometimes quite vivid) visual imagery. Others don’t. The answer to Molyneux’s question depends on whether the blind subjects have had visual imagery before their sight was restored. If they did, the answer t…Read more
  •  101
    Mental imagery is early perceptual processing that is not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. Multimodal mental imagery is early perceptual processing that is triggered by sensory stimulation in a different sense modality. For example, when early visual or tactile processing is triggered by auditory sensory stimulation, this amounts to multimodal mental imagery. Pulling together philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, I will argue in this paper that mu…Read more
  •  102
    Danto on perception
    with Sam Rose
    In Jonathan Gilmore & Lydia Goehr (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Arthur Danto, Blackwell. forthcoming.
    Jerry Fodor wrote the following assessment of Danto’s importance in 1993: “Danto has done something I’ve been very much wanting to do: namely, reconsider some hard problems in aesthetics in the light of the past 20 years or so of philosophical work on intentionality and representation” (Fodor 1993, p. 41). Fodor is absolutely right: some of Danto’s work could be thought of as the application of some influential ideas about perception that Fodor also shared. The problem is that these ideas have…Read more
  •  93
    Expectations in music
    In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Music and Philosophy, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Almost every facet of the experience of musical listening—from pitch, to rhythm, to the experience of emotion—is thought to be shaped by the meeting and thwarting of expectations. But it is unclear what kind of mental states these expectations are, what their format is, and whether they are conscious or unconscious. Here, we distinguish between different modes of musical listening, arguing that expectations play different roles in each, and we point to the need for increased collaboration betwe…Read more
  •  178
    Perception, Cognition, Action
    Oxford Bibliographies Online. 2016.
    Summary of recent research on perception, action and what's in between, with the help of a recurring culinary metaphor
  • Mind, Value and Metaphysics (edited book)
    Springer. 2014.
  • Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (edited book)
    with Ron Sun and Naomi Miyake
    CPC Press. 2006.
  •  425
    Zhongguo Meixue Yanjiu 10 311-331. 2018.
  • Words and Representations
    Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 41 805-826. 1997.
  •  66
    The problem of why we identify with Barney Stinson on the show How I Met Your Mother
  •  112
    Unconscious perceptual justification
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6): 569-589. 2018.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs. A perceptual experience of a dog justifies the belief that there is a dog present. But there is much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, as in experiments involving masked priming. Do unconscious perceptual states provide justification as well? The answer depends on one’s theory of justification. While most varieties of externalism seem compatible with unconscious perceptual justification, several theories have recently affor…Read more
  •  48
    Travolta’s Elvis-man and the Nietzschean Superman
    with Ian Schnee
    In K. Silem Mohammad & Richard Greene (eds.), Quentin Tarantino and Philosophy, Open Court. 2007.
    Vincent Vega from Pulp Fiction and the Nietzschian Superman!!!
  • Filosofia como biologia evolutiva
    In Havi Carel & David Gamez (eds.), Filosofia Contemporanea em Açao, Artmed. 2008.
  •  13
    I aim to show that the content of our perceptual states depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Most philosophical and psychological theories of perception claim or at least assume the opposite: they conceive of perception as allpurpose: what we want to do does not influence what we see. I will argue that the content of one's perceptual state does vary as the action one is inclined to perform varies. To put it very simply, what we see does indeed depend on what we want to do. …Read more
  •  52
    Perception, action and identification in the theatre
    In Daniel Krasner (ed.), Staging Philosophy, Michigan University Press. 2006.
    My endeavor in this paper is to examine the ways in which exactly the general structure of perception is modified in the case of the reception of theatre performances. First, perception in general is examined and it is argued that a basic characteristic of perception is that it is sometimes interdependent with action. After the analysis of perception in general, I turn to the special case of the perception of a theatre performance (or, theatre-perception, for short) and examine the role of the p…Read more
  •  11
    Four theories of amodal perception
    Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 2007.
    We are aware of those parts of a cat that are occluded behind a fence. The question is how we represent these occluded parts of perceived objects: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider four theories and compare their explanatory power: (i) we see them, (ii) we have nonperceptual beliefs about them, (iii) we have immediate perceptual access to them and (iv) we visualize them. I point out that the first three of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I argue…Read more
  •  7
    Picture perception and the two visual subsystems
    Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 2008.
    I aim to give a new account of picture perception: of the way our visual system functions when we see something in a picture. My argument relies on the functional distinction between the ventral and dorsal visual subsystems. I propose that it is constitutive of picture perception that our ventral subsystem attributes properties to the scene, whereas our dorsal subsystem attributes properties to the surface. Keywords: picture perception; dorsal subsystem;
  •  15
    Is action-guiding vision cognitively impenetrable?
    Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. 2013.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that action-guiding vision is not cognitively impenetrable and arguments that suggest otherwise rely on an unjustified identification between actionguiding vision and dorsal vision – a functional and an anatomical way of describing the mind. The examination of these arguments show the importance of making a distinction between the functional and the anatomical level when addressing the problem of cognitive penetrability.
  •  1
    Simulation, if used as a way of becoming aware of other people’s mental states, is the joint exercise of imagination and attribution. If A simulates B, then (i) A attributes to B the mental state in which A finds herself at the end of a process in which (ii) A has imagined being in B’s situation. Although necessary, imagination and attribution are not sufficient for simulation: the latter occurs only if (iii) the imagination process grounds or justifies the attribution. Depending on the notion o…Read more