University of Maryland (system-wide page)
Department of Philosophy
PhD
Flint, Michigan, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
  •  54
    Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned
    with Peter Carruthers
    Consciousness and Cognition 55 79-90. 2017.
  •  168
    The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge
    Philosophical Studies 172 (11): 2955-2974. 2015.
    Knowledge of what it’s like to have perceptual experiences, e.g. of what it’s like to see red or taste Turkish coffee, is phenomenal knowledge; and it is knowledge the substantial or significant nature of which is widely assumed to pose a challenge for physicalism. Call this the New Challenge to physicalism. The goal of this paper is to take a closer look at the New Challenge. I show, first, that it is surprisingly difficult to spell out clearly and neutrally what the New Challenge is in fact ur…Read more
  •  424
    The phenomenal concept strategy
    with Peter Carruthers
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10): 212-236. 2007.
    A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his
  •  53
    Belief, Re‐identification and Fineness of Grain
    European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2): 229-248. 2014.
    The so-called ‘re-identification condition’ (Kelly 2011) has played an important role in the most prominent argument for nonconceptualism, the argument from fineness of grain. A number of authors have recently argued that the condition should be modified or discarded altogether, with devastating implications for the nonconceptualist (see, e.g., Brewer 2005, Chuard 2006). The aim of this paper is to show that the situation is even more dire for nonconceptualists, for even if the re-identification…Read more
  •  146
    In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts
    Philosophical Papers 41 (1): 97-127. 2012.
    Abstract In recent debates, both physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers of mind have come to agree that understanding the nature of phenomenal concepts is key to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Recently, however, Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) have argued that there are no such concepts. Their case is especially troubling because they make use of a type of argument that proponents of phenomenal concepts have typically found persuasive in other contex…Read more
  •  242
    The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology
    with Peter Carruthers
    In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 35. 2011.
    The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that…Read more