•  592
    Collectivized Intellectualism
    Res Philosophica 96 (2): 199-227. 2019.
    We argue that the evolutionary function of reasoning is to allow us to secure more accurate beliefs and more effective intentions through collective deliberation. This sets our view apart both from traditional intellectualist accounts, which take the evolutionary function to be individual deliberation, and from interactionist accounts such as the one proposed by Mercier and Sperber, which agrees that the function of reasoning is collective but holds that it aims to disseminate, rather than come …Read more
  •  397
    Transparency and Reasons for Belief
    Logos and Episteme 6 (4): 475-494. 2015.
    Belief has a special connection to truth, a connection not shared by mental states like imagination. One way of capturing this connection is by the claim that belief aims at truth. Normativists argue that we should understand this claim as a normative claim about belief – beliefs ought to be true. A second important connection between belief and truth is revealed by the transparency of belief, i.e. the fact that, when I deliberate about what to believe, I can settle this deliberation only by app…Read more
  •  297
    Algorithmic Microaggressions
    Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (3). 2022.
    We argue that machine learning algorithms can inflict microaggressions on members of marginalized groups and that recognizing these harms as instances of microaggressions is key to effectively addressing the problem. The concept of microaggression is also illuminated by being studied in algorithmic contexts. We contribute to the microaggression literature by expanding the category of environmental microaggressions and highlighting the unique issues of moral responsibility that arise when we focu…Read more
  •  63
    The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be related to a nu…Read more
  •  55
    Dealing With Disagreement: Distinguishing Two Types of Epistemic Peers
    Spontaneous Generations 3 (1): 113-122. 2009.
    Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreement. Is it possible for two people to disagree and have both people still be rational? Those involved in this debate make use of the idea of epistemic peers. Two people are epistemic peers if they share the same knowledge of a given topic and have similar epistemic virtues. My paper argues that we have different kinds of epistemic peers; close peers who think similarly to ourselves, and remote peer…Read more
  •  30
    A New Defense of the Motive of Duty Thesis
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5): 1163-1179. 2018.
    According to the Motive of Duty Thesis, a necessary condition for an action to have moral worth is that it be motivated at least in part by a normative assessment of the action. However, this thesis has been subject to two powerful objections. It has been accused of over-intellectualizing moral agency, and of giving the wrong verdict when it comes to people who hold false moral theories that convince them that their actions are in fact morally wrong. I argue that both of these objections can be …Read more
  •  20
    Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, & Reasons, written by Joshua Gert (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2): 257-260. 2016.