•  583
    Is Blameworthiness Forever?
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2): 204-224. 2018.
    Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness f…Read more
  •  479
    When Artists Fall: Honoring and Admiring the Immoral
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2): 246-265. 2019.
    Is it appropriate to honor artists who have created great works but who have also acted immorally? In this article, after arguing that honoring involves identifying a person as someone we ought to admire, we present three moral reasons against honoring immoral artists. First, we argue that honoring can serve to condone their behavior, through the mediums of emotional prioritization and exemplar identification. Second, we argue that honoring immoral artists can generate undue epistemic credibilit…Read more
  •  200
    Celebrity, Democracy, and Epistemic Power
    with Alfred Archer, Amanda Cawston, and Machteld Geuskens
    Perspectives on Politics 18 (1 ). 2020.
    What, if anything, is problematic about the involvement of celebrities in democratic politics? While a number of theorists have criticized celebrity involvement in politics (Meyer 2002; Mills 1957; Postman 1987) none so far have examined this issue using the tools of social epistemology, the study of the effects of social interactions, practices and institutions on knowledge and belief acquisition. This paper will draw on these resources to investigate the issue of celebrity involvement in polit…Read more
  •  194
    Practical Identity
    In Benjamin Matheson & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 391-411. 2017.
    In this paper, I present a dilemma for those who believe in the afterlife: either we won’t survive death (or an eternal life) in the sense that most matters to us or we will become bored if we do. First, I argue that even if we – in a strict sense – survive death, there is practical sense in which we don’t survive death. This applies, I contend, to all accounts of the afterlife that: eventually, we lose our practical identity. I show that our practical identity is more important to us than our n…Read more
  •  148
    Tim Mawson. Free Will: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum, 2011 (review)
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1): 260--264. 2012.
  •  139
    How should academics respond to the work of immoral intellectuals? This question appears to be one that is of increasing concern in academic circles but has received little attention in the academic literature. In this paper, we will investigate what our response to immoral intellectuals should be. We begin by outlining the cases of three intellectuals who have behaved immorally or at least have been accused of doing so. We then investigate whether it is appropriate to admire an immoral person f…Read more
  •  133
    In defence of the Four-Case Argument
    Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1963-1982. 2016.
    Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument was once considered to be the most powerful of the manipulation arguments against compatibilism. However, because of Demetriou’s :595–617, 2010) response, Pereboom has significantly weakened his argument. Manipulation arguments in general have also been challenged by King : 65–83, 2013). In this paper, I argue that the Four-Case Argument resists both these challenges. One upshot is that Pereboom doesn’t need weaken his argument. Another is that compatibilists still …Read more
  •  104
    Compatibilism and personal identity
    Philosophical Studies 170 (2): 317-334. 2014.
    Compatibilists disagree over whether there are historical conditions on moral responsibility. Historicists claim there are, whilst structuralists deny this. Historicists motivate their position by claiming to avoid the counter-intuitive implications of structuralism. I do two things in this paper. First, I argue that historicism has just as counter-intuitive implications as structuralism when faced with thought experiments inspired by those found in the personal identity literature. Hence, histo…Read more
  •  101
    Escaping Heaven
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (3): 197-206. 2014.
    In response to the problem of Hell, Buckareff and Plug (Relig Stud 41:39–54, 2005; Relig Stud 45:63–72, 2009) have recently proposed and defended an ‘escapist’ conception of Hell. In short, they propose that the problem of Hell does not arise because God places an open-door policy on Hell. In this paper, I expose a fundamental problem with this conception of Hell—namely, that if there’s an open door policy on Hell, then there should be one on Heaven too. I argue that a coherent conception of Hea…Read more
  •  70
    More Than A Feeling: The Communicative Function of Regret
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5): 664-681. 2017.
    Rüdiger Bittner argues that regret is not useful and so it is always unreasonable to feel and express it. In this paper, I argue that regret is often reasonable because regret has a communicative function: it communicates where we stand with respect to things we have done and outcomes that we have caused. So, I not only argue that Bittner’s argument is unsuccessful, I also shed light on the nature and purpose of regret.
  •  65
    The Threat from Manipulation Arguments
    American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1): 37-50. 2018.
    Most seem to presume that what is threatening about manipulation arguments is the ‘no difference’ premise – that is, the claim that there are no responsibility-relevant differences between a manipulated agent and her merely causally determined counterpart. This presumption underlies three recent replies to manipulation arguments from Kearns (2012), King (2013), and Schlosser (2015). But these replies fail to appreciate the true threat from manipulation arguments – namely, the manipulation cases …Read more
  •  62
    Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4): 458-480. 2019.
    In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coher…Read more
  •  60
    Manipulators and Moral Standing
    Philosophia 47 (4): 1197-1214. 2019.
    Manipulation arguments aim to show that compatibilism is false. Usually, they aim to undermine compatibilism by first eliciting the intuition that a manipulated agent is not morally responsible. Patrick Todd's (2012) Moral Standing Manipulation Argument instead aims to first elicit the intuition that a manipulator cannot blame her victim. Todd then argues that the best explanation for why a manipulator cannot blame her victim is that incompatibilism is true. In this paper, I present three lines …Read more
  •  44
    The Palgrave Handbook of the Afterlife (edited book)
    Palgrave Macmillan. 2017.
  •  44
    Tracing and heavenly freedom
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1): 57-69. 2018.
    Accounts of heavenly freedom typically attempt to reconcile the claim that the redeemed have free will with the claim that the redeemed cannot sin. In this paper, I first argue that Pawl and Timpe :396–417, 2009) tracing account of heavenly freedom—according to which the redeemed in heaven have only ‘derivative’ free will—is untenable. I then sketch an alternative account of heavenly freedom, one which eschews derivative free will. On this account, the redeemed are able to sin in heaven.
  •  40
    Commemoration and Emotional Imperialism
    Journal of Applied Philosophy. forthcoming.
    The Northern Irish footballer James McClean chooses not to take part in the practice of wearing a plastic red poppy to commemorate those who have died fighting for the British Armed Forces. Each year he faces abuse, including occasional death threats, for his choice. This forms part of a wider trend towards ‘poppy enforcement’, the pressuring of people, particularly public figures, to wear the poppy. This enforcement seems wrong in part because, at least in some cases, it involves abuse. But is …Read more
  •  37
    Conventional wisdom suggests that the power to do otherwise is necessary for being morally responsible. While much of the literature on alternative possibilities has focused on Frankfurt’s argument against this claim, I instead focus on one of Dennett’s (1984) arguments against it. This argument appeals to cases of volitional necessity rather than cases featuring counterfactual interveners. van Inwagen (1989) and Kane (1996) appeal to the notion of ‘character setting’ to argue that these cases d…Read more
  •  24
    Shame and the sports fan
    Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 46 (2): 208-223. 2019.
    ABSTRACTSports fans sometimes feel shame for their team’s moral transgressions. In this paper, we investigate this phenomenon. We offer an account of sports fan shame in terms of collective shame....
  •  20
    Admiration Over Time
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4): 669-689. 2020.
    In this paper, we investigate the diachronic fittingness conditions of admiration – that is, what it takes for a person to continue or cease to be admirable over time. We present a series of cases that elicit judgements that suggest different understandings of admiration over time. In some cases, admirability seems to last forever. In other cases, it seems that it can cease within a person’s lifetime if she changes sufficiently. Taken together, these cases highlight what we call the puzzle of ad…Read more
  •  15
    Kevin Timpe: Free Will in Philosophical Theology. Bloomsbury 2014 (review)
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1): 212--221. 2017.