Bernard Matolino

Academic discourse on ubuntu, both in South Africa and Zimbabwe, coincided with the arrival of freedom in these countries. Ubuntu’s revival sought to show that there was an African alternative to the oppressive regimes that had cruelly governed both countries. This alternative was pronounced as offering a grounded beginning of the postcolonial society that would be able to humanize the African through resuscitating traditional values. These values would speak to how the African was supposed to be; ontologically, ethically, and politically. The hope was that the social conditions would, in line with these values, also transform to enable Ubuntu to thrive. However, I will contend that the social conditions developed in both countries not only fail to animate ubuntu but have begun to directly undermine its basics.

ABSTRACT While there is no proof that there are distinct races among humans, racial divisions remain alive and relevant. Discrimination feeds into racism and sponsors beliefs in differences among races. Race as a social issue and a topic of analysis is generally treated as if it were a concept that could be understood on its own terms and independently of some other issues. One of the most promising attempts at understanding race is its relation to perceptible differences between and among races. These differences have played out in numerous ways, including how philosophy has been used as a tool of exclusion. This exclusion necessitated the rise of African philosophy as an extension of the combat against racism. Yet racists and racist attitudes remain prevalent. While African philosophy’s emergence can be articulated in terms of race and racism, what is more difficult to articulate is why racist attitudes persist. In tracing the pervasiveness of race and racism in African philosophy’s emergence as a counter to Western views, I demonstrate how African philosophy could not avoid being implicated in the struggle against racism. As a representative of African thought systems, African philosophy had to define itself in contrast to Western philosophy to show the viability of the African thought processes. However, African philosophy neither ended racism nor caused African thought systems to be treated as equals to their Western rivals. On the contrary, racist thinking and practices remain rife. Hence, I attempt to show that the sponsors of these attitudes are insistent on making prominent, perceptible differences between humans.

My aim in this paper is to offer an explanation of the orientation I have adopted in my work on African political theory. This explanation is necessitated by some puzzlement that has arisen as a result of the commitment I have sought to pursue. The most prominent complaint has been that I must own up and claim my liberal colours (OYOWE 2015, 514). I have been asked to refrain from making communitarian thought the basis of my political thinking as my commitment to communitarianism is not as thoroughgoing as it should (OYOWE 2015, 514). It is important that I explain this accusation away.

Jonathan Chimakonam’s advocacy of conversational thinking has taken African philosophy by storm. It is not an exaggeration to say that no one working in African philosophy, today, can say they are unaware of the so-called Conversational Society of Philosophy. Equally, I doubt if anyone working in the field could ever say they are not aware of the name Johnathan Chimakonam. His courageous effort to advance a particular form of thinking in the African philosophical tradition is a welcome innovation. While I admire his efforts, I remain unconvinced by some of his claims. Two important claims will be the target of my discussion. The first is his insistence on using very strange language in the pursuit of a conversation. The second is his insistence that his methodology is different from other forms of philosophizing.

If we separate needs into basic and non-basic with the former characterized by the sort that relates to the security of people’s physical needs and the latter characterized by demands such as freedoms and self-determination, we could ask which of these two forms deserves more attention than the other. This question is especially pertinent on the African continent, where there seems to be a resurgence of the belief that it takes strongman tactics to fulfil the basic needs of the people. Such an approach does not prioritize what I characterize as non-basic needs. But for the advocates of non-basic needs, prioritizing basic needs to the exclusion of non-basic needs is dangerous, and it undermines values associated with non-basic needs. While it might appear obvious to resolve this conflict by insisting on the equality of these needs, such an approach will not work as the history of Africa has unfolded in a way that has consistently violated both sets of needs in ways that have led to a full-fledged impoverishment of its citizens in both respects. It, therefore, follows as an attempt to rebuild Africa that there has to be a starting point of which needs to attend to first. It is in that recognition and whatever follows that the current dilemma is created. My aim is to weigh these needs as theoretical competitors and to assess what such competition means for African politics and development on the one hand, and the freedoms and welfare of its citizens on the other.

Technological development as a human episode and achievement is reflective of either an underlying spirit or orientation toward the world. That spirit also communicates the values that people, making strides in technological development, uphold either as central to their identity or as the direction they wish to see life take. In this sense, technological development is not just an aid to life but a reflection of life, its valuing, and commitments to how it is best lived. In some instances, technological development appears to be necessitated by a variety of factors that seem to correlate with social and cultural histories of places at the forefront of these innovations. Africa has not displayed both the spirit and achievement of technological innovation. It has been a haphazard and voracious end consumer of technology as it is randomly brought into African countries. This consumerist status is not only reflective of failure to innovate but is indicative of a spirit that dominates African attitudes to both life and technological innovation itself. If Africa is to keep with the times, there is need to revisit the spirit that dominates the African’s construction of her views and commitments to the world.

The debate on the communitarian notion of personhood as initiated by Gyekye, in response to Menkiti, is both exhaustive and exhausted. Its exhaustiveness and exhaustion lies in the fact that, in all probability whatever can be said around it has been said, with truly nothing new likely ever being added. What is possibly left, is the potential for further additions to be more strident in their picking of sides or repeating that Gyekye and Menkiti are not sufficiently different or insisting on the authenticity of either approach to African thought. What is needed is to transcend the constraints of this debate by opening up new vistas of interpreting communitarian thought in personhood. Whatever merit there is in showing whether radical or moderate communitarianism is real, or in showing which of these two is better than the other, this discussion can be furthered by looking at implications of communitarianism to other facets of philosophy. The most plausibleavenue that could be implicated in communitarian considerations is the sphere of politics. Theorising about the communitarian notion of persons, I suggest, is partly to theorise about the political. If the commitments on which the doctrine of communitarianism is founded, are used to capture the sort of relations that exist between individuals, and between individuals and the community, then this relationship has an effect on how we conceive of the political theory we thinkappropriate. It is suggested here that contemplating on the communitarian polity will show the shortcomings of communitarianism as conceived by Gyekye and Menkiti.

Epistemic decolonization, in its various conceptual formulations and presentations, could be taken to hold promise for either the completion of the anti-colonial struggle or the self-re-discovery of the formerly colonized and oppressed. In Africa this project has had a long history as both a counter to hegemonic histories of claimed Western epistemological superiority as well as theories of racism and racist practices against black people of African descent. What is not entirely clear are the precise achievements of decolonial thought and practice. I interrogate the relevance, use and continuation of decoloniality as a genre of thought and practice on the African continent against the background of the perennial problems of material underdevelopment and stifled political spaces that render the supposed beneficiaries of decolonization hopeless subjects who continue to be disempowered and oppressed in their own home. This interrogation is to be carried alongside another inquiry aimed at evaluating the achievements of African philosophy as a form of epistemic decolonization. If African philosophy is a form of decolonization, as it should be, it should be able to clearly demonstrate its achievements and how they have had an effect on broader goals of decolonizing and empowering inhabitants of the African continent.

While Kwasi Wiredu’s name is associated with the genesis of modern African philosophy, there are some aspects of his work that are in tension. Although Wiredu is an advocate of a modernized and science-based philosophical orientation, on the African continent, he is also equally committed to a possibility of the existence of philosophy in traditional African society. In the development of his philosophical theses, it appears that he relies on both sources for his method and argument. It is this dual usage of two conflicting systems that leads to a tension in some aspects of his philosophy. In addition, Wiredu’s philosophy is in serious respects shaped by the postcolonial era it emerges from. In part, his thinking is a response to colonialism, and in another part, an attempt at overcoming the effects of colonialism. My aim is to show how Wiredu’s philosophy is ultimately a product of these contradictory forces.

The debate on the communitarian notion of personhood as initiated by Gyekye, in response to Menkiti, is both exhaustive and exhausted. Its exhaustiveness and exhaustion lies in the fact that, in all probability whatever can be said around it has been said, with truly nothing new likely ever being added. What is possibly left, is the potential for further additions to be more strident in their picking of sides or repeating that Gyekye and Menkiti are not sufficiently different or insisting on the authenticity of either approach to African thought. What is needed is to transcend the constraints of this debate by opening up new vistas of interpreting communitarian thought in personhood. Whatever merit there is in showing whether radical or moderate communitarianism is real, or in showing which of these two is better than the other, this discussion can be furthered by looking at implications of communitarianism to other facets of philosophy. The most plausible avenue that could be implicated in communitarian considerations is the sphere of politics. Theorising about the communitarian notion of persons, I suggest, is partly to theorise about the political. If the commitments on which the doctrine of communitarianism is founded, are used to capture the sort of relations that exist between individuals, and between individuals and the community, then this relationship has an effect on how we conceive of the political theory we think appropriate. It is suggested here that contemplating on the communitarian polity will show the shortcomings of communitarianism as conceived by Gyekye and Menkiti. Keywords: Menkiti, Gyekye, Communitarianism, Limited Communitarianism, Personhood, Classical Communitarianism

The disagreement over what was responsible for arriving at consensual positions, in traditional African polities, is best captured in the classic debate between Kwasi Wiredu and Emmanuel Eze. The former holds that rational persuasion was the sole informant of decision-making while the latter argues that non-rational factors played a crucial role in securing a consensual decision. If Wiredu is correct then consensus could work in modern society as it can be argued that it does not rely on traditionalistic scaffoldings. If, on the other hand, Eze is correct, then consensus cannot work in modern largely urbanised Africa as its traditional underpinnings have largely disappeared. While Emmanuel Ani’s intervention in this debate is welcome for its earnest search for a system that could work, his support for Eze is not bold enough to undermine Wiredu’s rationalistic orientation in consensus.

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, there has been a concerted effort at reviving the notion of ubuntu. Variously conceived, it is seen as the authentic African ethical concept, a way of life, an authentic mode of being African, an individual ideal, the appropriate public spirit, a definition of life itself and the preferred manner of conducting public and private business. Thus, among other public displays of the spirit of ubuntu, the government of the day has deliberately chosen its service delivery mantra and its public slogan as Batho Pele to animate, or perhaps pay obeisance to, ubuntu. In this paper we seek to advance arguments that question such a public, widespread, and concerted ‘ubuntu-isation’ of the intellectual, business, public and private lives. Our project follows two main lines of reasoning. We seek to show that the aggressive promotion of ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa is an elitist project so conceived by the new black elite. It is conceived both as a restorative move that is aimed at securing the dignity of the black masses as well as an attempt at forging a so-called black identity. This line of reasoning will rely on similar historical cases on the continent that sought to aggressively promote an African mode of being, which coincided with both the end of colonialism and the rise of black elitism. We note that such attempts always ended in very public social and political failure. We seek to question the desirability of ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit of the nation. Here our critique shall be concentrated on the disjunct that exists between the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of ubuntu and the stark ontological and ethical crisis facing the new elite and ‘our people’

The question of what political system best suites post colonial/independent African states remain alive and ever more pertinent particularly in the face of failed attempts at democratisation. Kwasi Wiredu notes that the adversarial nature of Western democratic practices along party political lines may not be well suited for African politics. Instead he suggests that the practice of consensual democracy as practised in the traditional Ashanti society may be more appropriate. Emmanuel Eze raises three objections against Wiredu’s account of consensual democracy. This paper seeks to respond to Eze’s objections and argue that consensual democracy may have more appeal than Eze is prepared to concede

Kwame Gyekye seeks to address the complex question of political legitimacy particularly on the African continent. He argues that the justification for political legitimacy need not necessarily depend on the economic performance of any given regime. For him, justification for legitimacy merely lies in whether all correct processes and procedures were properly followed in the assumption of power. He is of the view that military coups should not be tolerated as they lack legitimacy although they might have justification usurping power. He also argues that popular uprisings may have the justification to assume power but should subject themselves to a plebiscite to have legitimacy. In this paper I seek to argue that Gyekye's distinction between legitimacy and justification of exercise of political power is unsustainable. In contrast to Gyekye I seek to argue for a more plausible account of legitimacy that takes the substantive requirement much more seriously. I do this by showing the importance of the function of institutional checks on power in traditional African societies and seek to argue for the urgent need of such institutionalised checks on power in post-colonial Africa.

Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy has largely been met with hostility from African philosophers. Whilst Tempels intended to show that the Bantu were not only capable of thinking, but also that they had a distinct and coherent philosophy of their own, his project seems to have achieved exactly the opposite. Temples’ project sought to expose the racism of thinkers such as Lucien Levy-Bruhl, thereby raising the African to the same status as the Westerner. However, his efforts have been rejected for a number of reasons ranging from the view that it is a theory of magic, freely generalized to the Bantu, to the accusation that his project fails to speak on behalf of the oppressed Bantu and furthermore, that he is overly obsessed with finding the African difference at the cost of reason. In this paper, I seek to argue that a neglected critique of Tempels is one that has to do with the basis of his philosophical racialism. I seek to show that at the root of Bantu Philosophy is racialism grounded in the same assumptions as those made by Levy-Bruhl. I seek to argue that the categories that Tempels creates for Bantu thought do not simply seek to articulate a genuine difference from Western categories. The Bantu categories are coined as inferior, incoherent, inarticulate, illogical, and mystified. I argue that it is for reasons of philosophical racialism that Tempels urges his Western audience to overthrow their logical and articulable systems if they ever want to understand the Bantu system of thought

The communitarian conception of person is a widely accepted view in African thought. Kwame Gyekye thinks there is a distinction between what he calls radical communitarianism and his own version of moderate communitarianism. He is of the view that radical communitarianism is faced with insurmountable problems and ought to be jettisoned in favour of his moderate communitarianism. Gyekye’s strategy is twofold; he firstly seeks to show the shortcomings of radical communitarianism – particularly by attacking Ifeanyi Menkiti’s position. Secondly, he seeks to show the authenticity of his version as well as its serious regard for individual rights as representing a triumph over radical communitarianism. In this paper, I seek to contest both of Gyekye’s strategies

The communitarian conception of person is the dominant view of personhood in African philosophy. This view centrally holds that personhood is something that is attained in direct proportion to one's moral worth and one's relations with her surrounding community. This view understands personhood as something that is acquired as one's moral responsibility grows. Essentially personhood is constituted by the community and expressed in relations that one has with her community. Thus the individual and the community are both tied in the same fate. The individual is seen as constituted by the community and as one with the community. Whatever happens to her happens to the whole community. Some leaders of newly independent Africa used this communitarian VIew of personhood to argue for a socialist order. Such an order would have been faithful to the traditional communitarian conception of person and the soc,i al as well as the economic order that proceeds from that conception. In order to develop an authentically African socialist programme these leaders strived to show that the communitarian conception of personhood naturally leads to African socialism. They took African socialism to be a panacea to economic and social ills that had been brought on by colonialism. This thesis seeks to interrogate both the communitarian conception of personhood and the resultant political ideology of African socialism. It is argued that the major driving factor behind the development of the communitarian view and African socialism is an inordinate desire to find and present the African difference. The problem started with Placide Tempels' futile search for an African ontology and has been perpetuated by all communitarians and African socialists. Thus this project is conceived as a philosophical critique of African communitarianism and the resultant socialism

Kwame Gyekye seeks to address the complex question of political legitimacy particularly on the African continent. He argues that the justification for political legitimacy need not necessarily depend on the economic performance of any given regime. For him, justification for legitimacy merely lies in whether all correct processes and procedures were properly followed in the assumption of power. He is of the view that military coups should not be tolerated as they lack legitimacy although they might have justification usurping power. He also argues that popular uprisings may have the justification to assume power but should subject themselves to a plebiscite to have legitimacy. In this paper I seek to argue that Gyekye's distinction between legitimacy and justification of exercise of political power is unsustainable. In contrast to Gyekye I seek to argue for a more plausible account of legitimacy that takes the substantive requirement much more seriously. I do this by showing the importance of the function of institutional checks on power in traditional African societies and seek to argue for the urgent need of such institutionalised checks on power in post-colonial Africa