Bernard Schumacher

The subject of death and a possible survival has become in recent years a focal point for "scientific" investigations, public interest, and philosophical reflections. Paterson's work finds itself in the midst of this unlikely meeting of these three domains. He does not focus, however, upon the description of the final post mortem state--the domain of pure speculation, to which he dedicates a short chapter--but rather upon the possibility of a life after death which is the presupposition of personal immortality. Such an analysis of death is contrary to the philosophical thanatalogical reverse since Heidegger, which considers death as separated from the question of immortality. On the other hand, Paterson maintains that the belief in a life after death is based not only upon philosophical arguments but also and especially upon empirical facts, which help us in the final analysis to determine whether this state is a utopia without foundation, a possibility, a choice, or even a certitude.

This well-structured and excellently-introduced volume contains ten of Jonas's essays concerning morality and mortality, half of which are newly translated. The book's two parts, respectively characterizing Jonas's philosophical and theological patterns of thought, are preceded by a prologue discussing the state of twentieth-century philosophy and are followed by a talk given six days prior to the author's death and published here for the first time. A sort of testament to his life's work, Jonas challenges his listeners to rethink the notion of human responsibility with regard to creation.

This book contributes to current bioethical debates by providing a critical analysis of the philosophy of human death. Bernard N. Schumacher discusses contemporary philosophical perspectives on death, creating a dialogue between phenomenology, existentialism, and analytic philosophy. He also examines the ancient philosophies that have shaped our current ideas about death. His analysis focuses on three fundamental problems: (1) the definition of human death, (2) the knowledge of mortality and of human death as such, and (3) the question of whether death is nothing to us or, on the contrary, whether it can be regarded as an absolute or relative evil. Drawing on scholarship published in four languages and from three distinct currents of thought, this volume represents a comprehensive and systematic study of the philosophy of death, one that provides a provocative basis for discussions of the bioethics of human mortality.

L’auteur traite de la question fondamentale qui est une personne et, plus spécifiquement, si tous les êtres humains sont des personnes ou s’il existe des êtres humains qui ne seraient pas des personnes et qui n’auraient donc pas les mêmes droits à la vie que celles-ci. Certains philosophes, tels que Peter Singer, Michael Tooley et Tristram Engelhardt, se sont proposés de résoudre bon nombre des délicats problèmes bioéthiques contemporains en distinguant, d’une part, la vie humaine biologique, propre à l’être humain et, d’autre part, la vie humaine personnelle, qui est celle de la personne à laquelle est octroyé un droit à la vie. L’auteur soutient que tout être humain est fondamentalement une personne. The author discusses the fundamental question who is a person and more specifically if every human being is a person or if there exists some human beings who are not persons and who do not have the same rights to life as the human being. In an attempt to resolve a good number of delicate bioethical problems some philosophers, such as Peter Singer, Michael Tooley et Tristram Engelhardt, propose to distinguish between human biological life, belonging to all human beings, and human personal life, which belongs to a person to whom is accorded the right to life. The author maintains that every human being is fundamentally a person.