Bertha Alvarez Manninen

In this paper, I appeal to two aspects of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy – his metaphysics and ethics – in defense of abortion rights. Many Kantian pro-life philosophers argue that Kant’s second principle formulation of the categorical imperative, which proscribes treating persons as mere means, applies to human embryos and fetuses. Kant is clear, however, that he means his imperatives to apply to persons, individuals of a rational nature. It is important to determine, therefore, whether there is anything in Kant’s philosophy that permits regarding embryos and fetuses as persons, since they lack the capacity for sentience (at least until mid-gestation), let alone rational thought. In the first part of the paper, I will illustrate why there are difficulties maintaining, from a Kantian perspective, that conception marks the genesis of a new person. Even granting that embryos and fetuses are persons, however, this alone would not entail the moral impermissibility of abortion rights, mainly because prohibiting abortion, and compelling women to gestate, violates the formula of humanity against them. Developing this thesis encompasses the second part of my essay. Finally, although I argue that Kant’s philosophy lends strong support to abortion rights, this does not thereby entail that it allows for the complete dehumanization of the human fetus. By appealing to the writings of Kantian scholar Allen Wood, I will argue that a fetus’ status as a potential person does render it worthy of some degree of respect and moral value

In 2008, many states sought to pass Human Life Amendments, which would extend the definition of personhood to encompass newly fertilized eggs. If such an amendment were to pass, Roe v. Wade, as currently defended by the Supreme Court, may be repealed. Consequently, it is necessary to defend the right to an abortion in a manner that succeeds even if a Human Life Amendment successfully passes. J.J. Thomson's argument in “A Defense of Abortion” successfully achieves this. Her argument is especially strong when one considers that her central thesis—that one person's right to life does not entail the right to use another's person's body for continued sustenance—is pervasive in legal policies in the U.S.A.

Far too often in our society, the input of a potential father is not deemed relevant in a woman’s abortion decision. Men, however, can suffer emotional strains due to the abortion of their potential child, and given this harm it seems that morality must make room for a potential father’s voice in the abortion decision. I will argue that a man cannot have the right to veto a woman’s decision to procure an abortion, yet there may be times where a woman may exercise her right to an abortion in a manner not indicative of a virtuous character. This is especially a danger in the face of a dissenting man who may suffer greatly if his potential child is abortedand thus I will delineate circumstances where a virtuous woman would concede to carrying a fetus to term in order to give a man the child he so desperately desires. In addition to using virtue ethics to make the argument, I will incorporate certain aspects of care ethics in order to further what may seem to some to be a rather contentious claim.

In this essay, I provide evidence that a new generation of prochoice advocates wishes to move away from defending abortion rights via the view that fetal life has little or no value and toward a more complex view of abortion rights. This newer view simultaneously grants that fetuses are more than simply “clumps of cells,” that they are, to some extent, entities that possess some degree of value, and also that women still have the right to decide whether they wish to continue a pregnancy. Prima facie, this may sound like an impossible task—an instance of “having your cake and eating it too”—but I will show throughout my paper that, and how, such a task can indeed be accomplished.

One argument used by detractors of human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR) invokes Kant's formula of humanity, which proscribes treating persons solely as a means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves. According to Fuat S. Oduncu, for example, adhering to this imperative entails that human embryos should not be disaggregated to obtain pluripotent stem cells for hESCR. Given that human embryos are Kantian persons from the time of their conception, killing them to obtain their cells for research fails to treat them as ends in themselves

Many bioethicists working in reproductive ethics tacitly assume some theory of diachronic personal identity. For example, Peter Singer argues that there is no identity relation between a foetus and a future individual because the former shares no robust mental connections with the latter. Consequently, abortion prevents the existence of an individual; it does not destroy an already existing individual. Singer's argument implicitly appeals to the psychological account of personal identity, which, although endorsed by many philosophers such as Derek Parfit, is contentious. Singer does not attempt to defend the psychological account before applying it to the moral permissibility of abortion. Indeed, with some notable exceptions, very few bioethicists attempt antecedently to defend their chosen theory of personal identity before applying it to their ethical arguments. In this paper, I look at the issues of abortion, embryonic stem cell research, and human reproductive cloning in order to illustrate how many of the arguments made by bioethicists on these topics are, at least partly, based upon veiled metaphysical assumptions. My objective is to illustrate that progress can be made on these topics by attending to their fundamental metaphysical claims.

Many medical‐ethics advisory boards have concluded that human embryonic stem cell research can be conducted in an ethical manner. Yet, almost all the recommendations of the ethics advisory boards have included a rather obscure requirement: the embryos that are to be destroyed for stem cell research must be treated with profound respect. In none of these recommendations, however, do we see an adequate explanation of what proper respect for human embryos actually entails. In this essay I argue that showing proper respect for human embryos, on the one hand, and simultaneously destroying them for stem cell research, on the other hand, are not mutually exclusive. In addition, I maintain that given current U.S. in vitro fertilization practices, which deliberately produce more embryos than will be implanted, proper respect for surplus embryos requires their use in embryonic stem cell research.

This anthology takes a broad approach to ethics, incorporating traditional topics and texts while bringing in voices and themes that are too often excluded. A substantial section on ethical theory is provided, as are readings on topics such as oppression, sex, identity, the environment, life and death, war and terror, and caring for others. Accessible introductions and discussion questions are included throughout to contextualize material for the student reader without playing favorites among the positions at issue.

In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion

Far too often in our society, the input of a potential father is not deemed relevant in a woman’s abortion decision. Men, however, can suffer emotional strains due to the abortion of their potential child, and given this harm it seems that morality must make room for a potential father’s voice in the abortion decision. I will argue that a man cannot have the right to veto a woman’s decision to procure an abortion, yet there may be times where a woman may exercise her right to an abortion in a manner not indicative of a virtuous character. This is especially a danger in the face of a dissenting man who may suffer greatly if his potential child is abortedand thus I will delineate circumstances where a virtuous woman would concede to carrying a fetus to term in order to give a man the child he so desperately desires. In addition to using virtue ethics to make the argument, I will incorporate certain aspects of care ethics in order to further what may seem to some to be a rather contentious claim

Psychoactive drugs are being prescribed to millions of Americans at an increasing rate. In many cases these drugs are necessary in order to overcome debilitating emotional problems. Yet in other instances, these drugs are used to supplant, not supplement, interpersonal therapy. The process of overcoming emotional obstacles by introspection and the attainment of self knowledge is gradually being eroded via the gratuitous use of psychoactive medication in order to rapidly attain a release from the common problems that life inevitably presents us with. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s formula of humanity, which maintains that persons ought never to treat others or themselves soley as a means to an end, proscribes this. Moreover, Kant argues that we have an imperfect duty of self development, and I argue that we fail to adhere to such a duty whenever we seek to evade the process of introspection and self knowledge in favour of the expedient results that drugs may provide us with as we attempt to overcome the emotional hurdles in our lives

In 2008, many states sought to pass Human Life Amendments, which would extend the definition of personhood to encompass newly fertilized eggs. If such an amendment were to pass, Roe v. Wade, as currently defended by the Supreme Court, may be repealed. Consequently, it is necessary to defend the right to an abortion in a manner that succeeds even if a Human Life Amendment successfully passes. J.J. Thomson's argument in “A Defense of Abortion” successfully achieves this. Her argument is especially strong when one considers that her central thesis—that one person's right to life does not entail the right to use another's person's body for continued sustenance—is pervasive in legal policies in the U.S.A.

In Steven Spielberg's A.I. Artificial Intelligence a company called Cybertronics is responsible for creating, building, and disseminating a large number of ‘mechas’ – androids built specifically to address a multitude of human needs, including the desire to have children. David, an android mecha-child, has the capacity to genuinely love on whomever he ‘imprints.’ The first of this kind of mecha, he is ultimately abandoned by his ‘mother’ Monica, and David spends the rest of the film searching for Pinocchio's Blue Fairy so that he can be made into a ‘real boy’ and gain Monica's love. Their reunion finally occurs at the end of the film, after hundreds of years. Typically, the ending in A.I. is panned by critics, and written off as an egregrious example of Spielberg's sentimentalism. However, we argue that the ending is essential in order to portray a certain conception of the nature of human personhood. While many science fiction films about artificial intelligence are centered on the issue of what constitutes personhood, A.I. is one of the very few films that does not regard personhood as something purely intrinsic to the biological construction of the organism. We contend that one of the many the messages of this film is that the journey to complete personhood requires social recognition.

In this paper, I will examine the Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) arguments in the majority decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, and I will show how some of those arguments are flawed. Primarily, I will show that the right to bodily autonomy is a well-established right, both in the courts and in societal practices, and that the right to an abortion should be understood as an example of the right to bodily autonomy or bodily integrity. Second, I will examine the justices’ arguments that viability is not a reasonable place to restrict abortion access, in contrast to both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and will offer arguments that defend viability as a valid point to limit abortion access. Third, I will highlight some politicians’ goals to enact a federal ban on abortion, and show how the attempt to pass Personhood Amendments is a pathway for doing so. The upshot of this essay to is show how the SCOTUS decision is flawed, and how granting personhood to “potential life” has consequences that extend beyond abortion access.

Arguments both in favor and against including undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform abound. However, many of these arguments, including ones that are favorable towards immigrants, are ethically problematic, and for the same reason; namely, that they either support or deny the inclusion of undocumented immigrants in healthcare reform based on their perceived level of desert, due to their alleged contribution to our social utility, or lack thereof. This encourages gauging the lives and worth of undocumented immigrants in terms of their productivity or output, rather than viewing them as intrinsically valuable human beings. This, in turn, contributes to the instrumentalization of undocumented immigrants’ welfare; for even arguments in favor of including them in healthcare reform encourage viewing them as, in Kantian language, mere means instead of ends in themselves. In this paper, I will be critical of arguments that either seek to exclude or include undocumented immigrants from healthcare reform or access based on social utility and will, instead, champion arguments in favor of inclusion that rely on fostering a sense of solidarity and identification amongst citizens and migrants.

This paper will explain three reasons why pro-choice advocates should move away from arguments in favor of abortion choice that is dependent upon the fetus’ non-personhood, and more towards generating arguments in favor of abortion choice that embraces a more respectful view of fetal life. First, the future of the legal right to an abortion in the United States may depend on generating an argument that does not rely on denying fetal personhood. Second, pro-choice advocates should be more respectful of fetal life because the hesitancy of doing so has not gone over well in the general public. Even individuals who are sympathetic to a pro-choice perspective are sometimes hesitant to align themselves with the pro-choice community because of the perception that it is antithetical to the value of fetal life. The third reason is that some women who choose abortion regard it as a morally significant act precisely because they regard the fetus as a morally significant being.

Marlise Muñoz had told her husband, Erik, that if it were ever necessary, she opposed being kept alive through the use of artificial sustenance. Two days before Thanksgiving in 2013, Erik found his wife unconscious on their kitchen floor; she had, by that point, suffered from oxygen deprivation for about an hour. When she arrived at John Peter Smith Hospital, Muñoz was put on a ventilator as hospital workers sought to revive her. They did not succeed. She was declared brain-dead, meaning that she had suffered the irreversible loss of all brain activity. Her family requested that her ventilator be removed, and were shocked to hear their request denied. The Texas advance directive statute prohibits the removal of...

When considering the role of prayer in the lives of believers, most theists agree that one important effect is the psychological impact on the person who is praying. Nevertheless, the way many of us pray, by primarily or solely focusing on our welfare and the welfare of our loved ones, agitates the human tendency towards exclusion. If we take seriously God’s commandment to love the neighbor as the self, we should use prayer, instead, as a prime opportunity to help cultivate a moral character that embraces more inclusion. In this paper, I use Søren Kierkegaard’s Works of Love as a framework for working towards this more inclusive view of prayer—one that widens our moral circle and awareness to include all human beings, and not just the select ones we have chosen to prefer above all others. It does not follow that we are prohibited from praying for our own welfare or the welfare of our loved ones, but it does mean that using prayer in a way that only (or primarily) shows concern for those whom we prefer is morally problematic.

Civil Dialogue on Abortion provides a cutting-edge discussion between two philosophy scholars on each side of the abortion debate. Bertha Alvarez Manninen argues for her pro-choice view, but also urges respect for the life of the fetus, while Jack Mulder argues for his pro-life view, but recognizes that for the pro-life movement to be consistent, it must urge society to care more for the vulnerable. Coming together to discuss their views, but also to seek common ground, the two authors show how their differing positions nevertheless rest upon some common convictions. The book helps to provide a way forward for a divide that has only seemed to widen the aisle of public discourse in recent years. This engaging book will prove essential reading for students across multiple disciplines, including applied ethics, medical ethics, and bioethics, but will also be of interest to students of religious studies and women's studies.

In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'ignoring common cause'. The commercial exploited the false cause fallacy to get consumers to buy its product. This fallacy is also present in many of the arguments concerning the alleged connection between vaccines and autism despite the plethora of evidence otherwise. The chapter consists of various examples showcasing the fallacy of ignoring common cause. It also compares the examples, showing that slight changes can lead the other types of false cause fallacies to occur.