• Modern moral psychology: An introduction to the terrain
    In Bertram Malle & Philip Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology, Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
  • The Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. forthcoming.
    Moral psychology—broadly speaking, the study of how people reason and act morally—has a long and productive history. Initially a subfield of philosophy, it posed groundbreaking questions about the nature of values and virtues, the balance of reason and emotion, and the gap between “is” and “ought.” In the twentieth century, the rise of psychology expanded the a priori philosophical enterprise into an empirical science. In psychology, perspectives of development, social interaction, cognition, an…Read more
  •  1
    Intentional Action in Folk Psychology
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: What Intentional Action Is The Folk Concept of Intentionality Development The Judgment Process Intentionality and Moral Judgment Explanations of Intentional Action Reason Explanations Causal History of Reason Explanations Enabling Factor Explanations Synopsis References Further reading.
  •  4
    The now and future of social robots as depictions
    with Xuan Zhao
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46. 2023.
    The authors at times propose that robots are mere depictions of social agents (a philosophical claim) and at other times that people conceive of social robots as depictions (an empirical psychological claim). We evaluate each claim's accuracy both now and in the future and, in doing so, we introduce two dangerous misperceptions people have, or will have, about social robots.
  •  17
    Robotics and Well-Being (edited book)
    with Maria Isabel Aldinhas Ferreira, Ana S. Aníbal, P. Beardsley, Selmer Bringsjord, Paulo S. Carvalho, Raja Chatila, Vladimir Estivill-Castro, Nicola Fabiano, Sarah R. Fletcher, Rodolphe Gelin, Rikhiya Ghosh, Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu, John C. Havens, Teegan L. Johnson, Endre E. Kadar, Jon Larreina, Pedro U. Lima, Stuti Thapa Magar, André Martins, Michael P. Musielewicz, A. Mylaeus, Matthew Peveler, Matthias Scheutz, João Silva Sequeira, R. Siegwart, B. Tranter, and A. Vempati
    Springer Verlag. 2019.
    This book highlights some of the most pressing safety, ethical, legal and societal issues related to the diverse contexts in which robotic technologies apply. Focusing on the essential concept of well-being, it addresses topics that are fundamental not only for research, but also for industry and end-users, discussing the challenges in a wide variety of applications, including domestic robots, autonomous manufacturing, personal care robots and drones.
  •  32
    AI in the Sky: How People Morally Evaluate Human and Machine Decisions in a Lethal Strike Dilemma
    with Stuti Thapa Magar and Matthias Scheutz
    In Maria Isabel Aldinhas Ferreira, João Silva Sequeira, Gurvinder Singh Virk, Mohammad Osman Tokhi & Endre E. Kadar (eds.), Robotics and Well-Being, Springer Verlag. pp. 111-133. 2019.
    Even though morally competent artificial agents have yet to emerge in society, we need insights from empirical science into how people will respond to such agents and how these responses should inform agent design. Three survey studies presented participants with an artificial intelligence agent, an autonomous drone, or a human drone pilot facing a moral dilemma in a military context: to either launch a missile strike on a terrorist compound but risk the life of a child, or to cancel the strike …Read more
  •  20
    Folk theories of consciousness
    In William P. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness, Elsevier. pp. 251-263. 2009.
    People’s folk theory of consciousness encompasses three prototypes of conscious mental functioning: monitoring (awareness), choice, and subjective experience. All three are embedded in a broader folk theory of mind and thus closely linked to the concept of intentionality, action explanation, and a conception of free will. At least some of the prototypes of consciousness play a critical role in the assignment of personhood and responsibility. Recent discussions question the viability of folk conc…Read more
  •  13
    This Isn’t the Free Will Worth Looking For: General Free Will Beliefs Do Not Influence Moral Judgments, Agent-Specific Choice Ascriptions Do
    with Andrew E. Monroe and Garrett L. Brady
    Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (2): 191-199. 2016.
    According to previous research, threatening people’s belief in free will may undermine moral judgments and behavior. Four studies tested this claim. Study 1 used a Velten technique to threaten people’s belief in free will and found no effects on moral behavior, judgments of blame, and punishment decisions. Study 2 used six different threats to free will and failed to find effects on judgments of blame and wrongness. Study 3 found no effects on moral judgment when manipulating general free will b…Read more
  •  8
    Directions and Challenges in Studying Folk Concepts and Folk Judgments
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2): 321-329. 2006.
  •  42
    The relationship between joint attention and theory of mind in neurotypical adults
    with Jordan A. Shaw, Lauren K. Bryant, Daniel J. Povinelli, and John R. Pruett
    Consciousness and Cognition 51 268-278. 2017.
    Joint attention (JA) is hypothesized to have a close relationship with developing theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. We tested the co-occurrence of ToM and JA in social interactions between adults with no reported history of psychiatric illness or neurodevelopmental disorders. Participants engaged in an experimental task that encouraged nonverbal communication, including JA, and also ToM activity. We adapted an in-lab variant of experience sampling methods (Bryant, Coffey, Povinelli, & Pruett, 2…Read more
  •  145
    Considering the close relation between language and theory of mind in development and their tight connection in social behavior, it is no big leap to claim that the two capacities have been related in evolution as well. But what is the exact relation between them? This paper attempts to clear a path toward an answer. I consider several possible relations between the two faculties, bring conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to bear on them, and end up arguing for a version of co-evolution.…Read more
  •  42
    Introduction: The significance of intentionality
    with Louis J. Moses and Dare A. Baldwin
    In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, Mit Press. pp. 1--24. 2001.
  •  158
    Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are n…Read more
  •  58
    Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition (edited book)
    with Louis J. Moses and Dare A. Baldwin
    MIT Press. 2001.
    Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.
  •  72
    Attribution theory has played a major role in social-psychological research. Unfortunately, the term attribution is ambiguous. According to one meaning, forming an attribution is making a dispositional (trait) inference from behavior; according to another meaning, forming an attribution is giving an explanation (especially of behavior). The focus of this paper is on the latter phenomenon of behavior explanations. In particular, I discuss a new theory of explanation that provides an alternative t…Read more
  •  32
    Distinguishing Hope from Optimism and Related Affective States
    with Patricia Bruininks
    Motivation and Emotion 29 (4): 324--352. 2006.
  •  204
    Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition
    In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience, Oxford University Press. pp. 225-255. 2005.
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particula…Read more
  •  392
    Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later
    Psychologica Belgica 42 113-130. 2002.
    It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possib…Read more
  •  115
    At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology
    with Steve Guglielmo and Andrew E. Monroe
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5): 449-466. 2009.
    Moral judgments about an agent's behavior are enmeshed with inferences about the agent's mind. Folk psychology—the system that enables such inferences—therefore lies at the heart of moral judgment. We examine three related folk-psychological concepts that together shape people's judgments of blame: intentionality, choice, and free will. We discuss people's understanding and use of these concepts, address recent findings that challenge the autonomous role of these concepts in moral judgment, and …Read more
  •  265
    From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will
    with Andrew E. Monroe
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2): 211-224. 2010.
    People’s concept of free will is often assumed to be incompatible with the deterministic, scientific model of the universe. Indeed, many scholars treat the folk concept of free will as assuming a special form of nondeterministic causation, possibly the notion of uncaused causes. However, little work to date has directly probed individuals’ beliefs about what it means to have free will. The present studies sought to reconstruct this folk concept of free will by asking people to define the concept…Read more
  •  59
    Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others (edited book)
    with Sara D. Hodges
    Guilford. 2005.
    Leading scholars from psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy present theories and findings on understanding how individuals infer such complex mental states ...
  •  240
    Folk theory of mind: Conceptual foundations of social cognition
    In R. Hassin, J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (eds.), [Book Chapter], Oxford University Press. pp. 225-255. 2005.
    The human ability to represent, conceptualize, and reason about mind and behavior is one of the greatest achievements of human evolution and is made possible by a “folk theory of mind” — a sophisticated conceptual framework that relates different mental states to each other and connects them to behavior. This chapter examines the nature and elements of this framework and its central functions for social cognition. As a conceptual framework, the folk theory of mind operates prior to any particula…Read more