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173Disagreement and the division of epistemic laborSynthese 197 (7): 2823-2847. 2018.In this article we discuss what we call the deliberative division of epistemic labor. We present evidence that the human tendency to engage in motivated reasoning in defense of our beliefs can facilitate the occurrence of divisions of epistemic labor in deliberations among people who disagree. We further present evidence that these divisions of epistemic labor tend to promote beliefs that are better supported by the evidence. We show that promotion of these epistemic benefits stands in tension w…Read more
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106The epistemic significance of political disagreementPhilosophical Studies 176 (8): 2187-2202. 2019.The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of…Read more
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69Polarization in groups of Bayesian agentsSynthese 198 (1): 1-55. 2018.In this paper we present the results of a simulation study of credence developments in groups of communicating Bayesian agents, as they update their beliefs about a given proposition p. Based on the empirical literature, one would assume that these groups of rational agents would converge on a view over time, or at least that they would not polarize. This paper presents and discusses surprising evidence that this is not true. Our simulation study shows that these groups of Bayesian agents show g…Read more
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43Fairness, fast and slow: A review of dual process models of fairnessNeuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 89 49-60. 2018.Fairness, the notion that people deserve or have rights to certain resources or kinds of treatment, is a fundamental dimension of moral cognition. Drawing on recent evidence from economics, psychology, and neuroscience, we ask whether self-interest is always intuitive, requiring self-control to override with reasoning-based fairness concerns, or whether fairness itself can be intuitive. While we find strong support for rejecting the notion that self-interest is always intuitive, the literature h…Read more
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43Democratic Decision Making and the Psychology of RiskLes ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 12 (1): 51-83. 2017.Andreas Christiansen,Bjørn Hallsson | : In many cases, the public want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what is safe. In this…Read more
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25Does harm or disrespect make discrimination wrong? An experimental approachPhilosophical Psychology. forthcoming.While standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with and, in part, supported by the folk theory of the m…Read more
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23Democratic Decision Making and the Psychology of RiskLes Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 12 (1): 51-83. 2017.Andreas Christiansen,Bjørn Hallsson | : In many cases, the public want to restrict an activity or technology that they believe to be dangerous, but that scientific experts believe to be safe. There is thus a tension between respecting the preferences of the people and making policy based on our best scientific knowledge. Deciding how to make policy in the light of this tension requires an understanding of why citizens sometimes disagree with the experts on what is risky and what is safe. In this…Read more
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15Freedom of Expression, Diversity, and TruthIn Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee & David Coady (eds.), A Companion to Applied Philosophy, Wiley. 2016.The aim of this chapter is to examine how diversity benefits deliberation, information exchange and other socio‐epistemic practices associated with free speech. We separate five distinct dimensions of diversity, and discuss a variety of distinct mechanisms by which various forms of diversity may be thought to have epistemically valuable outcomes. We relate these results to the moral justification of free speech. Finally, we characterise a collective action problem concerning the compliance with …Read more
Copenhagen, Hovedstaden, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology |
Psychology |
Areas of Interest
Social Epistemology |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Political Science |
Psychology |