University of Aberdeen
School of Divinity, History and Philosophy
PhD, 2001
Aberdeen, Scotland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphilosophy
20th Century Philosophy
  •  7
    On Testimony, Sincerity and Truth
    Paragraph 30 (1): 30-50. 2007.
    In much recent cultural theory there has been a noticeable turn to testimonial discourse, perhaps especially in the context of finding ways of bearing witness to human suffering, tragedy and trauma.While this shift toward allowing others to speak ‘in the first person’ provides an important and powerful methodological tool, appealing to first-person testimony is also a hazardous enterprise. Drawing on a number of disparate philosophers and writers, in this article I explore some of the central ep…Read more
  • Jacques Derrida, Who's Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1 (review)
    Philosophy in Review 23 (4): 247-249. 2003.
  •  44
    This strange institution called 'philosophy': Derrida and the primacy of metaphilosophy
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (3): 257-288. 2012.
    In 1981, after 20 years of teaching and writing philosophy, Derrida claimed that ‘less than ever’ did he ‘know what philosophy is’. Indeed, his ‘knowledge of what ... constitutes the essence of philosophy’ remained ‘at zero degree’. 1 These were not flippant remarks. Rather, Derrida’s avowed uncertainty is part of a more general metaphilosophical view; namely, that ‘Philosophy has a way of being at home with itself that consists in not being at home with itself’. 2 In this article I will critica…Read more
  •  48
    Welcoming dogs: Levinas and 'the animal' question
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (1): 49-71. 2011.
    According to Levinas, the history of western philosophy has routinely ‘assimilated every Other into the Same’. More concretely stated, philosophers have neglected the ethical significance of other human beings in their vulnerable, embodied singularity. What is striking about Levinas’ recasting of ethics as ‘first philosophy’ is his own relative disregard for non-human animals. In this article I will do two interrelated things: (1) situate Levinas’ (at least partial) exclusion of the non-human an…Read more
  •  66
    On the Domain of Metaphilosophy
    Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2): 3-24. 2017.
    This article argues for four interrelated claims: Metaphilosophy is not one sub-discipline of philosophy, nor is it restricted to questions of methodology. Rather, metaphilosophical inquiry encompasses the general background conditions of philosophical practice. These background conditions are of various sorts, not only those routinely considered “philosophical” but also those considered biographical, historical, and sociological. Accordingly, we should be wary of the customary distinction betwe…Read more
  •  33
    Ethics without exit: Levinas and Murdoch
    Philosophy and Literature 27 (2): 456-470. 2003.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.2 (2003) 456-470 [Access article in PDF] Ethics without Exit:Levinas and Murdoch Bob Plant Hearts open very easily to the working class, wallets with more difficulty. What opens with the most difficulty of all are the doors of our own homes. —Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings... there is no debt to acquit. From the outset, I am not exonerated. I am originally in default. —Emmanuel Levinas, God, Dea…Read more
  •  36
    The Confessing Animal in Foucault and Wittgenstein
    Journal of Religious Ethics 34 (4): 533-559. 2006.
    In "The History of Sexuality", Foucault maintains that "Western man has become a confessing animal" (1990, 59), thus implying that "man" was not always such a creature. On a related point, Wittgenstein suggests that "man is a ceremonial animal" (1996, 67); here the suggestion is that human beings are, by their very nature, ritualistically inclined. In this paper I examine this crucial difference in emphasis, first by reconstructing Foucault's "genealogy" of confession, and subsequently by explor…Read more
  •  75
    Religion, Relativism, and Wittgenstein’s Naturalism
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (2): 177-209. 2011.
    Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour troubling fideistic and relativistic views. Unsurprisingly, commentators are generally resistant to the idea that religious belief constitutes a ‘language‐game’ governed by its own peculiar ‘rules’, and is thereby insulated from the critical assessment of non‐participants. Indeed, on this fideist‐relativist reading, it is unclear how mutual understanding between believers and non‐believers (even between differ…Read more
  •  21
    Levinas and the Holocaust: A Reconstruction
    Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 22 (1): 44-79. 2014.
  •  47
    Wittgenstein, Religious “Passion,” and Fundamentalism
    Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (2): 280-309. 2013.
    Notwithstanding his own spiritual inadequacies, Wittgenstein has a profound respect for those capable of living a genuinely religious life; namely, those whose “passionate,” “loving” faith demands unconditional existential commitment. In contrast, he disapproves of those who see religious belief as hypothetical, reasonable, or dependent on empirical evidence. Drawing primarily on Culture and Value, “Lectures on Religious Belief,” and On Certainty, in this essay I defend two claims: (1) that ther…Read more
  • Simon Glendinning, ed., Arguing with Derrida Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 22 (3): 181-185. 2002.
  •  82
    Philosophical Diversity and Disagreement
    Metaphilosophy 43 (5): 567-591. 2012.
    Widespread and lasting consensus has not been philosophy's fate. Indeed, one of philosophy's most striking features is its ability to accommodate “not only different answers to philosophical questions” but also “total disagreement on what questions are philosophical” (Rorty 1995, 58). It is therefore hardly surprising that philosophers' responses to this metaphilosophical predicament have been similarly varied. This article considers two recent diagnoses of philosophical diversity: Kornblith and…Read more
  •  2
    Gideon Ofrat, The Jewish Derrida (review)
    Philosophy in Review 22 (3): 181-185. 2002.
  •  64
    In "Culture and Value" Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist-relativist conclusions) I argue that the dist…Read more
  •  94
    In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Thoughts that are at peace. That's what someone who philosophizes yearns for’. The desire for such conceptual tranquillity is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein's work, and especially in his later ‘grammatical-therapeutic’ philosophy. Some commentators (notably Rush Rhees and C. G. Luckhardt) have cautioned that emphasising this facet of Wittgenstein's work ‘trivialises’ philosophy – something which is at odds with Wittgenstein's own philosophical ‘seri…Read more
  •  59
    On being (not quite) dead with Derrida
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (3): 320-338. 2016.
    If mortality is the most important fact about us, then it is reasonable to think that fear of death is our most fundamental fear. Indeed, while philosophers continue to disagree about whether it is rational to fear death, they tend to assume that fear is the most common, natural response our mortality provokes. I neither want to deny the reality of this fear nor evaluate its rationality. Rather, drawing on Derrida’s remarks on ‘quasi-death’, I will argue that fearful or not, death pervades every…Read more
  •  40
    Death, fear, and self-mourning
    Forum for European Philosophy Blog. 2015.
    Attitudes to our own mortality are characterized by more than just fear, suggests Bob Plant.
  • Simon Glendinning, ed., Arguing with Derrida (review)
    Philosophy in Review 22 181-185. 2002.
  •  217
    Playing games/playing us: Foucault on sadomasochism
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (5): 531-561. 2007.
    The impact of Foucault's work can still be felt across a range of academic disciplines. It is nevertheless important to remember that, for him, theoretical activity was intimately related to the concrete practices of self-transformation; as he acknowledged: `I write in order to change myself.' 1 This avowal is especially pertinent when considering Foucault's work on the relationship between sex and power. For Foucault not only theorized about this topic; he was also actively involved in the S&M …Read more
  •  76
    Is the Other radically ‘other’? A critical reconstruction of Levinas’ ethics
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (9): 977-995. 2012.
    Many Levinasians are prone to merely assert or presuppose that the Other is ‘radically Other’, and that such Otherness is of patent ethical significance. But building ethics into the very concept of ‘the Other’ seems question-begging. What then, if not mere Otherness, might motivate Levinasian responsibility? In the following discussion I argue that this can best be answered by reading Levinas as a post-Holocaust thinker, preoccupied with how one’s simply being-here constitutes a ‘usurpation of …Read more
  •  155
    Absurdity, incongruity and laughter
    Philosophy 84 (1): 111-134. 2009.
    In "The Myth of Sisyphus", Camus recommends scornful defiance in the face of our absurd, meaningless existence. Although Nagel agrees that human life possesses an absurd dimension, he objects to Camus' existentialist 'dramatics'. For Nagel, absurdity arises from the irreducible tension between our subjective and objective perspectives on life. In this paper I do two things: (i) critically reconstruct Camus' and Nagel's positions, and (ii) develop Nagel's critique of Camus in order to argue that …Read more
  •  31
    The Wittgenstein Archive
    Philosophy Now 58 26-27. 2006.
    Something in the way of a parody of iconography...
  • Richard Rand, ed., Futures of Jacques Derrida (review)
    Philosophy in Review 22 181-185. 2002.
  •  29
  •  61
    Doing justice to the Derrida–Levinas connection: A response to mark Dooley
    Philosophy and Social Criticism 29 (4): 427-450. 2003.
    Mark Dooley has recently argued (principally against Simon Critchley) that the attempt to establish too strong a ‘connection’ between Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas not only distorts crucial disparities between their respective philosophies, it also contaminates Derrida’s recent work with Levinas’s inherent ‘political naivety’. In short, on Dooley’s reading, Levinas is only of ‘inspirational value’ for Derrida. I am not concerned with defending Critchley’s own reading of the ‘Derrida–Levin…Read more
  •  78
    The banality of death
    Philosophy 84 (4): 571-596. 2009.
    Notwithstanding the burgeoning literature on death, philosophers have tended to focus on the significance death has (or ought/ought not to have) for the one who dies. Thus, while the relevance one's own death has for others (and the significance others' deaths have for us) is often mentioned, it is rarely attributed any great importance to the purported real philosophical issues. This is a striking omission, not least because the deaths of others - and the anticipated effects our own death will …Read more
  •  46
    Perhaps … : Jacques Derrida and Pyrrhonian Scepticism
    Angelaki 11 (3): 137-156. 2006.
    The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," [] we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not" []. But here again we do not fight about phrases [] these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism One could spend years on [] the perhaps [] whose modality will render fictional and fragile everything that follows []. One does not testify in court and before the law with "perhaps." Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony.