Bogusław Paź

The main goal of the article is to demonstrate that (against general opinion) Wolff used not one but few different research methods in his philosophy. Except mathematical (more geometrico), there were semiotic, eidetic and reflective ones. Moreover I indicate the presence of reductive, transcendental, and rhetorical method elements in Wolff's works. Each of this methods are represented in this article in details with an examples of their usage by Wolff. The choice of the methods and the structural relation between them are not coincidental. In the current article I try to prove that the heuristic epistemological primacy in Wolff's philosophy belongs not to the mathematical but to eidetic method. Speaking of the relation type between eidetic method and the rest of them – semiotic, reflective and axiomatic (mathematical one) – I would define it as: (1) genetic dependence, since eidetic method is the reason of existence of the rest of the methods, (2) heuretic dependence, while eidetic one gives the opportunity for the reflection over the rest of the methods, and (3) epistemological dependence, while eidetic method provides criteria of truth (reliability) of the knowledge for the rest of methods.

The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate methodological and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology.

Author: Paź Bogusław Title: ONTOLOGY VERSUS METAPHYSICS. GENESIS, DEVELOPMENT AND DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE MODERN THEORY OF BEING (Ontologia versus metafizyka? Geneza, rozwój i różne postaci nowożytnej teorii bytu) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.15, number: 2011/4, pages: 817-847 Keywords: ONTOLOGY, MODERN METAPHYSICS, ESSENCE, ESSENTIALISM, IDEA, REPRESENTATIONISM, RATIONALISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The paper presents the process of modern metaphysics transforming into the ontology. The major points of this process became: 1) scholastic sources of Catholic metaphysics represented by Fonseca, Suarez, Śmiglecki on the one side and Protestant metaphysics, represented by Goclenius and Clauberg, on the other; 2) Descartes’ epistemology of representation and 3) Leibniz’s rational and pluralistic metaphysics (monadology). The climax of the transformation process appears to be “Philosophia prima sive ontologia” (1729), a masterpiece being written by Wolff, where the first system of the ontology (science about being as possibility) was presented as a discipline independent from the traditional metaphysics. However starting with the Kant’s works ontology no longer was the discipline of knowledge about the real world but has being turned into a field of aprioristic categories of thinking about an existence and the physical world

RATIONALITY IN POSTMODERNISM? The aim of the article is to present analytical criticism of rationalism in a postmodern interpretation by I. Trzcińska in her book Logos, mit i ratio. Wybrane koncepcje racjonalności od XV do XVII wieku. The author of the article proves that the postmodern rationalistic interpretation is either irrational, since it abolishes the guiding principles of thinking and being (such as the law of contradiction and the principle of reason), or deficient in methodology. In the paper analyzed, the absence of quite essential arrangements for rationality as such is pointed out, just as the absence of a typology of possible rationality forms. The author claims that in the case of I. Trzcińska’s book we deal with both problems mentioned, which makes the book irrelevant to traditionally understood science. Keywords: ANALYTICAL CRITICISM, IRRATIONAL POSTMODERN, ABSENCE OF RATIONALITY FORMS