•  807
    (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1): 374-397. 2017.
    Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have emb…Read more
  •  289
    Knowledge-How (Reference Entry)
    Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. 2016.
    The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic d…Read more
  •  323
    Extended Knowledge-How
    Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259-273. 2016.
    According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosoph…Read more
  •  13
    Is Augmented Reality a Source of New Types of Knowledge?
    with Tadeusz Czarnecki
    In José María Ariso (ed.), Augmented Reality: Reflections on its Contribution to Knowledge Formation, De Gruyter. pp. 151-170. 2017.