•  3
    Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity
    Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4). 2021.
    Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity. By Janos Damien.
  •  4
    Meta Logou in Plato’s Theaetetus
    Apeiron 54 (1): 109-128. 2020.
    The account of knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus, as true belief meta logou, seems to lead to a regress, which may be avoided by defining one kind of knowledge as true belief that rests on a different kind of knowledge. I explore a specific version of this move: to define knowledge as true belief that results from a successful and proper exercise of a rational capacity.
  •  12
    Form and Function in Aristotle
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2): 317-337. 2020.
    On the one hand, Aristotle claims that the matter of a material thing is not part of its form. On the other hand, he suggests that the proper account of a natural thing must include a specification of the kind of matter in which it is realized. There are three possible strategies for dealing with this apparent tension. First, there may be two kinds of definition, so that the definition of the form of a thing does not include any specification of its matter, whereas the definition of a compound d…Read more
  •  5
    Teleonomy
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 14 (1): 185-202. 2011.
    The distinction between teleology and teleonomy that biologists sometimes refer to seems to be helpful in certain contexts, but it is used in several different ways and has rarely been clearly drawn. This paper discusses three prominent uses of the term “teleonomy” and traces its history back to what seems to be its first use. This use is examined in detail and then justified and refined on the basis of elements found in the philosophy of Aristotle, Kant, Anscombe and others. In the course of th…Read more
  •  20
    This is a discussion of self-knowledge in Hugh of St. Victor. It will yield the following three systematic results. First, it will be shown that there is a clear sense in which human self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s own rationality, and therefore knowledge of the proper object of one’s rational capacities (dunameis meta logou). Second, a distinction will be drawn between perfect and imperfect self-knowledge. Third, it will turn out that under conditions of perfect self-knowledge, all our rat…Read more
  •  35
    Knowledge and Truth in Plato: Stepping Past the Shadow of Socrates
    Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276): 638-641. 2019.
    Review of Catherine Rowett's Knowledge and Truth in Plato
  •  29
    Lichtenberg’s Point
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2): 265-286. 2018.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 265 - 286 The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the _passive_ subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ _cogito_ argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all our thoughts. Moreo…Read more
  •  116
  •  57
    Socrates and Self-Knowledge
    Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271): 421-424. 2018.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected] idea of this book is to closely examine all passages where Socrates talks about the Delphic precept, ‘Know Thyself’, and see what picture of self-knowledge emerges. Given that Socrates is a key figure in the transmission of this precept, it is very likely that such a proje…Read more
  •  22
    Schuld und Gewissen bei Abelard
    Dialektik (1): 129-143. 2003.
    In Abelards Kommentar zum Römerbrief erscheint das Handeln contra conscientiam als eines gegen das eigene Urteil über andere. Abelard bezieht sich hier vor allem auf eine frühere Stelle im selben Brief, wo Paulus schreibt, jeder werde nach dem Gesetz gerichtet, das er sich selbst gibt (Rom 2,1). Was wir an Anderen verur- teilen, erläutert er, stehe dadurch auch unserer eigenen conscientia entgegen, und nur ein Handeln gegen die conscientia sei Sünde. Damit wird die goldene Regel, auf die Abelard…Read more
  •  24
    Tugenden und Absichten
    Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (1): 165-182. 2008.
    Psychological experiments show that human behavior is often determined by features of the situation rather than general and persistent character traits of the agent. Therefore, it may seem naive to suppose that someone with a virtuous character will in general act virtuously. This is at least true if a character trait is taken to be a persistent characteristic or property that reliably causes certain behavior. On the basis of the conception of agency developed by Anscombe in Intention, I will ar…Read more
  • Kants Modell kausaler Verhältnisse
    Kant-Studien. forthcoming.
    Eric Watkins argues that according to Kant, causation is not a relation between two events, but a relation between the “causality” of a substance and an event. It is shown that his arguments are partly based on a confusion between causation and interaction. Further, Watkins claims that for Kant, causes cannot be temporally determined. If this were true, it would follow that there can be no causal chains, and that all factors that determine the time when an effect occurs do not belong to its caus…Read more
  •  66
    The man without properties
    Synthese 194 (6). 2017.
    Contemporary philosophical logic rests on a distinction between things and properties. Properties are thought to differ from things in that their proper expression is incomplete or unsaturated. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle did not distinguish between things and properties in this way. I will show, first, that Aristotle’s essences are not properties, and that certain passages in Aristotle make sense only if we do not take accidents to be properties either. The notion of a property i…Read more
  •  34
    Conscientia bei Descartes
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 60 (1): 21-36. 2006.
    Obwohl ‚conscientia’ ein zentraler Grundbegriff der cartesischen Metaphysik ist, sagt Descartes nirgends explizit, was er damit meint. Auch aus der Art und Weise, in der er das Wort verwendet, lässt sich dessen Bedeutung nicht vollends erschließen. Insbesondere handelt es sich nicht um einen reflexiven Denkakt (cogitatio), nicht um eine Disposition zum Haben solcher cogitationes und nicht um eine Art Aufmerksamkeit. Um die Bedeutung des Begriffes zu klären, schlage ich vor, auf klassische Texte …Read more
  •  32
    Was bedeutet ‚Conscientia' bei Descartes
    Dissertation, Universität Leipzig. 2004.
    Obwohl 'conscientia' ein zentraler Grundbegriff der cartesischen Metaphysik ist, sagt Descartes nirgends explizit, was er damit meint. Auch aus der Art und Weise, in der er das Wort verwendet, lässt sich dessen Bedeutung nicht vollends erschließen. Insbesondere handelt es sich nicht um einen reflexiven Denkakt (cogitatio), nicht um eine Disposition zum Haben solcher cogitationes und nicht um eine Art Aufmerksamkeit. Um die Bedeutung des Begriffes zu klären, schlage ich vor, auf klassische Texte…Read more
  •  38
    Social facts explained and presupposed
    In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality, Ontos Verlag. 2006.
    Attempts are often made to explain collective action in terms of the interaction of individuals. A common objection to such attempts is that they are circular: Since every interaction presupposes the existence of common practices and common practices involve collective action, no analysis of collective agency in terms of interaction can reduce collectivity away. In this essay I will argue that this does not constitute a real circularity. It is true that common practices are presupposed in every …Read more
  •  76
    Matter in Z3
    Foundations of Science 13 (3-4): 199-215. 2008.
    In this paper, I will discuss a certain conception of matter that Aristotle introduces in Metaphysics Z3. It is often assumed that Aristotle came to distinguish between matter and form only in his physical writings, and that this lead to a conflict with the doctrine of primary substances in the Categories that he tries to resolve in Z3. I will argue that there is no such conflict. In Z3, Aristotle seems to suggest that matter is what is left over when we strip a thing of all its properties. I ta…Read more
  •  37
    I will in this paper attempt to extract a positive doctrine on the substantiality of the human soul from Ghazali"s critique of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition. Rather than reflecting on the possibilities and limitations of intercultural dialogue, my aim is to directly engage in such dialogue. Accordingly, I will not suppose that we need to develop and apply external standards according to which one of the two philosophical traditions addressed here, Western and Islamic, may turn out to …Read more
  • Disposition
    In Hans Jörg Sandkühler & Others (eds.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie, Meiner Verlag. 2010.
  •  128
    Teleonomy
    History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 14. 2011.
    The distinction between teleology and teleonomy that biologists sometimes refer to seems to be helpful in certain contexts, but it is used in several different ways and has rarely been clearly drawn. This paper discusses three prominent uses of the term “teleonomy” and traces its history back to what seems to be its first use. This use is examined in detail and then justified and refined on the basis of elements found in the philosophy of Aristotle, Kant, Anscombe and others. In the course of th…Read more
  • Review of Johannes Haag, erfahrung und gegenstand (review)
    Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger (3): 209-214. 2007.
    Die Frage, mit der sich Johannes Haag in Erfahrung und Gegenstand auseinandersetzt, lautet: „Auf welchem Grunde beruht die Beziehung desjenigen, was man in uns empirische Vorstellung, d. i. Erfahrung nennt, auf den Gegenstand überhaupt?“ ...
  • Johannes Haag: Erfahrung und Gegenstand (review)
    Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 60 (3). 2007.
  •  36
    Eine Verteidigung des typologischen Artbegriffs
    Philosophia Naturalis 46 (2): 251-278. 2009.
    The paper demonstrates that the biological species concept that Mayr con- trasts with the typological one in fact presupposes a version of the typological species concept. For one cannot assess whether two living beings are capable of producing offspring without already knowing what would count as off- spring. Therefore, one must know non-relational features of typical offspring of a kind of living beings in order to be able to apply the biological species concept. The typological species concep…Read more
  •  13
    "Conscientia" bei Descartes
    Alber Verlag. 2006.
    Although Descartes is often said to have coined the modern notion of 'consciousness', he nowhere defines the according Latin term (conscientia), neither explicitly nor implicitly. This may either imply that he used the word in a sense that he did not make sufficiently clear, that he was not the first to use 'conscientia' in its modern psychological sense, or that he still used it in its traditional sense. I argue for the third assumption: Descartes used 'conscientia' according to the traditional…Read more
  • What is formal ontology?
    In Katherine Munn & Barry Smith (eds.), Applied Ontology. An Introduction, Ontos Verlag. 2008.
  •  393
    Substance, Reality, and Distinctness
    Prolegomena 7 (1): 2008. 2008.
    Descartes claims that God is a substance, and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible. For Descartes, that something is real means it can exist in separation, and something is a substance if it does not depend on other substances for its existence. Further, separable objects are correlates of distinct ideas, for an idea is distinct (in an objective sense) if its object may be easily and clearly sepa…Read more
  •  36
    Naturteleologie, reduktiv
    Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2): 296--315. 2006.
    The sciences may be able to describe living beings, but this is not to account for their life. Life is not a describable property of things. There is also no philosophical a priori argument by which one could prove the existence of life – except perhaps our own. In order to understand what life is, we must start with our conception of that life that we know, human life, and reduce the notion of this life to a notion of mere life. We may do this by introducing the following distinctions. Intentio…Read more
  •  54
    In this essay, I will sketch my view of the connections between some methodological assumptions in social philosophy, namely those of individualism, holism, and collectivism. My interest in doing so is to outline a rough conceptual landscape, into which an approach of collective actions and intentions can be placed.
  •  39