Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Areas of Interest
  •  67
    Russell–Myhill and grounding
    Analysis. forthcoming.
    The Russell-Myhill paradox puts pressure on the Russellian structured view of propositions by showing that it conflicts with certain prima facie attractive ontological and logical principles. I describe several versions of RMP and argue that structurists can appeal to natural assumptions about metaphysical grounding to provide independent reasons for rejecting the ontological principles used in these paradoxes. It remains a task for future work to extend this grounding-based approach to all vari…Read more
  •  112
    Essence and modal knowledge
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 8): 1957-1979. 2018.
    During the last quarter of a century, a number of philosophers have become attracted to the idea that necessity can be analyzed in terms of a hyperintensional notion of essence. One challenge for proponents of this view is to give a plausible explanation of our modal knowledge. The goal of this paper is to develop a strategy for meeting this challenge. My approach rests on an account of modality that I developed in previous work, and which analyzes modal properties in terms of the notion of a me…Read more
  •  78
    Chance and the Structure of Modal Space
    Mind 127 (507): 633-665. 2018.
    The sample space of the chance distribution at a given time is a class of possible worlds. Thanks to this connection between chance and modality, one’s views about modal space can have significant consequences in the theory of chance and can be evaluated in part by how plausible these implications are. I apply this methodology to evaluate certain forms of modal contingentism, the thesis that some facts about what is possible are contingent. Any modal contingentist view that meets certain conditi…Read more
  •  60
    Free Will and Ultimate Explanation
    Philosophical Issues 27 (1): 114-130. 2017.
  •  10
    Analysis 77 (1): 129-133. 2017.
  •  22
    Replies to Dorr, Emery and Hill and Yablo
    Analysis 77 (1): 166-188. 2017.
  •  141
    Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals
    Philosophical Review 121 (4): 573-609. 2012.
    Antihaecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distribu…Read more
  •  41
    Précis of Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2): 489-498. 2015.
  •  467
    Counterfactuals and explanation
    Mind 115 (458): 261-310. 2006.
    On the received view, counterfactuals are analysed using the concept of closeness between possible worlds: the counterfactual 'If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q' is true at a world w just in case q is true at all the possible p-worlds closest to w. The degree of closeness between two worlds is usually thought to be determined by weighting different respects of similarity between them. The question I consider in the paper is which weights attach to different …Read more
  •  879
    Modality and Explanatory Reasoning
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Boris Kment takes a new approach to the study of modality that emphasises the origin of modal notions in everyday thought. He argues that the concepts of necessity and possibility originate in counterfactual reasoning, which allows us to investigate explanatory connections. Contrary to accepted views, explanation is more fundamental than modality.
  •  30
    Replies to Sullivan and Lange
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2): 516-539. 2015.