•  6
    Properties Ain't No Puzzle
    Filozofia Nauki 25 (2 (98)): 89-101. 2017.
    Frege’s Commitment Puzzle concerns inferences from sentences such as “Jupiter has four moons” to sentences such as “The number of moons of Jupiter is four”. Although seemingly about completely different things, such pairs of sentences appear to be truth-conditionally equivalent. In this paper, I make a case against versions of the Puzzle that appeal to properties and propositions. First, I argue that propositions in Frege’s biconditionals serve a specific, non-referring conversational role. Seco…Read more
  •  44
    Comprehensive Linguistic Approach to Frege's Commitment Puzzle There is a puzzle, noticed by Frege, about inferences from sentences like (F1) "Jupiter has four moons" to sentences like (F2) "The number of moons of Jupiter is four". They seem to be truth-conditionally equivalent but, apparently, they say something about completely different things. (F1) seems to be about moons, while (F2) about numbers. This phenomenon raises several puzzles about semantics, syntax, and is one of main tools of ea…Read more