Brad Stone

Colin Koopman’s Pragmatism as Transition offers a new insight into how to understand pragmatism, particularly by connecting pragmatism’s melioristic approach to problems with a Foucauldian genealogical analysis of the very problems that pragmatism hope to solve. Peculiarly absent from Koopman’s presentation is a consideration of Cornel West’s prophetic pragmatism, which itself combined the melioristic problem-solving of pragmatism and the Foucauldian analysis proposed by Koopman. This absence is not malicious, of course, but it does bring to mind how West’s prophetic pragmatism has been generally disregarded by mainstream pragmatism scholarship.

This chapter offers an overview of Foucault' s conception of power. The new interpretation of power relationships as a kind of war calls traditional understandings of power into question and corrects our errors concerning the role of power in the constitution of knowledge, institutions, and subjects. In his lecture course, Society Must Be Defended, Focault presents his notion of power in terms of “Nietzsche's Hypothesis”. The chapter then turns to the analysis of political power and describes the difference between sovereignty and biopower as political paradigms. Finally, it looks at Foucault's definition of race and racism. Foucault explains how racism enters the political equation as a useful strategy of biopolitics. Two areas that are directly affected by biopower are sexuality and racism.

This essay explores the Foucauldian influence on Cornel West’s prophetic pragmatism. Although West argues that Foucauldian methods are insufficient to deliver a philosophy of liberation, I argue that there is nothing in Foucault that would prohibit West from such a goal, even though a philosophy of liberation was not one of Foucault’s goals. Fortunately, one can understand West’s own project of liberation in terms of “practices of freedom,” allowing one to describe West’s philosophical project in strict Foucauldian terms

Prophetic pragmatism and radical orthodoxy seek to overcome the limitations of traditional philosophy by means of religious practices. This essay compares and contrasts the two positions by discussing the importance of religious practices in "making sense" of the world and the lives of those who perform such practices. By taking advantage of and overcoming the postmodern age, both traditions free religion from the auspices of philosophy. However, certain theological limitations make radical orthodoxy more difficult to implement than prophetic pragmatism, which is not only free of such limitations, but can also account for the radical orthodox position

I begin by expressing thanks to Paul Rabinow. As a Foucault scholar, I am personally indebted to him for that wonderful book he wrote with Hubert Dreyfus, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structrualism and Hermeneutics, which served as my introduction to the Foucauldian philosophical enterprise. I am honored to respond to his Coss lecture on the philosophical methods of Foucault and Dewey that shape his work in philosophy and anthropology.I begin by quoting two lengthy yet revealing passages—one from Foucault's "Life: Experience and Science" and the other from Dewey's "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy"—that will set the stage for this discussion:Phenomenology expected "lived experience" to supply the originary meaning ..

Perhaps one innovation brought about by Spanish philosophy is the notion that “God”names a problem instead of an entity. This is what Xavier Zubiri means when he uses thephrase “the problem of God.” Although he does not employ the Zubirian phrase, Miguel deUnamuno also addresses God as a problem. This paper compares Zubiri’s and Unamuno’saccounts of how God appears to human beings polemically. For both thinkers, God is aproblem only for human beings; there is something about the structure of human existencethat makes God come to mind. For Zubiri, God comes to mind because human beings findthemselves implanted into reality. For Unamuno, God comes to mind because human beings understand their own mortality and seek to overcome it. After presenting their respective views on the structures of human beings that account for the problem of God, the philosophical implications of such a view are explored. If we take Zubiri and Unamuno to becorrect about “the very problem of the problem of God,” true theism would not be evidentialist . Also, true atheism would be impossible, for even if the entity called“God” does not in fact exist, “God” as a problem does.Quizás una innovación provocada por filosofía española es la noción de que “Dios” refiere a un problema en vez de una entidad. Esto es lo que Xavier Zubiri quiere decir al usarla frase “el problema de Dios”. Aunque él no emplea la frase zubiriana, Miguel de Unamuno también se dirige a Dios como un problema. Este ensayo compara el pensamiento deZubiri y de Unamuno en torno a cómo Dios aparece polémicamente a los seres humanos.Para ambos pensadores, Dios es sólo un problema para los seres humanos; hay algo sobrela estructura de existencia humana que hace que Dios venga a la mente. Para Zubiri, Diosviene a la mente porque los seres humanos se encuentran implantado en realidad. ParaUnamuno, Dios viene a la mente porque los seres humanos entienden su propia mortalidady buscan superarlo. Después de presentar sus vistas respectivas de las estructuras humanas que explican el problema de Dios, se exploran las implicaciones filosóficas de tales vistas. Si supongamos que Zubiri y Unamuno sean correctos sobre “el problema mismo delproblema de Dios,” el verdadero teísmo no sería evidentialista . También, el verdadero ateísmo sería imposible, ya que aun cuando la entidad llamó que“Dios” no exista de hecho, “Dios” como un problema sí existe