•  705
    The Story About Propositions
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Noûs 46 (4): 635-674. 2012.
    It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent lin…Read more
  •  587
    From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth‐Theoretic Fictionalism
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1): 93-118. 2014.
    We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.
  •  340
    Truthmakers, paradox and plausibility
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Analysis 70 (1): 11-23. 2010.
    In a series of articles, Dan Lopez De Sa and Elia Zardini argue that several theorists have recently employed instances of paradoxical reasoning, while failing to see its problematic nature because it does not immediately (or obviously) yield inconsistency. In contrast, Lopez De Sa and Zardini claim that resultant inconsistency is not a necessary condition for paradoxicality. It is our contention that, even given their broader understanding of paradox, their arguments fail to undermine the insta…Read more
  •  300
  •  256
    Sellars and Pretense on "Truth & 'Correspondence'"
    Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (21): 33-63. 2012.
    In this paper, we show how an internal tension in Wilfrid Sellars’s understanding of truth, as well as an external tension in his account of meaning attribution, can be resolved while adhering to a Sellarsian spirit, by appealing to the particular fictionalist accounts of truth-talk and proposition-talk that we have developed elsewhere
  •  233
    Semantic pathology and the open pair (review)
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3). 2005.
    In Vagueness and Contradiction (2001), Roy Sorensen defends and extends his epistemic account of vagueness. In the process, he appeals to connections between vagueness and semantic paradox. These appeals come mainly in Chapter 11, where Sorensen offers a solution to what he calls the no-no paradox—a “neglected cousin” of the more famous liar—and attempts to use this solution as a precedent for an epistemic account of the sorites paradox. This strategy is problematic for Sorensen’s project, ho…Read more
  •  195
    Semantic defectiveness and the liar
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Philosophical Studies 164 (3): 845-863. 2013.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
  •  183
    Deflationism (About Theories of Truth)
    Philosophy Compass 7 (4): 267-277. 2012.
    In this article, I provide a general account of deflationism. After doing so, I turn to truth-defla- tionism, where, after first describing some of the species, I highlight some challenges for those who wish to adopt it
  •  159
    The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    with Graham Priest and Jc Beall
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced…Read more
  •  140
    No consistent way with paradox
    Analysis 72 (1): 66-75. 2012.
    In ‘A Consistent Way with Paradox’, Laurence Goldstein (2009) clarifies his solution to the liar, which he touts as revenge immune . In addition, he (Ibid.) responds to one of the objections that Armour-Garb and Woodbridge (2006) raise against certain solutions to the open pair and argues that his proffered solution to the liar family of paradoxes undermines what they (Ibid.) call the dialetheic conjecture . In this paper, after critically evaluating Goldstein’s response to A-G&W, I turn to his …Read more
  •  133
    Contextualism without pragmatic encroachment
    Analysis 71 (4): 667-676. 2011.
    In ‘Withdrawal and contextualism’, Jonathan Adler (2006) provides an argument which, if successful, undermines what contextualists take to be prime support for their view. Given the popularity of contextualist (and related) positions in epistemology, together with the fact that, thus far, no one has challenged Adler's argument, a critical assessment therefore presses. In this article, after briefly reviewing Adler's argument, I show that it fails. My reason for taking his argument to fail will t…Read more
  •  132
    Dialetheism, semantic pathology, and the open pair
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3). 2006.
    Over the past 25 years, Graham Priest has ably presented and defended dialetheism, the view that certain sentences are properly characterized as true with true negations. Our goal here is neither to quibble with the tenability of true, assertable contradictions nor, really, with the arguments for dialetheism. Rather, we wish to address the dialetheist's treatment of cases of semantic pathology and to pose a worry for dialetheism that has not been adequately considered. The problem that we presen…Read more
  •  129
    Understanding and Mathematical Fictionalism
    Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3): 335-344. 2011.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Mark Balaguer develops and defends a new version of mathematical fictionalism, what he calls ‘Hermeneutic non-assertivism’, and responds to some recent objections to mathematical fictionalism that were launched by John Burgess and others. In this paper I provide some fairly compelling reasons for rejecting Hermeneutic non-assertivism — ones that highlight an important feature of what understanding mathematics involves (or, as we shall see, does not involve)
  •  117
    New problems for modal fictionalism
    Philosophical Studies 172 (5): 1201-1219. 2015.
    In this paper, after clarifying certain features of Gideon Rosen’s Modal Fictionalism, I raise two problems for that view and argue that these problems strongly suggest that advocates of a “Deflationist Strategy” ought not to endorse, or adopt Rosen-style Modal Fictionalism
  •  116
    The pathology of validity
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Synthese 160 (1): 63-74. 2008.
    Stephen Read has presented an argument for the inconsistency of the concept of validity. We extend Read's results and show that this inconsistency is but one half of a larger problem. Like the concept of truth, validity is infected with what we call "semantic pathology," a condition that actually gives rise to two symptoms: inconsistency and indeterminacy. After sketching the basic ideas behind semantic pathology and explaining how it manifests both symptoms in the concept of truth, we present c…Read more
  •  115
    Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth
    Philosophy Compass 7 (4): 256-266. 2012.
    In this paper, I address some of the chief challenges, or problems, for Deflationary Theories of Truth, viz., the Generalization Problem, the Conservativeness Argument, and the Success Argument
  •  113
    Analetheism: A pyrrhic victory
    with Graham Priest
    Analysis 65 (2). 2005.
  •  113
    In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflict…Read more
  •  89
    Minimalism and the dialetheic challenge
    with Jc Beall
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3). 2003.
    Minimalists, following Horwich, claim that all that can be said about truth is comprised by all and only the nonparadoxical instances of (E) p is true iff p. It is, accordingly, standard in the literature on truth and paradox to ask how the minimalist will restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences (alternatively: propositions). In this paper, we consider a prior question: On what grounds does the minimalist restrict (E) so as to rule out paradox-inducing sentences and, thereby, a…Read more
  •  82
    Deflationary Truth (edited book)
    Open Court Press. 2005.
    This book is a collection of important writings on deflationism, with a detailed introduction and an exhaustive annotated bibliography. Among philosophers concerned with the theory of truth, deflationist positions have quickly gained ground and have become the most popular. Yet heretofore there has been no single book to which the readers can go for a detailed, overall view of the entire phenomenon of deflationism. This is the only available map of the whole terrain of deflationism. Deflationism…Read more
  •  81
    A Minimalist Theory of Truth
    Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2): 53-57. 2013.
    This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some …Read more
  •  78
    Can deflationists be dialetheists?
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6): 593-608. 2001.
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for…Read more
  •  74
    Wrestling with (and without) dialetheism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1). 2005.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  73
    Deflationism and Paradox (edited book)
    with Jc Beall
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of langua…Read more
  •  68
    Alethic fictionalism, alethic nihilism, and the Liar Paradox
    with James A. Woodbridge
    Philosophical Studies 174 (12): 3083-3096. 2017.
    Recently, several philosophers have proposed fictionalist accounts of truth-talk, as a means for resolving the semantic pathology that the Liar Paradox appears to present. These alethic fictionalists aim to vindicate truth-talk as a kind of as if discourse, while rejecting that the talk attributes any real property of truth. Liggins has recently critically assessed one such proposal, Beall’s constructive methodological deflationist, offering objections to Beall’s proposed alethic fictionalism th…Read more
  •  65
    Spandrels of Truth * By JC BEALL
    with L. Goldstein
    Analysis 70 (3): 586-589. 2010.
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  64
    Further remarks on truth and contradiction
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207): 217-225. 2002.
    We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence-theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to resolve, two further challenges for dialetheism whi…Read more