
410Deference Done BetterPhilosophical Perspectives 35 (1): 99150. 2021.There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“NewReflection”style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an antiexpert. We propose a middle way: deferring…Read more

44A Problem for Confirmation Measure ZPhilosophy of Science 88 (4): 726730. 2021.In this article, I present a serious problem for confirmation measure Z.

169Models and Reality—A Review of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the Social ContractPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 237. 1999.Human beings are peculiar. In laboratory experiments, they often cooperate in oneshot prisoners’ dilemmas, they frequently offer 1/2 and reject low offers in the ultimatum game, and they often bid 1/2 in the game of dividethecake All these behaviors are puzzling from the point of view of game theory. The first two are irrational, if utility is measured in a certain way.1 The last isn’t positively irrational, but it is no more rational than other possible actions, since there are infinitely ma…Read more

510Four Approaches to SuppositionErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. The introduction of either type of supposition initiates judgments that may be either qualitative, binary judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or quantitative, numerical ones about how acceptable it is. As such, accounts of qualitative/quantitative judgment under indicative/subjunctive supposition have been developed in the literature. We explore these four different types of theories by systematica…Read more

140Two Approaches to Belief RevisionErkenntnis 84 (3): 487518. 2019.In this paper, we compare and contrast two methods for the revision of qualitative beliefs. The first method is generated by a simplistic diachronic Lockean thesis requiring coherence with the agent’s posterior credences after conditionalization. The second method is the orthodox AGM approach to belief revision. Our primary aim is to determine when the two methods may disagree in their recommendations and when they must agree. We establish a number of novel results about their relative behavior.…Read more

23Confirmation, causation, and Simpson's paradoxEpisteme 14 (3): 297309. 2017.ABSTRACTIn this paper, I review some recent treatments of Simpson's Paradox, and I propose a new rationalizing explanation of its paradoxicality.

IntroductionIn Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. 2019.

255How Not to Detect DesignThe Design Inference. William A. DembskiPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 472488. 1999.As every philosopher knows, “the design argument” concludes that God exists from premisses that cite the adaptive complexity of organisms or the lawfulness and orderliness of the whole universe. Since 1859, it has formed the intellectual heart of creationist opposition to the Darwinian hypothesis that organisms evolved their adaptive features by the mindless process of natural selection. Although the design argument developed as a defense of theism, the logic of the argument in fact encompasses …Read more

75Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacyThinking and Reasoning 14 (2): 182199. 2008.The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt of providing a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here, we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides et al., 2001) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgments experimentally observed are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of…Read more

231Logical Foundations of Evidential SupportPhilosophy of Science 73 (5): 500512. 2006.Carnap's inductive logic (or confirmation) project is revisited from an "increase in firmness" (or probabilistic relevance) point of view. It is argued that Carnap's main desiderata can be satisfied in this setting, without the need for a theory of "logical probability." The emphasis here will be on explaining how Carnap's epistemological desiderata for inductive logic will need to be modified in this new setting. The key move is to abandon Carnap's goal of bridging confirmation and credence, in…Read more

34detail a question that, for a quarter of a century, remained open despite intense study by various researchers. Is the formula XC B = e(x e(e(e( ) e( )) z)) a single axiom for the classical equivalential calculus when the rules of inference consist..

146Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3): 666672. 2011.This (brief) note is about the (evidential) “favoring” relation. Pretheoretically, favoring is a threeplace (epistemic) relation, between an evidential proposition E and two hypotheses H1 and H2. Favoring relations are expressed via locutions of the form: E favors H1 over H2. Strictly speaking, favoring should really be thought of as a fourplace relation, between E, H1, H2, and a corpus of background evidence K. But, for present purposes (which won't address issues involving K), I will suppre…Read more

43• Several recent Bayesian discussions make use of “approximation” – Earman on the Quantitative Old Evidence Problem – Vranas on Quantitative Approaches to the Ravens Paradox – Dorling’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – Strevens’s Quantitative Approach to Duhem–Quine – rThere are also examples not involving conﬁrmation: E.g.

81This talk is (mainly) about the relationship two types of epistemic norms: accuracy norms and coherence norms. A simple example that everyone will be familiar with

31Certain distributivity results for Lukasiewicz’s inﬁnitevalued logic Lℵ0 are proved axiomatically (for the ﬁrst time) with the help of the automated reasoning program Otter [16]. In addition, non distributivity results are established for a wide variety of positive substructural logics by the use of logical matrices discovered with the automated model ﬁndingprograms Mace [15] and MaGIC [25].

46Let Ln be a sentential language with n atomic sentences {A1, . . . , An}. Let Sn = {s1, . . . , s2n} be the set of 2n state descriptions of Ln, in the following, canonical lexicographical truthtable order: State Description A1 A2 · · · An−1 An T T T T T s1 = A1 & A2 & · · · &An−1 & An T T T T F s1 = A1 & A2 & · · · &An−1 & ¬An T T T F T s3 = A1 & A2 & · · · & ¬An−1 & An T T T F F s4 = A1 & A2 & · · · & ¬An−1 & ¬An..

15Review of Richard Swinburne (ed.), Bayes's Theorem (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.

88Comments and Criticism: Measuring Confirmation and EvidenceJournal of Philosophy 97 (12): 663672. 2000.Bayesian epistemology suggests various ways of measuring the support that a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. Such measures are defined in terms of a subjective probability assignment, pr, over propositions entertained by an agent. The most standard measure (where “H” stands for “hypothesis” and “E” stands for “evidence”) is: the difference measure: d(H,E) = pr(H/E)  pr(H).0 This may be called a “positive (probabilistic) relevance measure” of confirmation, since, according to it, a piece…Read more

103Contrastive BayesianismIn Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives, Routledge. 2012.Bayesianism provides a rich theoretical framework, which lends itself rather naturally to the explication of various “contrastive” and “noncontrastive” concepts. In this (brief) discussion, I will focus on issues involving “contrastivism”, as they arise in some of the recent philosophy of science, epistemology, and cognitive science literature surrounding Bayesian confirmation theory

76∗ C pp, qq as a “mutual confirmation” generalization of pp & qq Prpe hq won’t work Prpp & qq won’t work ∗ C pp, qq, so understood, is not Prpp & qq or Prpq  pq, etc.

30With the inclusion of an e ective methodology, this article answers in detail a question that, for a quarter of a century, remained open despite intense study by various researchers. Is the formula XCB = e(x e(e(e(x y) e(z y)) z)) a single axiom for the classical equivalential calculus when the rules of inference consist of detachment (modus ponens) and substitution? Where the function e represents equivalence, this calculus can be axiomatized quite naturally with the formulas (x x), e(e(x y) e(…Read more

32The principle that every truth is possibly necessary can now be shown to entail that every truth is necessary by a chain of elementary inferences in a perspicuous notation unavailable to Hegel. —Williamson [5, p.

170Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmationSynthese 156 (3): 473489. 2007.Likelihoodists and Bayesians seem to have a fundamental disagreement about the proper probabilistic explication of relational (or contrastive) conceptions of evidential support (or confirmation). In this paper, I will survey some recent arguments and results in this area, with an eye toward pinpointing the nexus of the dispute. This will lead, first, to an important shift in the way the debate has been couched, and, second, to an alternative explication of relational support, which is in some se…Read more

179The plurality of bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivityPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 378. 1999.Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of nonequivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed an…Read more

352Goodman’s “New Riddle‘Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6): 613643. 2008.First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed. Specifically, the anal…Read more
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