•  625
    Kelsen, Hart, and Legal Normativity
    Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 34 25-42. 2018.
    This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative way. In this Kelse…Read more
  •  239
    H. L. A. Hart and the "open texture" of language
    Law and Philosophy 10 (1). 1991.
    H. L. A. Hart and the "Open Texture" of Language tries to clarify the writings of both Hart and Friedrich Waismann on "open texture". In Waismann's work, "open texture" referred to the potential vagueness of words under extreme (hypothetical) circumstances. Hart's use of the term was quite different, and his work has been misunderstood because those differences were underestimated. Hart should not be read as basing his argument for judicial discretion on the nature of language; primarily, he was…Read more
  •  213
    Legal positivism and 'explaining' normativity and authority
    American Philosophical Association Newsletter 5 (2 (Spring 2006)): 5-9. 2006.
    It has become increasingly common for legal positivist theorists to claim that the primary objective of legal theory in general, and legal positivism in particular, is "explaining normativity." The phrase "explaining normativity" can be understood either ambitiously or more modestly. The more modest meaning is an analytical exploration of what is meant by legal or moral obligation, or by the authority claims of legal officials. When the term is understood ambitiously - as meaning an explanation …Read more
  •  183
    On the Nature of Legal Normativity, 37 Revus 83-91 (2019)
    Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law / Revija Za Ustavno Teorijo in Filozofijo Prava 37 83-91. 2019.
    In this response to eight commentaries on my article “Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity” I clarify some points in my original analysis and agree with some comments regarding work that still needs to be done. In particular, I attempt to distinguish my position from both Berkeleyan idealism and mere subjective perception. I agree with the commentators who urge that more must be done to analyze the nature of normativity in general, and legal normativity in particular.
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  •  101
    This article is based on a Lecture given as part of the Franklin J. Matchette Foundation Lecture Series on Truth at the Catholic University of America, School of Philosophy, in 2002. It explores what theorists in the natural law tradition and modern legal theorists have argued about what makes propositions of morality and law true, focusing on the rubric of "reason" as opposed to "will." It seems probable, and perhaps inevitable, that theorists about the nature of truth in morality must choose b…Read more
  •  99
    Legal positivism
    In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blackwell. 2004.
    This chapter contains section titled: History and Context Clarifications Alternative Legal Positivisms The Rule of Recognition and the Basic Norm The Divisions Within Contemporary Legal Positivism Debates and Distinctive Views Critiques of Legal Positivism Two Critics: Ronald Dworkin and John Finnis Methodological Questions and the Way Forward Conclusion Note References Further Reading.
  •  98
    Jurisprudence: Theory and Context
    Westview Press. 1996.
    This introduction to legal theory provides a broad overview of the main topics and theories and covers the central issues. Written in a straightforward style, the author conveys academically challenging and often controversial ideas in a lucid manner.
  •  94
    A number of important legal theorists have recently argued for metaphysically realist approaches to legal determinacy grounded in particular semantic theories or theories of reference, in particular, views of meaning and reference based on the works of Putnam and Kripke. The basic position of these theorists is that questions of legal interpretation and legal determinacy should be approached through semantic meaning. However, the role of authority (in the form of lawmaker choice) in law in gener…Read more
  •  82
    Law and Language: How Words Mislead Us
    Jurisprudence 1 (1): 25-38. 2010.
    Our world is full of fictional devices that let people feel better about their situation - through deception and self-deception. The legal realist, Felix Cohen, argued that law and legal reasoning is full of similarly dubious labels and bad reasoning, though of a special kind. He argued that judges, lawyers and legal commentators allow linguistic inventions and conventions to distort their thinking. Like the ancient peoples who built idols out of stone and wood and then asked them for assistance…Read more
  •  80
    Analyzing law: new essays in legal theory (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1998.
    Analyzing Law offers an important selection of the most influential and challenging work now being done in legal theory. A central focus of the essays in this work is the contribution of the well-known philosopher Jules Coleman to the various topics which are covered by the contributors.
  •  79
    Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence
    Legal Theory 1 (4): 465-479. 1995.
    Conceptual analysis is an integral part of legal theory, but the nature and purpose of such inquiries are often not clearly stated. In this article, I attempt to elaborate upon some of the differing reasons for conceptual analysis and what consequences may follow from choosing one objective rather than another. By showing that divergent purposes are often present in competing analyses of the same concept, I also hope to indicate why some “debates” in the jurisprudential literature are best under…Read more
  •  79
    There is an ongoing debate in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature regarding the nature and possibility of Contract theory. On one hand are those who argue (or assume) that there is, or should be, a single, general, universal theory of Contract Law, one applicable to all jurisdictions and all times. On the other hand are those who assert that Contract theory should be localized to particular times and places, perhaps even with different theories for different types of agreements. Thi…Read more
  •  78
    Contracts
    In Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer (eds.), The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice, Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Consent, in terms of voluntary choice, is - or, at least, appears to be or purports to be - at the essence of contract law. Contract law, both in principle and in practice, is about allowing parties to enter arrangements on terms they choose - each party imposing obligations on itself in return for obligations another party has placed upon itself. This freedom of contract- an ideal by which there are obligations to the extent, but only to the extent, freely chosen by the parties - is contrasted …Read more
  •  61
    A Dictionary of Legal Theory
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Modern legal theory contains a wide range of approaches and topics: from economic analysis of law to feminist legal theory to traditional analytical legal philosophy to a range of theories about justice. This healthy variety of jurisprudential work has created a problem: students and theorists working in one tradition may have difficulty understanding the concepts and terminology of a different tradition. This book works to make terminology and ways of thinking accessible. This dictionary covers…Read more
  •  60
    On philosophy in american law : Analytical legal philosophy
    In Francis J. Mootz & William S. Boyd (eds.), On Philosophy in American Law, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
    This short article was written for a collection on American legal philosophy today. It gives a brief overview of analytical legal philosophy, and speculates on why this theoretical approach has been consistently misunderstood in the United States, from the time of the legal realists until today.
  •  55
    Philosophy of law (edited book)
    Routledge. 2006.
    The first two volumes of the collection are devoted primarily to analytical legal theory--in particular, theories about the nature of law. This is the idea of legal philosophy most familiar to jurisprudential students in the English-speaking world, and many of the civil-law countries. The last two volumes sample schools and theorists who mostly come from outside the analytical tradition, and who are, in one sense or another, critical theorists--theorists more interested in offering systematic cr…Read more
  •  53
    Legal philosophy in America
    In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    This article, written for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, offers an overview of the most important American contributions to legal philosophy - American legal realism, law and economics, various critical schools of jurisprudence, Lon Fuller, and Ronald Dworkin - while speculating on what might be distinctive of American legal philosophy. One obvious recurring theme is a focus on practical application in general, and adjudication (especially constitutional adjudication) in…Read more
  •  50
    Raz on necessity
    Law and Philosophy 22 (6). 2003.
  •  38
    John Austin
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
  •  30
    Teoría del Derecho: tipos y propósitos
    Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 25 57-68. 2006.
  •  28
    Legal interpretation and truth
    Jurisprudence 13 (1): 107-112. 2022.
    Pierluigi Chiassoni’s wonderful book, Interpretation without Truth,1 is an important and welcome addition to the ongoing conversations about interpretation, legal realism, and legal truth. Chiasson...
  •  27
    Family Law: Values Beyond Choice and Autonomy?
    Law and Philosophy 40 (2): 163-183. 2020.
  •  25
    Global Error and Legal Truth
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (3): 535-547. 2009.
    One standard criterion for there being objectivity in an area of discourse is that there is conceptual space between what someone thinks to be the case and what actually is the case. That is, participants can be mistaken. This article explores one aspect of the objectivity debate as regards law: does it make sense to say that all legal officials or practitioners in a jurisdiction are mistaken (over a significant period of time) about some legal proposition? The possibility of legal error is impo…Read more