•  15
    Lockeans against labor mixing
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (3): 251-272. 2021.
    The idea that labor mixing confers property in unowned resources is, for many, the very heart of the Lockean system of property. In this essay I shall argue that this common view is mistaken. Locke...
  •  6
    Secret Government: The Pathologies of Publicity
    Cambridge University Press. 2021.
    Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a com…Read more
  •  13
    Secrecy and transparency in political philosophy
    Philosophy Compass 16 (4). 2021.
    Philosophy Compass, EarlyView.
  •  13
    Kant, Rawls, and the Possibility of Autonomy
    Social Theory and Practice 45 (4): 613-635. 2019.
    One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s notion of autonomy, the model of the well-ordered society pr…Read more
  •  4
    Rawlsian originalism
    with Alexander William Salter
    Jurisprudence 10 (3): 334-353. 2019.
    ABSTRACTHow should judges reason in a well-ordered constitutional democracy? According to John Rawls’s famous remarks in Political Liberalism, they ought to do so in accordance with the idea of pub...
  •  25
    The supreme court as the Fountain of public reason
    Legal Theory 24 (4): 345-369. 2018.
    ABSTRACTThe idea of public reason requires that citizens in their public deliberation employ considerations stemming from a shared conception of justice. One worry is that public reason's content will be incomplete, in that it does not contain sufficient material for adequate public debate. Rawls has a way of expanding the content of public reason to address such concerns—by including in public reason all those things you and I say in our justification of the conception of justice. After arguing…Read more
  •  229
    Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3): 371-389. 2018.
    In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting—we communicate a desire …Read more
  •  40
    Public reason liberalism takes as its starting point the deep and irreconcilable diversity we find characterizing liberal societies. This deep and irreconcilable diversity creates problems for social order. One method for adjudicating these conflicts is through the use of rights. This paper is about the ability of such rights to adjudicate disputes when perspectival disagreements—or disagreements over how to categorize objects in the world—obtain. We present both formal possibility and impossibi…Read more
  •  25
    Aggregating out of indeterminacy: Social choice theory to the rescue
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (2): 210-232. 2017.
    This article explores public reason liberalism’s indeterminacy problem, a problem that obtains when we admit significant diversity into our justificatory model. The article argues first that Gerald Gaus’s solution to the indeterminacy problem is unsatisfactory and second that, contra Gaus’s concerns, social choice theory is able to solve public reason’s indeterminacy problem. Moreover, social choice theory can do so in a way that avoids the worries raised against Gaus’s solution to the indetermi…Read more
  •  43
    Justice, Diversity, and the Well-Ordered Society
    Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269): 663-684. 2017.
    One unchanging feature of John Rawls’ thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. Yet, once we introduce justice pluralism—the fact that reasonable people disagree about the nature and requirements of justice, something Rawls eventually admits is inevitable in liberal societies—then a well-ordered society as Rawls defines it is impossible. This requires we develop new models of society to replace the well-ordered society in order to adequately address such disagreements. To do so, …Read more
  •  11
    A reality check for the ideal society
    The Philosophers' Magazine 69 51-57. 2015.
  •  66
    The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (4): 211-222. 2015.
    In “The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism” Braham and van Hees prove that four conditions on rights—completeness, conclusiveness, non-imposition, and symmetry—cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If Braham and van Hees’s proof is to have any relevance, at least some prominent libertarians must endorse their four conditions, and libertarianism as a philosophical position must in some way be committed to all the axioms. In this paper we demonstrate the irrelevance of Braham and van Hees’s proof …Read more
  •  18
    What we choose, what we prefer
    Synthese 195 (7): 3221-3240. 2018.
    This paper develops an account of what it is that rational agents choose and what it is that rational agents prefer. There are three desiderata to satisfy when offering such an account. First, the account should maintain canonical axioms of rational choice theory as intuitively plausible. Here I focus on contraction and expansion consistency properties. Second, the account should prevent canonical axioms of rational choice theory from becoming trivial—it should be possible to actually violate th…Read more