•  39
    I argue that the account of the epistemic modalities developed by Kripke and Putnam is incomplete since it does not make use of the possible worlds machinery that is indispensable to their analysis of the metaphysical modalities. It would have been simpler and more elegant if they had used the concept of 'possible world' to explain both modalities. Instead, they provide an explication of the epistemic modalities in terms of the vague concepts of conceivability and revisability. I show that logic…Read more
  •  36
    Every university student has his or her nemesis. Biology and social science students anticipate with great apprehension their required statistics course, while many philosophy students live in fear of formal logic. Math anxiety is the common thread uniting all of them. This article argues that since formal logic is an algebra requiring similar kinds of symbol-manipulation skills needed to succeed in a basic mathematics course, then if logic students have math anxiety, this can impede their progr…Read more
  •  35
    Three Misrepresentations of Logic
    Informal Logic 19 (2). 1999.
    Three misrepresentations of informal and formal logic by two feminist writers are discussed. Andrea Nye's criticism that the semantics for formal logic abstracts from context is a misrepresentation of formal logic because Nye ignores the development of intensional logics. Second, Nye's criticism that informaIlogicians ignore the origins of arguments is a misrepresentation of fallacy theory. Prominent writers in the field specifiy numerous cases where the origins of an argument are relevant to it…Read more
  •  23
    Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief
    Journal of Philosophical Research 25 125-140. 2000.
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of being an …Read more
  •  23
    The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen. A complete normative theory of argumentation should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-mindedness are worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that can account for why argumentative vir…Read more
  •  15
    Is it possible that belief isn't necessary?
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (1): 12-28. 1992.
  •  4
    Much attention has been paid in the literature to the deleterious effects of errors in diagnostic reasoning due to underlying cognitive biases. This is an important topic since people’s lives and well-being are at stake. Empirical studies cited by Chapman et al. corroborate the view that gender, racial, or age biases exist in a significant number of clinicians, thereby limiting objective diagnosis. Croskerry endorses a so-called metacognitive approach to achieve de-biasing in clinicians, a key c…Read more
  •  3
    This paper argues that deep disagreements stem from conflicting worldviews. In particular, I examine how recent moves in engineering education contribute to deep disagreement by inculcating stu-dents into valuing the environment as a key stakeholder in engineering design. However, some graduates who value the environment meet resistance from employers who hold a more traditional engineering worldview, which regards the environment as an externality. Clashing worldviews can, as Robert Fogelin pos…Read more
  •  2
    Egocentric Omniscience and Self-Ascriptive Belief
    Journal of Philosophical Research 25 125-140. 2000.
    David Lewis’s property-centered account of belief falls prey to the problem of egocentric omniscience: In self-ascribing the property of being an eye doctor, an agent is thereby self-ascribing the property of being an oculist. It is argued that the problem of egocentric omniscience can be made palatable for Lewis’s property-centered account of belief, at least for the case of linguistic beliefs. Roughly, my solution is as follows: An agent can believe that he or she has the property of being an …Read more