134In Defense of an End-Relational Account of GoodnessDissertation, University of California, Davis. 2014.What is it exactly that we are attributing to a thing when we judge it to be good? According to the orthodox answer, at least in some cases when we judge that something is good we are attributing to it a monadic property. That is, good things are “just plain good.” I reject the orthodox view. In arguing against it, I begin with the idea that a plausible account of goodness must take seriously the intuitive claim that there is something in common between moral and non-moral goodness—something i…Read more
1Review: Joseph Mendola, Human Interests; or, Ethics for Physicalists (review)Ethics 126 (2): 517-521. 2016.
Eastern Michigan UniversityDepartment of History & PhilosophyLecturer
University of California, Davis
Department of Philosophy
Ypsilanti, Michigan, United States of America